INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.510
B.RAMAN
The commando-style suicidal raid by a group of unidentified terrorists into the heavily-guarded Police Academy at Manawan in the Lahore area on March 30, 2009, should be of concern to India and the rest of the international community for two reasons. Twenty police personnel are reported to have been killed in the raid into the police academy and its occupation by a group of 10 to 12 terrorists. The occupation lasted seven hours before the para-military forces intervened and terminated it. According to the Pakistani authorities, four terrorists died and six have been captured.
2. The first reason is the renewed use by the Pakistan-based terrorists of the old modus operandi of commando style swarm attacks with hand-held weapons. The first of these attacks was seen in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, the second in Kabul on February 11,2009,and the third on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore on March 3,2009. The fourth has now been seen in the Lahore area at Manawan, about 12 kms from the Indian border in the Wagah sector. While the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan was found to have been responsible for the Mumbai attack, the Afghan and Pakistani authorities have not been able to establish the identity of the organisation or organisations behind the Kabul and the March 3 Lahore attacks. Rehman Malik, the Pakistani Internal Security Adviser, has voiced the suspicion that the Pakistani Taliban must have been responsible for the Manawan attack. Although the Pakistani authorities claim to have arrested six of those involved in the Manawan attack, they have not yet been able to establish their identity.
3. The second reason for concern arises from the possibility that if it was so easy for a group of 10 to 12 terrorists wearing police uniforms and wielding assault rifles to raid and occupy for seven hours a heavily-guarded establishment like the Police Academy in the Lahore area, it should be equally easy for a similar group to raid and occupy a Pakistani nuclear establishment. The terrorists have repeatedly seen in Kabul and Lahore how easy it is to surprise and overwhem at least temporarily the security personnel guarding the buildings targeted by them. More such incidents involving a similar MO are to be apprehended. We in India cannot remain complacent thinking wishfully that what happened in Lahore cannot happen in India. It can--- and it did in Mumbai.
4. However, it must be said to the credit of the Indian security forces that commando-style attacks with hand-held weapons on hard, heavily-guarded targets have invariably been beaten back by the security forces guarding them. One could cite as examples the unsuccessful terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament House in New Delhi in December,2001, on the Akshardam Temple in Ahmedabad in September,2002, and on the training centre of the Central Reserve Police Force in Rampur in Uttar Pradesh in January,2008. The terrorists succeeded temporarily in Mumbai because the buildings targeted by them were private establishments, which were soft targets with no protection of trained security forces.
5.The only similarity between the Mumbai attack and the Manawan attack is the resort by the terrorists to commando-style suicidal attacks. There are some differences. The first difference is that at Mumbai --- as subsequently in Kabul--- the terrorists attacked multiple targets, whereas in Lahore on March 3 and in Manawan on March 30, the terrorists attacked a single target. The second difference is that at Mumbai the terrorists attacked innocent civilians, including foreigners, in unprotected soft areas, but in Kabul and Manawan, the terrorists attacked heavily protected public servants---- the personnel of the jail department at Kabul and policemen and polifce cadets at Manawan. The Sri Lankan cricketeers, though civilians, were heavily protected. Despite this, the terrorists managed to attack them and get away.
6. It should be of great concern to the international community that none of the major terrorist strikes of the last two years in Pakistan have been successfully detected by the Pakistani intelligence and police though they claimed to have identified the suspects and arrested some of them. Among the major undetected cases are the unsuccessful attempt to kill Benazir Bhutto at Karachi on October 18,2007, her assassination at Rawalpindi on December 27,2007, the explosion in the Marriott Hotel of Islamabad in September,2008, and the March 3 attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team at Lahore.
7. Is this string of undetected major cases merely an indicator of police incompetence or , more ominously, is this also due to the complicity of elements from the Police and the military-intelligence establishment with the perpetrators of the attacks? (30-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, March 30, 2009
Sunday, March 29, 2009
BUSH WINE IN OBAMA BOTTLE
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.509
B.RAMAN
President Barack Obama's new comprehensive Af-Pak strategy unveiled on March 27,2009, to deal with a mix of cancerous problems might impress and enthuse the new Internet generation with which Obama feels comortable, but not Indian professionals in terrorism withtheir feet firmly on the ground in this region. These problems arise from the continuing old Islamic insurgency of the 1980s vintage inAfghanistan, the new post-Lal Masjid raid Islamic insurgency in Pakistan, the continuing jihadi terrorism with many faces--- anti- West, anti-Indian, anti-Afghan, anti-Israeli, anti-Russian, anti-Chinese, anti-infidels and anti-apostates -- from sanctuaries and breeding grounds in Pakistan and the continuing spread of radical ideas justifying the use of terrorism from the madrasas of Pakistan
2. Former President George Bush left for Obama a bleeding stalemate with no end in sight. As a descriptive analysis of the kind of situationin the Af-Pak region inherited by him from Bush, Obama's new strategic broth to which many cooks have contributed, has shown a clearunderstanding of the problems confronting him in this region. Bush and his advisers were not as articulate as Obama and his advisers areand not as word-smart, but they too had come to a similar conclusion though not in as smart a language. Their conclusion was: Pakistan isthe source of the plethora of problems faced in the region and unless and until that source is tackled effectively the bleeding will continue.
3. Obama and his advisers suffer from the same prescriptive deficiency as their predecessors. This deficiency arises from their tendency tomix facts with illusions. The facts were as clear to Bush and his advisers as they are now to Obama and his advisers. These are theexistence in the Pakistani territory of the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda, the Pashtun Taliban and the Punjabi Taliban organisations with theLashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) in the forefront and the role of the Pakistan Army and its Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI) in nursing them to serve what they perceive as Pakistan's strategic interests.
4. The prescriptive part of Obama's strategy is as full of illusions as the strategy of Bush was. There is a common root cause for the illusionsof the two Administrations. The root cause is their inability to understand that the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment hasconvinced itself that Pakistan, which had lost its strategic relevance in the immediate aftermath of the end of the cold war,has acquired anew strategic importance.This is thanks to the terrorists of various hues operating from its territory and its nuclear arsenal. The continuedexistence of these terrorists is in its interest.Action against terrorism when unavoidable, support for terrorism when possible. That is itspolicy.It has been using its nuclear arsenal not only in an attempt to intimidate India and deter it from retaliating for terrorist strikes in Indian territory, but also to deter the US and the rest of the West from exercising too much pressure on it to deal with the terroristsanctuaries in its territory.
5.Unless the mind of the Pakistani military and intelligence officers is disabused of this belief and they are made to co-operate with theinternational community in destroying the terrorist infrastructure in its territory, no strategy is going to work in ending jihadi terrorism bredin Pakistan. The major deficiency in the prescriptive analysis of Obama arises from his naive assumption that Pakistan can be made toco-operate more effectively against terrorism through a basket of incentives---- more military and economic assistance, more training, anemphasis on the continuing importance of Pakistan even after the war on terrorism is over etc.
6. Bush too hailed Pakistan as a frontline ally in the war against terrorism and provided it with various lollipops--- over US$ 10 billion inmilitary and economic aid since 9/11, dual-use weapons and equipment which could be used against the terrorists as well as against Indiaand a willingness to close the eyes to Pakistan's sins of commission and omission against India so long as it acted against terrorismdirected at the US. These lollipops failed to make the regime of Pervez Musharraf co-operate sincerely against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.These incentives could not prevent the Neo Taliban of Afghanistan from staging a spectacular come-back from sanctuaries in Pakistan andAl Qaeda and its associates from organising acts of terrorism in different parts of the world.
7. The lessons from the failure of the strategy of Bush were: Firstly, a policy based only on incentives will not work in the case of aninsincere state such as Pakistan. Secondly, a policy which makes a distinction between terrorism directed against the US and terrorismdirected against India and the rest of the world will be ineffectve. Thirdly, the fear of exercising too much pressure on Pakistan lest theState collapse and its nuclear arsenal fall into jihadi hands is exploited by Pakistan to prevent the ultimate success of the war againstterrorism.
8.One was hoping----on the basis of the statements by him during his election campaign--- that Obama would have factored these lessonsinto the formulation of his new strategy. Surprisingly, he has not. The same old policy of incentives and nothing but incentives is sought tobe pursued under the garb of a so-called new strategy. The only new feature is the emphasis on the benchmarks of implementation whichwill determine the continued availability of the incentives to Pakistan at every stage. The only disincentive with which Pakistan has beenconfronted is the risk of the incentives drying up if it is seen as dragging its feet in its co-operation in the fight against terrorism.
9. Obama's strategy ---like the one of his predecessor--- is marked by a fear of punishing Pakistan if it does not change its policy of usingterrorists to advance its own strategic agenda. The reluctance to punish Pakistan if it continues to be insincere in dealing with terrorismoriginating from its territory arises from the fear that too much pressure on Pakistan and a policy of punitive measures might push Pakistaninto the arms of the jihadis or might result in a collapse of the Pakistani State with unpredictable consequences.The US must rid itself ofthis fear and make it clear to Pakistan that, if the worst comes to the worst, the world is prepared to face the eventuality of a failedPakistan. A failed Pakistan may be a disaster for the people of Pakistan, but not necessarily for the rest of the world.
10. It is important to constitute a contact group to work out alternative strategies with incentives as well as disincentives, with rewards aswell as punishments. Such a contact group must be only of the victims of terrorism. A contact group, which seeks to bring together thevictims of terrorism as well as the perpetrator, will be a non-starter.
11. Obama's strategy has three components--- a counter-insurgency component for Afghanistan, a counter- terrorism component for use inPakistan and a counter-radicalisation component for use in the entire Af-Pak region. It is a mix of military and political measures. While themilitary measures will be largely implemented by the US and other NATO powers plus Australia, the regional role of countries such as India,China and Iran is sought to be restricted to the political component. They will have no say in the way the military measures areimplemented.
12. The US expectations that the international community will co-operate in implementing the unilaterally worked out US strategy can bebelied because the strategy offers no end in sight to the wave of terrorism of Pakistani origin faced by them. This is particularly true ofIndia. Even though the strategy projects Al Qaeda and its associates operating from sanctuaries in Pakistan as posing a threat to the worldas a whole, its objective is limited to preventing another 9/11 in US territory mounted from this region. It does not pay equal attention to theconcerns of India and other countries. The strategy is, therefore, unlikely to excite professionals in India. (30-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
President Barack Obama's new comprehensive Af-Pak strategy unveiled on March 27,2009, to deal with a mix of cancerous problems might impress and enthuse the new Internet generation with which Obama feels comortable, but not Indian professionals in terrorism withtheir feet firmly on the ground in this region. These problems arise from the continuing old Islamic insurgency of the 1980s vintage inAfghanistan, the new post-Lal Masjid raid Islamic insurgency in Pakistan, the continuing jihadi terrorism with many faces--- anti- West, anti-Indian, anti-Afghan, anti-Israeli, anti-Russian, anti-Chinese, anti-infidels and anti-apostates -- from sanctuaries and breeding grounds in Pakistan and the continuing spread of radical ideas justifying the use of terrorism from the madrasas of Pakistan
2. Former President George Bush left for Obama a bleeding stalemate with no end in sight. As a descriptive analysis of the kind of situationin the Af-Pak region inherited by him from Bush, Obama's new strategic broth to which many cooks have contributed, has shown a clearunderstanding of the problems confronting him in this region. Bush and his advisers were not as articulate as Obama and his advisers areand not as word-smart, but they too had come to a similar conclusion though not in as smart a language. Their conclusion was: Pakistan isthe source of the plethora of problems faced in the region and unless and until that source is tackled effectively the bleeding will continue.
3. Obama and his advisers suffer from the same prescriptive deficiency as their predecessors. This deficiency arises from their tendency tomix facts with illusions. The facts were as clear to Bush and his advisers as they are now to Obama and his advisers. These are theexistence in the Pakistani territory of the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda, the Pashtun Taliban and the Punjabi Taliban organisations with theLashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) in the forefront and the role of the Pakistan Army and its Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI) in nursing them to serve what they perceive as Pakistan's strategic interests.
4. The prescriptive part of Obama's strategy is as full of illusions as the strategy of Bush was. There is a common root cause for the illusionsof the two Administrations. The root cause is their inability to understand that the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment hasconvinced itself that Pakistan, which had lost its strategic relevance in the immediate aftermath of the end of the cold war,has acquired anew strategic importance.This is thanks to the terrorists of various hues operating from its territory and its nuclear arsenal. The continuedexistence of these terrorists is in its interest.Action against terrorism when unavoidable, support for terrorism when possible. That is itspolicy.It has been using its nuclear arsenal not only in an attempt to intimidate India and deter it from retaliating for terrorist strikes in Indian territory, but also to deter the US and the rest of the West from exercising too much pressure on it to deal with the terroristsanctuaries in its territory.
5.Unless the mind of the Pakistani military and intelligence officers is disabused of this belief and they are made to co-operate with theinternational community in destroying the terrorist infrastructure in its territory, no strategy is going to work in ending jihadi terrorism bredin Pakistan. The major deficiency in the prescriptive analysis of Obama arises from his naive assumption that Pakistan can be made toco-operate more effectively against terrorism through a basket of incentives---- more military and economic assistance, more training, anemphasis on the continuing importance of Pakistan even after the war on terrorism is over etc.
6. Bush too hailed Pakistan as a frontline ally in the war against terrorism and provided it with various lollipops--- over US$ 10 billion inmilitary and economic aid since 9/11, dual-use weapons and equipment which could be used against the terrorists as well as against Indiaand a willingness to close the eyes to Pakistan's sins of commission and omission against India so long as it acted against terrorismdirected at the US. These lollipops failed to make the regime of Pervez Musharraf co-operate sincerely against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.These incentives could not prevent the Neo Taliban of Afghanistan from staging a spectacular come-back from sanctuaries in Pakistan andAl Qaeda and its associates from organising acts of terrorism in different parts of the world.
7. The lessons from the failure of the strategy of Bush were: Firstly, a policy based only on incentives will not work in the case of aninsincere state such as Pakistan. Secondly, a policy which makes a distinction between terrorism directed against the US and terrorismdirected against India and the rest of the world will be ineffectve. Thirdly, the fear of exercising too much pressure on Pakistan lest theState collapse and its nuclear arsenal fall into jihadi hands is exploited by Pakistan to prevent the ultimate success of the war againstterrorism.
8.One was hoping----on the basis of the statements by him during his election campaign--- that Obama would have factored these lessonsinto the formulation of his new strategy. Surprisingly, he has not. The same old policy of incentives and nothing but incentives is sought tobe pursued under the garb of a so-called new strategy. The only new feature is the emphasis on the benchmarks of implementation whichwill determine the continued availability of the incentives to Pakistan at every stage. The only disincentive with which Pakistan has beenconfronted is the risk of the incentives drying up if it is seen as dragging its feet in its co-operation in the fight against terrorism.
9. Obama's strategy ---like the one of his predecessor--- is marked by a fear of punishing Pakistan if it does not change its policy of usingterrorists to advance its own strategic agenda. The reluctance to punish Pakistan if it continues to be insincere in dealing with terrorismoriginating from its territory arises from the fear that too much pressure on Pakistan and a policy of punitive measures might push Pakistaninto the arms of the jihadis or might result in a collapse of the Pakistani State with unpredictable consequences.The US must rid itself ofthis fear and make it clear to Pakistan that, if the worst comes to the worst, the world is prepared to face the eventuality of a failedPakistan. A failed Pakistan may be a disaster for the people of Pakistan, but not necessarily for the rest of the world.
10. It is important to constitute a contact group to work out alternative strategies with incentives as well as disincentives, with rewards aswell as punishments. Such a contact group must be only of the victims of terrorism. A contact group, which seeks to bring together thevictims of terrorism as well as the perpetrator, will be a non-starter.
11. Obama's strategy has three components--- a counter-insurgency component for Afghanistan, a counter- terrorism component for use inPakistan and a counter-radicalisation component for use in the entire Af-Pak region. It is a mix of military and political measures. While themilitary measures will be largely implemented by the US and other NATO powers plus Australia, the regional role of countries such as India,China and Iran is sought to be restricted to the political component. They will have no say in the way the military measures areimplemented.
12. The US expectations that the international community will co-operate in implementing the unilaterally worked out US strategy can bebelied because the strategy offers no end in sight to the wave of terrorism of Pakistani origin faced by them. This is particularly true ofIndia. Even though the strategy projects Al Qaeda and its associates operating from sanctuaries in Pakistan as posing a threat to the worldas a whole, its objective is limited to preventing another 9/11 in US territory mounted from this region. It does not pay equal attention to theconcerns of India and other countries. The strategy is, therefore, unlikely to excite professionals in India. (30-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, March 26, 2009
US SPIES-IN-THE-SKY OVER FATA
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO. 508
B.RAMAN
There have been two more missile strikes from Predator (unmanned) aircraft on suspected terrorists in the South and North Waziristanareas of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. With these, there have been seven Predator strikes carried out by theUS Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the tribal belt of Pakistan since President Barack Obama assumed office on January 20,2009.
2. The first of these strikes carried out on March 25,2009, targeted two vehicles--- a pick-up and a car--- which were moving on a kacharoad (non-metalled country road) near the Makeen area of South Waziristan. Seven terrorists, believed to be Uzbecks and Arabs, werereportedly killed. While there is no doubt about their links with Al Qaeda, they seem to be low-level operatives of the organisation.
3.The second of these strikes targeted the house of a tribal leader by name Malik Gulab Khan in an area called Essokhel, 30 Kms from thetown of Mir Ali in North Waziristan, on March 26,2009, killing fours persons. All of them are believed to be Pakistani supporters of the Taliban.There have been no local protest demonstrations against the two strikes indicating a lack of local anger over the deaths of these persons.This would indicate that the locals do not believe that those killed were innocent civilians.
4. The first strike on two moving vehicles was more significant than the second strike on a building. Shortly after the vehicles carrying theterrorists started moving on the road, a Predator aircraft appeared over them and fired two missiles hitting both vehicles. This precise information about the movement of the vehicles, which led to the instantaneous Predator strike, could not have come from human intelligence. A possibility is that the inmates of the vehicle were speaking over phone and their conversation was intercepted by the US technical intelligence units operating on the Afghan side. Or a greater possibility is that the US has one or more spy-in-the-sky satellites over the FATA, which are keeping a continuous watch over all vehicular movements in the area. The vehicles targeted had probably come to the notice of the CIA earlier as being used by the terrorists and the moment their movement on the road was detected by a satellite, thePredators, which were already over the area, went into action. The local villagers have been quoted by some sections of the Pakistani media as saying that Predators had been flying over the area for some hours prior to the attack. They did not blindly target any vehicle.They precisely targeted the two vehicles by which the seven terrorists were travelling. It is not clear whether the Americans knew beforehand that these persons were Uzbecks and Arabs or came to know of it only after they had hit the vehicles and killed them. (26-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
There have been two more missile strikes from Predator (unmanned) aircraft on suspected terrorists in the South and North Waziristanareas of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. With these, there have been seven Predator strikes carried out by theUS Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the tribal belt of Pakistan since President Barack Obama assumed office on January 20,2009.
2. The first of these strikes carried out on March 25,2009, targeted two vehicles--- a pick-up and a car--- which were moving on a kacharoad (non-metalled country road) near the Makeen area of South Waziristan. Seven terrorists, believed to be Uzbecks and Arabs, werereportedly killed. While there is no doubt about their links with Al Qaeda, they seem to be low-level operatives of the organisation.
3.The second of these strikes targeted the house of a tribal leader by name Malik Gulab Khan in an area called Essokhel, 30 Kms from thetown of Mir Ali in North Waziristan, on March 26,2009, killing fours persons. All of them are believed to be Pakistani supporters of the Taliban.There have been no local protest demonstrations against the two strikes indicating a lack of local anger over the deaths of these persons.This would indicate that the locals do not believe that those killed were innocent civilians.
4. The first strike on two moving vehicles was more significant than the second strike on a building. Shortly after the vehicles carrying theterrorists started moving on the road, a Predator aircraft appeared over them and fired two missiles hitting both vehicles. This precise information about the movement of the vehicles, which led to the instantaneous Predator strike, could not have come from human intelligence. A possibility is that the inmates of the vehicle were speaking over phone and their conversation was intercepted by the US technical intelligence units operating on the Afghan side. Or a greater possibility is that the US has one or more spy-in-the-sky satellites over the FATA, which are keeping a continuous watch over all vehicular movements in the area. The vehicles targeted had probably come to the notice of the CIA earlier as being used by the terrorists and the moment their movement on the road was detected by a satellite, thePredators, which were already over the area, went into action. The local villagers have been quoted by some sections of the Pakistani media as saying that Predators had been flying over the area for some hours prior to the attack. They did not blindly target any vehicle.They precisely targeted the two vehicles by which the seven terrorists were travelling. It is not clear whether the Americans knew beforehand that these persons were Uzbecks and Arabs or came to know of it only after they had hit the vehicles and killed them. (26-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, March 25, 2009
FROM MUMBAI TO KUPWARA IN JAMMU & KASHMIR
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 507 B.RAMAN
Eight members of the Army, one of them a Major, and 17 terrorists are reported to have been killed in a series of encounters between patrolsof the army and five different groups of terrorist infiltrators from the Pakistani territory in densely-forested areas of the Kupwara district ofJammu & Kashmir. The encounters, which started on March 20,2009, lasted five days.
2. The Army has stated that the encounters were the result of proactive action taken by it on receipt of human intelligence about theinfiltration of the terrorists. The Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), which has claimed responsibility for the encounters, has tried to project them as inresponse to a surprise action launched by it which, according to it, started with an ambush of an army patrol. Media reports from the areahave described the encounters as one of the fiercest gun battles in that area in recent years. The infiltration of the LET terrorists into theKupwara area and their encounters with the army patrols have come in the wake of a significant improvement in the ground situation in J&Klast year, which made possible the peaceful holding of the elections to the local Legislative Assembly. The elections saw a record voterturn-out.
3.Addressing a media conference on December 25,2008, Kuldeep Khoda, the Director-General of Police of J&K, had said: ("The Hindu" ofDecember 26, 2008):
Terrorist violence showed a remarkable decline of 40 per cent in 2008 as compared to 2007.
Civilian deaths at the hands of the terrorists, which reached a peak of 1413 in 1996, came down to 164 in 2007 and only 89 in 2008.
48 political activists, including a Minister, were killed by terrorists during the 2002 election campaign. They could not kill a single political activist during the election campaign of 2008.
For the first time, 2008 witnessed the best ever performance of the police and the security forces on the human rights front. There was only one complaint of death in police custody and no complaint of disappearance from police custody.
At the same time, he warned against complacency and pointed out that there were still 800 trained terrorists----300 of them foreigners, mainly Pakistanis---- in the State waiting for an opportunity to step up terrorism.
4. Since the elections in November-December last, the improvement in the ground situation achieved by the security forces last yearcontinued to hold, but there was an increase in agitprop incidents in the urban areas in the form of orchestrated demonstrations overallegations of violations of the human rights of local residents by the security forces. Through the present infiltration and the consequentclashes lasting five days, the LET has sought to achieve three objectives----firstly, to demonstrate that it is still a force to be reckoned withand secondly, to convey a message to the people of J&K that despite the so-called action taken by the Pakistani authorities against theLET after the Mumbai terrorist attack in response to international pressure, the LET's terrorist acts in J&K will not be affected. Thirdly, theLET has also sought to strengthen the arguments of those in the West such as David Miliband, the British Foreign Secretary, who claim thatunless attention is paid to solving Indo-Pakistan differences on the Kashmir issue, jihadi terrorism in the Indian territory will continue insome form or the other.
5.When he was the President till August last year, Pervez Musharraf used to make a distinction between acts of terrorism in J&K which heprojected as a legitimate freedom struggle not amounting to terrorism and acts in Indian territory outside J&K which, he admitted, wereacts of terrorism. He did not deny the activities of the LET in J&K, but projected it as an indigenous Kashmiri organisation having rootcauses for its actions. He did not accept that the LET was active in the Indian territory outside J&K.
6. The encounters between the Army and the LET in the Kupwara area during the last five days clearly show that the Government ofPresident Asif Ali Zardari is following the same policy as Musharraf. It is following a policy of legitimising the terrorist acts of the LET inJ&K and, at the same time, pretending to co-operate with the Government of India in the investigation of the LET's terrorist strike inMumbai.
7.The heavily-forested Kupwara is not the sprawling urban Mumbai. Encounters within forests have nothing in common with encounterswith terrorists entrenched inside urban buildings and going on a shooting spree in crowded public places in a big city such as Mumbai. Butthere are disconcerting similarities between what happened in Mumbai between November 26 and 29,2008, and between what hashappened during the last five days in the Kupwara area----- simultaneous, well-orchestrated attacks on multiple targets, whether static ormoving army patrols, a skilful use of hand-held weapons and gadgets such as GPS systems, suicidal and not suicide terrorism, strike, stayand fight tactics instead of the hit and vanish tactics and an ability to keep the encounters with the security forces going for a long time inorder to make an impact on the local population and the international community through dramatic media reports.
8. In the weeks before the polls, it will be the aim of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the terrorists sponsored by it to step up violencein J&K through so-called indigenous Kashmiri organisations and to encourage elements belonging to the Indian Mujahideen and its ally theStudents' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), which have not committed any major act of terrorism after the Delhi blasts of September,2008,to strike again.
9. These have to be factored into our security plan for the elections. (25-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Eight members of the Army, one of them a Major, and 17 terrorists are reported to have been killed in a series of encounters between patrolsof the army and five different groups of terrorist infiltrators from the Pakistani territory in densely-forested areas of the Kupwara district ofJammu & Kashmir. The encounters, which started on March 20,2009, lasted five days.
2. The Army has stated that the encounters were the result of proactive action taken by it on receipt of human intelligence about theinfiltration of the terrorists. The Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), which has claimed responsibility for the encounters, has tried to project them as inresponse to a surprise action launched by it which, according to it, started with an ambush of an army patrol. Media reports from the areahave described the encounters as one of the fiercest gun battles in that area in recent years. The infiltration of the LET terrorists into theKupwara area and their encounters with the army patrols have come in the wake of a significant improvement in the ground situation in J&Klast year, which made possible the peaceful holding of the elections to the local Legislative Assembly. The elections saw a record voterturn-out.
3.Addressing a media conference on December 25,2008, Kuldeep Khoda, the Director-General of Police of J&K, had said: ("The Hindu" ofDecember 26, 2008):
Terrorist violence showed a remarkable decline of 40 per cent in 2008 as compared to 2007.
Civilian deaths at the hands of the terrorists, which reached a peak of 1413 in 1996, came down to 164 in 2007 and only 89 in 2008.
48 political activists, including a Minister, were killed by terrorists during the 2002 election campaign. They could not kill a single political activist during the election campaign of 2008.
For the first time, 2008 witnessed the best ever performance of the police and the security forces on the human rights front. There was only one complaint of death in police custody and no complaint of disappearance from police custody.
At the same time, he warned against complacency and pointed out that there were still 800 trained terrorists----300 of them foreigners, mainly Pakistanis---- in the State waiting for an opportunity to step up terrorism.
4. Since the elections in November-December last, the improvement in the ground situation achieved by the security forces last yearcontinued to hold, but there was an increase in agitprop incidents in the urban areas in the form of orchestrated demonstrations overallegations of violations of the human rights of local residents by the security forces. Through the present infiltration and the consequentclashes lasting five days, the LET has sought to achieve three objectives----firstly, to demonstrate that it is still a force to be reckoned withand secondly, to convey a message to the people of J&K that despite the so-called action taken by the Pakistani authorities against theLET after the Mumbai terrorist attack in response to international pressure, the LET's terrorist acts in J&K will not be affected. Thirdly, theLET has also sought to strengthen the arguments of those in the West such as David Miliband, the British Foreign Secretary, who claim thatunless attention is paid to solving Indo-Pakistan differences on the Kashmir issue, jihadi terrorism in the Indian territory will continue insome form or the other.
5.When he was the President till August last year, Pervez Musharraf used to make a distinction between acts of terrorism in J&K which heprojected as a legitimate freedom struggle not amounting to terrorism and acts in Indian territory outside J&K which, he admitted, wereacts of terrorism. He did not deny the activities of the LET in J&K, but projected it as an indigenous Kashmiri organisation having rootcauses for its actions. He did not accept that the LET was active in the Indian territory outside J&K.
6. The encounters between the Army and the LET in the Kupwara area during the last five days clearly show that the Government ofPresident Asif Ali Zardari is following the same policy as Musharraf. It is following a policy of legitimising the terrorist acts of the LET inJ&K and, at the same time, pretending to co-operate with the Government of India in the investigation of the LET's terrorist strike inMumbai.
7.The heavily-forested Kupwara is not the sprawling urban Mumbai. Encounters within forests have nothing in common with encounterswith terrorists entrenched inside urban buildings and going on a shooting spree in crowded public places in a big city such as Mumbai. Butthere are disconcerting similarities between what happened in Mumbai between November 26 and 29,2008, and between what hashappened during the last five days in the Kupwara area----- simultaneous, well-orchestrated attacks on multiple targets, whether static ormoving army patrols, a skilful use of hand-held weapons and gadgets such as GPS systems, suicidal and not suicide terrorism, strike, stayand fight tactics instead of the hit and vanish tactics and an ability to keep the encounters with the security forces going for a long time inorder to make an impact on the local population and the international community through dramatic media reports.
8. In the weeks before the polls, it will be the aim of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the terrorists sponsored by it to step up violencein J&K through so-called indigenous Kashmiri organisations and to encourage elements belonging to the Indian Mujahideen and its ally theStudents' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), which have not committed any major act of terrorism after the Delhi blasts of September,2008,to strike again.
9. These have to be factored into our security plan for the elections. (25-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
TAKING THE PREDATORS TO BALOCHISTAN
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO.506
B.RAMAN
The need for a regional counter-terrorism strategy to be spear-headed by India and the US for eradicating all terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistani territory has been one of the themes of my writings and lectures in the last two years. Extracts from two of the articles written by me on this subject on October 11,2008, and January 1,2009, are annexed.
2. It has been my belief that unless and until the US takes the initiative for such a strategy focused on eradicating all terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistani territory India will continue to bleed at the hands of jihadi terrorists spawned in Pakistan and the US will meet the same fate in Afghanistan as the erstwhile USSR did in the 1980s.
3.President Barack Obama’s strategy for the Af-Pak region is still unfolding in bits and pieces. A surge of 16,000 troops to start with and intensified Predator strikes on terrorist hide-outs and training camps in Pakistani territory are two components of this strategy, which are already under implementation. His administration has also been expanding the geographic and target spread of the Predator strikes. From North and South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the geographic area of the strikes has been extended to the Kurram Agency in the FATA. The Bannu area in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), which was already targeted once by the Bush Administration, has been receiving more attention from the advisers of Obama.
4. The targets are also expanding. The initial targeting under the Bush Administration was mainly against the hide-outs and training camps of Al Qaeda and its associates such as the Afghan Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union, which is also an Uzbeck group with many Europeans in it. Under Obama, the targets have been expanded to cover the hide-outs and training camps of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in all these areas and of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar’s Hizbe-Islami in the Kurram Agency.
5. A report carried by “the New York Times” and reproduced by the “Times of India” of March 19,2009, indicates that the Obama Administration is also examining the advisability of hitting at the hide-outs and training camps of the Afghan Taliban in Quetta and some other areas of Balochistan adjoining the border with Afghanistan. Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Neo Taliban, and his advisers are operating from sanctuaries in these areas.
6. In order to weaken the movement for Baloch independence , the late Gen.Zia-ul-Haq had got settled a large number of Afghan Pashtun refugees in these areas and given them Pakistani citizenship. It is in the midst of these pockets of citizens or residents of Afghan origin that the command and control of the Neo Taliban is located. Unless and until this command and control is targeted and eliminated, the US and other NATO troops will not be able to win the war against terrorism in the Af-Pak region.
7. Predator strikes on the sanctuaries of the Neo Taliban in the areas of Balochistan adjoining the Afghan border will be more difficult and tricky than the strikes now being carried out in the FATA. The targeted Balochistan areas may not be as sparsely populated as the targeted FATA areas. Unless there is precise intelligence, the dangers of civilian killings will be more. Human intelligence collection in the FATA area has already improved, indicating new capabilities now available to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in this region. US intelligence officials must be confident of similar precise intelligence in respect of Balochistan too. Otherwise, recommendations would not have been made to Obama to expand the attacks to cover sanctuaries in Balochistan.
8. It is important that Obama gives his clearance to this recommendation as quickly as possible before the Neo Taliban launches its summer offensive in Afghanistan from its sanctuaries in the Balochistan area.
9. The policy already being followed by Obama and the change now recommended cover only attacks on the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda and its associates, the Neo Taliban, the TTP and the Hizb-e-Islami. They do not cover the group of five organizations----the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ)---- which are commonly referred to in Pakistan as the Punjabi Taliban.
10. The JEM has been helping the TTP in the Swat Valley of the NWFP. The LET has been helping the Neo Taliban and the Hizb-e-Islami in the Kabul area. It was involved in the explosion outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul in the first week of July last year. The HUM, the HUJI and the LEJ have been active in the tribal belt since the 1990s.
11. These organizations, except the LEJ, have been behind most acts of jihadi terrorism in the Indian territory. Unless the new US counter-terrorism strategy covers the terrorist infrastructure of the Punjabi Taliban too, the results will not be satisfactory.
12. It is here that the question of Indo-US operational co-operation comes in. The counter-terrorism co-operation between the intelligence agencies of India and the US has till now been confined to intelligence-sharing, mutual legal assistance in investigation of terrorist incidents and training for capacity building. Joint operations are practically nil.
13. The time has come for considering joint operations in the form of some of the Predators operating from bases in Indian territory and joint covert actions against the Punjabi Taliban. Such joint operations will be in the mutual interests of the two countries. (19-3-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Extract from my article dated October 11,2008 and titled “Seven Years of OP Enduring Freedom: No Light Yet” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2877.html
The US and other NATO forces may want a political face-saving because they are not doing well in the fighting, but why should the Taliban Commanders want one when they think they are winning? The same is the situation on the Pakistan side of the border. The TTP thinks it is doing well against the Pakistani security forces. Why should it agree to a compromise without achieving its objective?
Gen . David Petraeus, who was till recently the Commander of the US forces in Iraq, is shortly taking over as the Commander of the US Central Command (has since taken over). In that capacity, he will be responsible for the strategy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In Iraq, he successfully drove a wedge between the secular Iraqi resistance fighters and the Wahabised Arab terrorists of Al Qaeda. There is a talk that he might try a similar approach in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region by driving a wedge between the Taliban on both sides of the border and the Al Qaeda remnants. He succeeded in Iraq because the former Baathists of Saddam Hussein's Army, who constituted the resistance fighters, were secular and did not like the Wahabised Al Qaeda. But, in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Wahabism provides the binding ties which strongly unite the Talibans with Al Qaeda. They all feel that the future of Islam is going to be decided in the fight against the US-led NATO forces. They have two common objectives--- the defeat and withdrawal of the NATO forces and the proclamation of an Islamic sharia-based rule in the entire region. So long as these objectives unite them, the Talibans are unlikely to agree to separate peace with the NATO forces. Media reports of a split between the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda have not been substantiated.
Unless and until the US is able to hunt down and kill at least bin Laden, Zawahiri and Mulla Omar, there is unlikely to be a change in the ground situation. Instead of nursing illusions of engineering a split between Al Qaeda and the Taliban and negotiating a separate peace with the Taliban, the US should focus on eliminating the Al Qaeda leadership. That was the main objective of Op Enduring Freedom and that should continue to be its main objective.
Extract from my article dated January 1,2009, and titled “Jihadi Terrorism--- 2008 & 2009: Part II & Last” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers30/paper2998.html
The success of the new policy will depend upon the neutralisation of the sanctuaries in Pakistani territory which keep the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighting against the US. The neutralisation of the sanctuaries of the Taliban is necessary for the success of the US-led forces and the ANA (Afghan National Army) in Afghanistan. Without the neutralisation of the Al Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistani territory, the US cannot be free of fears of another 9/11 in the US homeland. Military and intelligence officers of the US realise that the US objectives vis-a-vis Al Qaeda and the Taliban cannot be met unless these sanctuaries are wiped out and the surviving leadership of Al Qaeda is neutralised. They also realise that missile and Predator strikes alone (over 30 during 2008 as compared to 10 during the previous two years) cannot achieve their objective unless combined with clandestine strikes by land-based stealth forces. They did attempt one such strike in September in South Waziristan. It was not successful and the furore in Pakistan over it led to their abandoning any more land-based strikes in Pakistani territory.
The US finds itself in the same position as the USSR found itself in Afghanistan before it decided to quit in 1988. The Soviet troops avoided land-based action against the sanctuaries of the Afghan Mujahideen in Pakistani territory. They confined their retaliatory strikes to Scud missiles fired at the suspected hide-outs of the Mujahideen in Pakistani territory. The civilian deaths caused by the Scuds added to the anger among the Afghan refugees and strengthened their determination to step up their attacks on the Soviet troops in Afghan territory and on Soviet convoys taking logistics supplies to the far-flung Soviet posts. The Mujahideen's success in disrupting the logistics supplies was one of the factors, which contributed to the Soviet decision to quit.
The Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, advised by retired officers of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) such as Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, are following against the US-led forces the same strategy which the Mujahideen had followed against the Soviet troops-----keeping them bleeding and trying to starve them of essential supplies. In addition to keeping up a high level of suicide and other terrorism in Afghan territory to disrupt road movements of troops and supplies and weaken the control of the ANA in towns, they have stepped up their attacks on road movement of supplies for the NATO forces from Karachi. The US is trying to work out alternate routes through Russia, Georgia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs). It remains to be seen how satisfactory the proposed new supply routes will be.
When Obama's advisers talk of a regional strategy, they mean being responsive to Pakistan's perceived unhappiness and concerns. If they do it, they can exercise more pressure on the Pakistan Army to deal with the sanctuaries and if and when Pakistan does it, it will benefit not only the US, but also India. So their argument goes. This is pure wishful thinking and betrays a failure to comprehend the Pakistani mind-set. Pakistan looks upon the various terrorist groups operating from its territory ----whether against India or Afghanistan or the US---- as strategic assets to limit the power of India and its influence in Afghanistan and the CARs. It is not going to voluntarily give up these perceived assets, unless forced to do so.
The inaction or inability or both of successive Pakistan Governments has enabled Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, the anti-India terrorist organisations, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Group ( (IJG) and radicalised members of the Pakistani diaspora in Europe and North America acquire a strategic depth in the tribal belt of Pakistan from where they can operate wherever they want all over the world----whether against India or Afghanistan or the West or Russia or even against Pakistan if it co-operates too closely with the US.
What the Obama administration would need is a regional strategy to eliminate the terrorirst sanctuaries in Pakistani territory and to deprive the jihadi terrorists of the world of the strategic depth which they presently enjoy in Pakistani territory. This is a strategy on which the US and India can closely collaborate as and when Obama and his advisers come out of their present mode of wishful thinking.
B.RAMAN
The need for a regional counter-terrorism strategy to be spear-headed by India and the US for eradicating all terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistani territory has been one of the themes of my writings and lectures in the last two years. Extracts from two of the articles written by me on this subject on October 11,2008, and January 1,2009, are annexed.
2. It has been my belief that unless and until the US takes the initiative for such a strategy focused on eradicating all terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistani territory India will continue to bleed at the hands of jihadi terrorists spawned in Pakistan and the US will meet the same fate in Afghanistan as the erstwhile USSR did in the 1980s.
3.President Barack Obama’s strategy for the Af-Pak region is still unfolding in bits and pieces. A surge of 16,000 troops to start with and intensified Predator strikes on terrorist hide-outs and training camps in Pakistani territory are two components of this strategy, which are already under implementation. His administration has also been expanding the geographic and target spread of the Predator strikes. From North and South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the geographic area of the strikes has been extended to the Kurram Agency in the FATA. The Bannu area in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), which was already targeted once by the Bush Administration, has been receiving more attention from the advisers of Obama.
4. The targets are also expanding. The initial targeting under the Bush Administration was mainly against the hide-outs and training camps of Al Qaeda and its associates such as the Afghan Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union, which is also an Uzbeck group with many Europeans in it. Under Obama, the targets have been expanded to cover the hide-outs and training camps of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in all these areas and of Gulbuddin Heckmatyar’s Hizbe-Islami in the Kurram Agency.
5. A report carried by “the New York Times” and reproduced by the “Times of India” of March 19,2009, indicates that the Obama Administration is also examining the advisability of hitting at the hide-outs and training camps of the Afghan Taliban in Quetta and some other areas of Balochistan adjoining the border with Afghanistan. Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Neo Taliban, and his advisers are operating from sanctuaries in these areas.
6. In order to weaken the movement for Baloch independence , the late Gen.Zia-ul-Haq had got settled a large number of Afghan Pashtun refugees in these areas and given them Pakistani citizenship. It is in the midst of these pockets of citizens or residents of Afghan origin that the command and control of the Neo Taliban is located. Unless and until this command and control is targeted and eliminated, the US and other NATO troops will not be able to win the war against terrorism in the Af-Pak region.
7. Predator strikes on the sanctuaries of the Neo Taliban in the areas of Balochistan adjoining the Afghan border will be more difficult and tricky than the strikes now being carried out in the FATA. The targeted Balochistan areas may not be as sparsely populated as the targeted FATA areas. Unless there is precise intelligence, the dangers of civilian killings will be more. Human intelligence collection in the FATA area has already improved, indicating new capabilities now available to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in this region. US intelligence officials must be confident of similar precise intelligence in respect of Balochistan too. Otherwise, recommendations would not have been made to Obama to expand the attacks to cover sanctuaries in Balochistan.
8. It is important that Obama gives his clearance to this recommendation as quickly as possible before the Neo Taliban launches its summer offensive in Afghanistan from its sanctuaries in the Balochistan area.
9. The policy already being followed by Obama and the change now recommended cover only attacks on the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda and its associates, the Neo Taliban, the TTP and the Hizb-e-Islami. They do not cover the group of five organizations----the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ)---- which are commonly referred to in Pakistan as the Punjabi Taliban.
10. The JEM has been helping the TTP in the Swat Valley of the NWFP. The LET has been helping the Neo Taliban and the Hizb-e-Islami in the Kabul area. It was involved in the explosion outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul in the first week of July last year. The HUM, the HUJI and the LEJ have been active in the tribal belt since the 1990s.
11. These organizations, except the LEJ, have been behind most acts of jihadi terrorism in the Indian territory. Unless the new US counter-terrorism strategy covers the terrorist infrastructure of the Punjabi Taliban too, the results will not be satisfactory.
12. It is here that the question of Indo-US operational co-operation comes in. The counter-terrorism co-operation between the intelligence agencies of India and the US has till now been confined to intelligence-sharing, mutual legal assistance in investigation of terrorist incidents and training for capacity building. Joint operations are practically nil.
13. The time has come for considering joint operations in the form of some of the Predators operating from bases in Indian territory and joint covert actions against the Punjabi Taliban. Such joint operations will be in the mutual interests of the two countries. (19-3-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Extract from my article dated October 11,2008 and titled “Seven Years of OP Enduring Freedom: No Light Yet” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2877.html
The US and other NATO forces may want a political face-saving because they are not doing well in the fighting, but why should the Taliban Commanders want one when they think they are winning? The same is the situation on the Pakistan side of the border. The TTP thinks it is doing well against the Pakistani security forces. Why should it agree to a compromise without achieving its objective?
Gen . David Petraeus, who was till recently the Commander of the US forces in Iraq, is shortly taking over as the Commander of the US Central Command (has since taken over). In that capacity, he will be responsible for the strategy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In Iraq, he successfully drove a wedge between the secular Iraqi resistance fighters and the Wahabised Arab terrorists of Al Qaeda. There is a talk that he might try a similar approach in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region by driving a wedge between the Taliban on both sides of the border and the Al Qaeda remnants. He succeeded in Iraq because the former Baathists of Saddam Hussein's Army, who constituted the resistance fighters, were secular and did not like the Wahabised Al Qaeda. But, in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, Wahabism provides the binding ties which strongly unite the Talibans with Al Qaeda. They all feel that the future of Islam is going to be decided in the fight against the US-led NATO forces. They have two common objectives--- the defeat and withdrawal of the NATO forces and the proclamation of an Islamic sharia-based rule in the entire region. So long as these objectives unite them, the Talibans are unlikely to agree to separate peace with the NATO forces. Media reports of a split between the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda have not been substantiated.
Unless and until the US is able to hunt down and kill at least bin Laden, Zawahiri and Mulla Omar, there is unlikely to be a change in the ground situation. Instead of nursing illusions of engineering a split between Al Qaeda and the Taliban and negotiating a separate peace with the Taliban, the US should focus on eliminating the Al Qaeda leadership. That was the main objective of Op Enduring Freedom and that should continue to be its main objective.
Extract from my article dated January 1,2009, and titled “Jihadi Terrorism--- 2008 & 2009: Part II & Last” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers30/paper2998.html
The success of the new policy will depend upon the neutralisation of the sanctuaries in Pakistani territory which keep the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighting against the US. The neutralisation of the sanctuaries of the Taliban is necessary for the success of the US-led forces and the ANA (Afghan National Army) in Afghanistan. Without the neutralisation of the Al Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistani territory, the US cannot be free of fears of another 9/11 in the US homeland. Military and intelligence officers of the US realise that the US objectives vis-a-vis Al Qaeda and the Taliban cannot be met unless these sanctuaries are wiped out and the surviving leadership of Al Qaeda is neutralised. They also realise that missile and Predator strikes alone (over 30 during 2008 as compared to 10 during the previous two years) cannot achieve their objective unless combined with clandestine strikes by land-based stealth forces. They did attempt one such strike in September in South Waziristan. It was not successful and the furore in Pakistan over it led to their abandoning any more land-based strikes in Pakistani territory.
The US finds itself in the same position as the USSR found itself in Afghanistan before it decided to quit in 1988. The Soviet troops avoided land-based action against the sanctuaries of the Afghan Mujahideen in Pakistani territory. They confined their retaliatory strikes to Scud missiles fired at the suspected hide-outs of the Mujahideen in Pakistani territory. The civilian deaths caused by the Scuds added to the anger among the Afghan refugees and strengthened their determination to step up their attacks on the Soviet troops in Afghan territory and on Soviet convoys taking logistics supplies to the far-flung Soviet posts. The Mujahideen's success in disrupting the logistics supplies was one of the factors, which contributed to the Soviet decision to quit.
The Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, advised by retired officers of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) such as Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, are following against the US-led forces the same strategy which the Mujahideen had followed against the Soviet troops-----keeping them bleeding and trying to starve them of essential supplies. In addition to keeping up a high level of suicide and other terrorism in Afghan territory to disrupt road movements of troops and supplies and weaken the control of the ANA in towns, they have stepped up their attacks on road movement of supplies for the NATO forces from Karachi. The US is trying to work out alternate routes through Russia, Georgia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs). It remains to be seen how satisfactory the proposed new supply routes will be.
When Obama's advisers talk of a regional strategy, they mean being responsive to Pakistan's perceived unhappiness and concerns. If they do it, they can exercise more pressure on the Pakistan Army to deal with the sanctuaries and if and when Pakistan does it, it will benefit not only the US, but also India. So their argument goes. This is pure wishful thinking and betrays a failure to comprehend the Pakistani mind-set. Pakistan looks upon the various terrorist groups operating from its territory ----whether against India or Afghanistan or the US---- as strategic assets to limit the power of India and its influence in Afghanistan and the CARs. It is not going to voluntarily give up these perceived assets, unless forced to do so.
The inaction or inability or both of successive Pakistan Governments has enabled Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, the anti-India terrorist organisations, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Group ( (IJG) and radicalised members of the Pakistani diaspora in Europe and North America acquire a strategic depth in the tribal belt of Pakistan from where they can operate wherever they want all over the world----whether against India or Afghanistan or the West or Russia or even against Pakistan if it co-operates too closely with the US.
What the Obama administration would need is a regional strategy to eliminate the terrorirst sanctuaries in Pakistani territory and to deprive the jihadi terrorists of the world of the strategic depth which they presently enjoy in Pakistani territory. This is a strategy on which the US and India can closely collaborate as and when Obama and his advisers come out of their present mode of wishful thinking.
Sunday, March 15, 2009
BIN LADEN CONTINUES TO EVADE US PREDATOR STRIKES
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.505
B.RAMAN
An audio message purporting to be from Osma bin Laden has been broadcast by the Al Jazeera TV channel on March 14,2009. The messageis believed to be authentic. This is the second audio message of bin Laden got disseminated by Al Qaeda's propaganda set-up this year. Theearlier one was disseminated in January through the Internet.
2.The main theme of both the messages is the fighting between the Israeli security forces and the people of Gaza. In his latest message,bin Laden has described the actions of the Istaeli security forces in Gaza as Gaza's holocaust and has accused some Arab leaders of beingcomplicit with the Israelis in their operations in Gaza. He has called for renewed support to the anti-US jihad in Iraq and for a jihad inJordan and in the area administered by the Palestine Authority as a prelude to the liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem with its Al Aqsamosque from the control of Israel. The message is critical of Hassan Nasrallah of the Hizbollah too and says: "There is no difference in thisissue between Hassan and Hosni (Mubarak) and the rest of the Arab idol-kings who have besieged our family there (in Palestine). "
3. It also accuses Jews and Christians "of carrying out the murder of our brothers in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Waziristan, Somalia,Kashmir, the Philippines and Chechnya." It projects Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and the Islamic Maghreb as among "the open fieldsof jihad.". It says: "I ask Allah to guide us to help the religion and perform Jihad in His Path, so that we liberate the Muslim countries,especially Iraq, and set off from there to Palestine." What the latest message seeks to emphasise is that Jerusalem cannot be liberatedfrom the control of the Israelis without first liberating Iraq, Jordan and the areas under the control of the Palestine Authority. He sees this as a long-term plan and recommends the constitution of a high-power committee of respected religious scholars and others to advise onhow to plan and carry on the struggle for the liberation of Jerusalem and "all of Palestine from the (Jordan) river to the sea."
4. bin Laden's second message of the year has come at a time when President Barack Obama has continued with the former PresidentGeorge Bush's policy of attacking with unmanned Predator aircraft suspected hide-outs of Al Qaeda and the Taliban---both the Afghan andthe Pakistani branches--- in Pakistani territory. A new development since Obama assumed office on January 20,2009, is the geographicspread of the attacks from the two Waziristans and the Bajaur Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to the KurramAgency of the FATA, which has a large Shia population as well as a large number of Sunni Pashtuns from Afghanistan, many of whomsupport either the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans or Gulbuddin Heckmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami (HEI).
5. Since Obama took over as the President, there have already been five Predator strikes out of a total of about 30 since Asif Ali Zardari tookover as the President last September. Two of these strikes have been on suspected hide-outs or training camps in the Kurram Agency.These strikes since September last year have been increasingly accurate. While most of them did not kill any high-value Al Qaeda or Talibanor HEI operative, they did kill mostly terrorists supporting the Taliban or the HEI or Al Qaeda. The collateral deaths of innocent civilians wassmall in number. None of these strikes led to any large public demonstration against the US by the locals, thereby indicating that most ofthose killed were terrorists .
6. Those monitoring Pakistani blogs and chat rooms in order to see how those frequenting them react to these Predator attacks wouldhave noticed that, interestingly, whereas in the past, criticism of the Predator strikes was very virulent, it is less so now. One could evensee remarks indicating that many of those posting their reactions do not mind the Predator strikes provided they kill only foreign terroristsmisusing the hospitality of the Pashtuns. There are no signs of the turning of opinion in favour of the Americans, who are still dislikedstrongly, but there are some signs of an "Arab fatigue"----- meaning being fed up with the Arab members of Al Qaeda who are operating in thePashtun belt. However, it is difficult to say whether this "Arab fatigue" is also among the Pashtuns, who have given shelter to Al Qaedaterrorists or is confined to non-Pashtuns living outside the Pashtun belt.
7. The improvement in the flow of human intelligence, which is contributing to the improving success rate of the Predator strikes, and theincreasing number of Pashtuns---some of them Shias--- being killed by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on suspicion of being US spiesindicate that after nearly six years of not coming forward with intelligence which could be useful to the US, there are elements now, whichare prepared to take the risk of passing on intelligence to the US. This also speaks of a certain Arab fatigue.
8.Al Qaeda is also nervous about talks of secret contacts between the US and some Taliban elements through the intermediary of theSaudi rulers and officials and about the comments emanating from President Barack Obama and Defence Secretary Robert Gates about the US having an open mind on the question of a possible dialogue with moderate elements in the Taliban. In his message of February 22,2009,titled " From Kabul To Mogadishu", Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No.2 to bin Laden, has poured scorn over reports of a possible dialogue andridiculed hopes expressed in the US that it should be possible to drive a wedge between the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
9. Zawahiri said: " O defiant Muslim Afghan people, it is your right to take pride in your sons the Taliban and take pride in Mullah MohammadOmar Mujahid who told the tyrants and criminals---no, we will not hand over a Muslim to an infidel--- and then continued to wage jihad against the Crusaders and their aides and here are the good omens of victory beginning to appear on the horizon. O defiant Muslim Afghanpeople, take part with your brothers and sons the Taliban in the jihad against the American Crusader occupation, which insulted theProphet, violated the sanctity of the Quran and descecrated the soil of Afghanistan."
10. Despite the increase in the flow of intelligence and in the number of successful Predator strikes, none of the over 30 strikes made sinceSeptember last has come anywhere near threatening even remotely bin Laden and Zawahiri. It is apparent from the damage inflicted by thesuccessful strikes that most of the correct information has been about the training camps of the Taliban and the Uzbecks. Some Arabs, whohappened to be present in those camps without the Americans being aware of it, got killed, but they were not the specific targets of thestrikes.
11. The Americans are still groping in the dark in their hunt for bin Laden and Zawahiri. They have not yet been able to find a source whowould be prepared to betray them just as an Iraqi source betrayed Saddam Hussein. None of the reports from reliable Pakistani sources about the Predator strikes indicated that either bin Laden or Zawahiri was anywhere near the place attacked. It is quite likely that binLaden and Zawahiri are either permanently living in a bunker guarded by their Arab bodyguards and avoiding any movement or they areliving in a populated area of the North-West Frontier Province, which is unlikely to be attacked by the Predators due to US fears of causinglarge civilian casualties.
12. The Tajiks of the former Northern Alliance, who have a grudge against bin Laden for having killed Ahmed Shah Masood shortly before9/11, might be useful assets in the hunt for bin Laden, but it is not clear whether the Americans are trying to use them. Neither the Talibannor the Pakistani Army and ISI are likely to betray bin Laden. Other ways of getting at him and Zawahiri have to be explored. (15-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
An audio message purporting to be from Osma bin Laden has been broadcast by the Al Jazeera TV channel on March 14,2009. The messageis believed to be authentic. This is the second audio message of bin Laden got disseminated by Al Qaeda's propaganda set-up this year. Theearlier one was disseminated in January through the Internet.
2.The main theme of both the messages is the fighting between the Israeli security forces and the people of Gaza. In his latest message,bin Laden has described the actions of the Istaeli security forces in Gaza as Gaza's holocaust and has accused some Arab leaders of beingcomplicit with the Israelis in their operations in Gaza. He has called for renewed support to the anti-US jihad in Iraq and for a jihad inJordan and in the area administered by the Palestine Authority as a prelude to the liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem with its Al Aqsamosque from the control of Israel. The message is critical of Hassan Nasrallah of the Hizbollah too and says: "There is no difference in thisissue between Hassan and Hosni (Mubarak) and the rest of the Arab idol-kings who have besieged our family there (in Palestine). "
3. It also accuses Jews and Christians "of carrying out the murder of our brothers in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Waziristan, Somalia,Kashmir, the Philippines and Chechnya." It projects Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and the Islamic Maghreb as among "the open fieldsof jihad.". It says: "I ask Allah to guide us to help the religion and perform Jihad in His Path, so that we liberate the Muslim countries,especially Iraq, and set off from there to Palestine." What the latest message seeks to emphasise is that Jerusalem cannot be liberatedfrom the control of the Israelis without first liberating Iraq, Jordan and the areas under the control of the Palestine Authority. He sees this as a long-term plan and recommends the constitution of a high-power committee of respected religious scholars and others to advise onhow to plan and carry on the struggle for the liberation of Jerusalem and "all of Palestine from the (Jordan) river to the sea."
4. bin Laden's second message of the year has come at a time when President Barack Obama has continued with the former PresidentGeorge Bush's policy of attacking with unmanned Predator aircraft suspected hide-outs of Al Qaeda and the Taliban---both the Afghan andthe Pakistani branches--- in Pakistani territory. A new development since Obama assumed office on January 20,2009, is the geographicspread of the attacks from the two Waziristans and the Bajaur Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to the KurramAgency of the FATA, which has a large Shia population as well as a large number of Sunni Pashtuns from Afghanistan, many of whomsupport either the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans or Gulbuddin Heckmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami (HEI).
5. Since Obama took over as the President, there have already been five Predator strikes out of a total of about 30 since Asif Ali Zardari tookover as the President last September. Two of these strikes have been on suspected hide-outs or training camps in the Kurram Agency.These strikes since September last year have been increasingly accurate. While most of them did not kill any high-value Al Qaeda or Talibanor HEI operative, they did kill mostly terrorists supporting the Taliban or the HEI or Al Qaeda. The collateral deaths of innocent civilians wassmall in number. None of these strikes led to any large public demonstration against the US by the locals, thereby indicating that most ofthose killed were terrorists .
6. Those monitoring Pakistani blogs and chat rooms in order to see how those frequenting them react to these Predator attacks wouldhave noticed that, interestingly, whereas in the past, criticism of the Predator strikes was very virulent, it is less so now. One could evensee remarks indicating that many of those posting their reactions do not mind the Predator strikes provided they kill only foreign terroristsmisusing the hospitality of the Pashtuns. There are no signs of the turning of opinion in favour of the Americans, who are still dislikedstrongly, but there are some signs of an "Arab fatigue"----- meaning being fed up with the Arab members of Al Qaeda who are operating in thePashtun belt. However, it is difficult to say whether this "Arab fatigue" is also among the Pashtuns, who have given shelter to Al Qaedaterrorists or is confined to non-Pashtuns living outside the Pashtun belt.
7. The improvement in the flow of human intelligence, which is contributing to the improving success rate of the Predator strikes, and theincreasing number of Pashtuns---some of them Shias--- being killed by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on suspicion of being US spiesindicate that after nearly six years of not coming forward with intelligence which could be useful to the US, there are elements now, whichare prepared to take the risk of passing on intelligence to the US. This also speaks of a certain Arab fatigue.
8.Al Qaeda is also nervous about talks of secret contacts between the US and some Taliban elements through the intermediary of theSaudi rulers and officials and about the comments emanating from President Barack Obama and Defence Secretary Robert Gates about the US having an open mind on the question of a possible dialogue with moderate elements in the Taliban. In his message of February 22,2009,titled " From Kabul To Mogadishu", Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No.2 to bin Laden, has poured scorn over reports of a possible dialogue andridiculed hopes expressed in the US that it should be possible to drive a wedge between the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
9. Zawahiri said: " O defiant Muslim Afghan people, it is your right to take pride in your sons the Taliban and take pride in Mullah MohammadOmar Mujahid who told the tyrants and criminals---no, we will not hand over a Muslim to an infidel--- and then continued to wage jihad against the Crusaders and their aides and here are the good omens of victory beginning to appear on the horizon. O defiant Muslim Afghanpeople, take part with your brothers and sons the Taliban in the jihad against the American Crusader occupation, which insulted theProphet, violated the sanctity of the Quran and descecrated the soil of Afghanistan."
10. Despite the increase in the flow of intelligence and in the number of successful Predator strikes, none of the over 30 strikes made sinceSeptember last has come anywhere near threatening even remotely bin Laden and Zawahiri. It is apparent from the damage inflicted by thesuccessful strikes that most of the correct information has been about the training camps of the Taliban and the Uzbecks. Some Arabs, whohappened to be present in those camps without the Americans being aware of it, got killed, but they were not the specific targets of thestrikes.
11. The Americans are still groping in the dark in their hunt for bin Laden and Zawahiri. They have not yet been able to find a source whowould be prepared to betray them just as an Iraqi source betrayed Saddam Hussein. None of the reports from reliable Pakistani sources about the Predator strikes indicated that either bin Laden or Zawahiri was anywhere near the place attacked. It is quite likely that binLaden and Zawahiri are either permanently living in a bunker guarded by their Arab bodyguards and avoiding any movement or they areliving in a populated area of the North-West Frontier Province, which is unlikely to be attacked by the Predators due to US fears of causinglarge civilian casualties.
12. The Tajiks of the former Northern Alliance, who have a grudge against bin Laden for having killed Ahmed Shah Masood shortly before9/11, might be useful assets in the hunt for bin Laden, but it is not clear whether the Americans are trying to use them. Neither the Talibannor the Pakistani Army and ISI are likely to betray bin Laden. Other ways of getting at him and Zawahiri have to be explored. (15-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
AL QAEDA & BALOCHISTAN: KIDNAPPING OF US NATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.504
B.RAMAN
On February 2, 2009, John Solecki, an American national and head of the office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees(UNHCR) in Balochistan, was kidnapped in Quetta and his driver shot dead.A hitherto unknown organisation calling itself the BalochistanLiberation United Front (BLUF) subsequently claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and demanded the release of 141 Baloch women andseveral thousand Baloch males, alleged to be in the custody of the Pakistani intelligence agencies. Till now, Solecki has not been traced bythe Pakistani security forces, who do not seem to have any idea of the organisation behind the kidnapping.
2.The Pakistani authorities have denied having such a large number of Balochs, including women, in their custody. Baloch nationalistelements, who have been fighting for the independence of their homeland, have also strongly denied any responsibility for the kidnapping.They suspect that the kidnapping had been orchestrated by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) through the Afghan or Pakistani Taliban fordiscrediting their freedom struggle by projecting the Baloch freedom-fighters as terrorists. The leadership of the Afghan Taliban headed byits Amir Mulla Mohammad Omar, operates from sanctuaries in the Pashtun majority areas of Balochistan.
3.The Baloch freedom-fighters totally disapprove of the ideology of the Taliban and Al Qaeda and their anti-US policies. In fact, they feel thatthe US could help them in their freedom struggle and try to maintain good interactions with governmental and non-governmental elements inthe US. It is, therefore, very unlikely that the Baloch freedom-fighters----either in Pakistan or in the Baloch majority areas of Iran--- wouldkidnap or harm an American national. John Solecki was quite popular among the Balochs of Balochistan.
4. In its past messages, Al Qaeda had always projected the Punjabis and the Pashtuns as participants in its global jihad against theCrusaders and the Jewish people. It had never projected the Sindhis, the Mohajirs and the Balochs as forming part of its global jihad. In asignificant departure from this practice, an audio message of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No.2 of Al Qaeda, disseminated on February 22,2009,refers to the Balochs also as participants in the global jihad. It appeals to the Arabs of Saudi Arabia and Yemen to emulate the Pashtuns andthe Balochs of Pakistan in stepping up the jihad against the rulers of these two countries.
5. It says: " I call on the noble and defiant tribes of the Yemen and tell them--- don't be less than your brothers in the defiant Pashtun andBaluch tribes, who aided Allah and His Messenger and made America and the Crusaders dizzy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.Your brothers from the defiant Pashtun and Baluch tribes are making the Crusaders taste woe after woe and are sending thousands of their lions to jihadin Afghanistan under the banner of Mullah Mohammad Omar Mujahid and are disciplining the treasonous Pakistani Army, making it tastedefeat after defeat and forcing it to make pacts with them in order to save itself from their violence and they are severing the supply routeof the Crusaders from Pakistan to Afghanistan."
6. Zawahiri's reference to some members of Baluch tribes fighting in Afghanistan against the Americans under the banner of the AfghanTaliban and the kidnapping of the American UN official indicate the possibility that that BLUF might be an organisation of Afghan, Pakistaniand Iranian Balochs , who are sought to be used by the Taliban and Al Qaeda in their fight against the US-led NATO troops in Afghanistan.This needs further enquiry. (15-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
On February 2, 2009, John Solecki, an American national and head of the office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees(UNHCR) in Balochistan, was kidnapped in Quetta and his driver shot dead.A hitherto unknown organisation calling itself the BalochistanLiberation United Front (BLUF) subsequently claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and demanded the release of 141 Baloch women andseveral thousand Baloch males, alleged to be in the custody of the Pakistani intelligence agencies. Till now, Solecki has not been traced bythe Pakistani security forces, who do not seem to have any idea of the organisation behind the kidnapping.
2.The Pakistani authorities have denied having such a large number of Balochs, including women, in their custody. Baloch nationalistelements, who have been fighting for the independence of their homeland, have also strongly denied any responsibility for the kidnapping.They suspect that the kidnapping had been orchestrated by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) through the Afghan or Pakistani Taliban fordiscrediting their freedom struggle by projecting the Baloch freedom-fighters as terrorists. The leadership of the Afghan Taliban headed byits Amir Mulla Mohammad Omar, operates from sanctuaries in the Pashtun majority areas of Balochistan.
3.The Baloch freedom-fighters totally disapprove of the ideology of the Taliban and Al Qaeda and their anti-US policies. In fact, they feel thatthe US could help them in their freedom struggle and try to maintain good interactions with governmental and non-governmental elements inthe US. It is, therefore, very unlikely that the Baloch freedom-fighters----either in Pakistan or in the Baloch majority areas of Iran--- wouldkidnap or harm an American national. John Solecki was quite popular among the Balochs of Balochistan.
4. In its past messages, Al Qaeda had always projected the Punjabis and the Pashtuns as participants in its global jihad against theCrusaders and the Jewish people. It had never projected the Sindhis, the Mohajirs and the Balochs as forming part of its global jihad. In asignificant departure from this practice, an audio message of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No.2 of Al Qaeda, disseminated on February 22,2009,refers to the Balochs also as participants in the global jihad. It appeals to the Arabs of Saudi Arabia and Yemen to emulate the Pashtuns andthe Balochs of Pakistan in stepping up the jihad against the rulers of these two countries.
5. It says: " I call on the noble and defiant tribes of the Yemen and tell them--- don't be less than your brothers in the defiant Pashtun andBaluch tribes, who aided Allah and His Messenger and made America and the Crusaders dizzy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.Your brothers from the defiant Pashtun and Baluch tribes are making the Crusaders taste woe after woe and are sending thousands of their lions to jihadin Afghanistan under the banner of Mullah Mohammad Omar Mujahid and are disciplining the treasonous Pakistani Army, making it tastedefeat after defeat and forcing it to make pacts with them in order to save itself from their violence and they are severing the supply routeof the Crusaders from Pakistan to Afghanistan."
6. Zawahiri's reference to some members of Baluch tribes fighting in Afghanistan against the Americans under the banner of the AfghanTaliban and the kidnapping of the American UN official indicate the possibility that that BLUF might be an organisation of Afghan, Pakistaniand Iranian Balochs , who are sought to be used by the Taliban and Al Qaeda in their fight against the US-led NATO troops in Afghanistan.This needs further enquiry. (15-3-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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