Sunday, October 11, 2009



I have received through a common friend the following comments on my articles on the terrorist attack on the Pakistan Army GHQ on October 10,2009, from a very distinguished retired senior officer of the Indian Army:
1.Though I would call this a suicide attack there are some interesting aspects to be taken note of.
2.Firstly the target was Army HQ. HQ are usually weak spots.
3.Death of a Brigadier and other officers is surprising. It shows they just rushed to the gates non tactically. Pakistani officers are not known for their professionalism. Unfortunately similar to Police officers’ deaths at Mumbai.
4.Total Number of terrorists seems to be minimum 8 since four died at Gate 1, and at least 4 must have gone through Gate 2 to hold large number of hostages.
5.How did they know personnel of one gate would go to the other? Must have been insiders or had observed the drills well. Or some insider told them of this drill. Shows reserves were not held on the premises.
6.All guards at the GHQ were unprofessional. These could not be of the SSG. SSG must have been called later and these too took so much time to eliminate the terrorists.
7.Why were SSG called in and not normal infantry? Shows professional standard of the military and the SSG.
8.Interesting that a maximum of four terrorists could hold at least 40 hostages. How could a max of four terrorists hold 40 hostages for so long? The hostages did nothing throughout last night!!
9.HQ of Pakistan’s elite 10 Corps and its Corps reserve brigade (111?) are located at Rawalpindi besides troops of other arms and services.
10.Most demands were anti Army operations and against Pervez Musharraf, who is a non entity now.
11.Why did the Taliban waste at least 8 suicide terrorists just to send this message? Could have been done with much less. Do they have plenty of suicide terrorists? Are there mature leaders planning strategies for them? Seems the aim was to tarnish image of the Army. Why?by Who?
12.There is nothing new about their state of training or modus operandi. Attacks at Kalu Chak, Sanjuwan and Akhnur in 2002 – 2003 as well as the attack on the Parliament followed similar tactics. They wore Khaki uniforms and shot their way in killing guards at the perimeter.