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Sunday, July 12, 2009
Friday, July 3, 2009
THE MYSTERIOUS CASE OF ARIF QASMANI
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO.542
B.RAMAN
In a press note issued on July 1,2009, the US Department of Treasury gave the personal particulars of four persons--- a Pashtun born in Afghanistan, two Punjabis and a fourth person of
unclear ethnicity originating from Karachi----associated with the Lashkare-Toiba (LET),who were designated by the Department under Executive Order 13224 “as providing direct support to Al Qaeda and the LET and as facilitating terrorist attacks, including the July 2006 train bombing in Mumbai.”
2. The four persons so designated by the Treasury Department are:
(a).FAZEEL-A-TUL SHAYKH ABU MOHAMMED AMEEN AL-PESHAWARI born in the Konar Province of Afghanisan and living in Peshawar.
(b).ARIF QASMANI, a Pakistani national from Karachi.
(c).MOHAMMED YAHYA MUJAHID, a Pakistani national from Lahore.
(d).NASIR JAVAID, a Pakistani national from Gujranwala, Punjab, living in Manshera, NWFP.
3.The Treasury Department's notification does not specifically refer to Fazeel-A-Tul Shaykh Abu Mohammed Ameen Al-Peshawari (Ameen al-Peshawari) as an associate or an office-bearer of the LET. However, it says of him as follows: " He was providing assistance, including funding and recruits, to the al Qaida network. He has also provided funding and other resources to the Taliban, including explosive vests and other resources and actively facilitated the activities of anti-Coalition militants operating in Afghanistan by raising money in support of terrorist activities. In addition, he had begun a campaign to support militants in Pakistan. As of 2007, Ameen al-Peshawari was responsible for recruiting fighters and suicide bombers and for the acquisition of funds and equipment for militants in Afghanistan. Ameen al-Peshawari has also provided monetary compensation to families of fighters killed in Afghanistan and has been involved in anti-Coalition militia recruiting activities."
4.All the activities of Abu Mohammed al-Peshawari referred to in the notification relate to Afghanistan. No activities of his in relation to India have been cited.
5. However, Arif Qasmani of Karachi has been specifically named by the notification as involed in the Mumbai suburban train blasts of July,2006, and in the Samjotha Express blast of February, 2007. It says of him as follows: "Arif Qasmani is the chief coordinator for Lashkar-e Tayyiba's (LET) dealings with outside organizations and has provided significant support for LET terrorist operations. Qasmani has worked with LET to facilitate terrorist attacks, including the July 2006 train bombing in Mumbai, India, and the February 2007 Samjota Express bombing in Panipat, India. Qasmani conducted fundraising activities on behalf of LET in 2005 and utilized money that he received
from Dawood Ibrahim, an Indian crime figure and terrorist supporter, to facilitate the July 2006 train bombing in Mumbai, India. Since 2001, Arif Qasmani has also provided financial and other support and services to al Qaida, including facilitating the movement of al Qaida leaders and personnel in and out of Afghanistan, the return of foreign fighters to their respective countries, and the provision of supplies and weapons. In return for Qasmani's support, al Qaida provided Qasmani with operatives to support the July 2006 train bombing in Mumbai, India, and the February 2007 Samjota Express bombing in Panipat, India. In 2005, Qasmani provided Taliban leaders with a safe haven and a means to smuggle personnel, equipment, and weapons into Afghanistan."
6.From the notification, three significant points about Qasmani emerge: First, he received money from Dawood Ibrahim for the July 2006 bombings in Mumbai; second, he provided financial and logistics support to Al Qaeda and its leaders; and third, he provided safehaven to the leaders of the Afghan Taliban.
7. According to the notification, "Mohammed Yahya Mujahid is the head of the LET media department and has served as an LET media spokesman since at least mid-2001. In that capacity, Mujahid has issued statements to the press on behalf of LET on numerous occasions, including after the December 2001 LET attacks on the Indian Parliament, and following the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India. Mujahid's statements on behalf of LET have been reported by international news sources such as BBC News, the New York Times, the International Herald Tribune, and Asia Times Online. As of late 2007, Mujahid was influential among the LET central leadership."
8.The notification says that "Nasir Javaid is an LET official involved in LET operations and has served as an LET commander in Pakistan. From 2001 to at least 2008, Nasir Javaid was also involved in LET military training. In mid-2001, Javaid assumed command of an LET training center in Pakistan."
9. The notification does not specify whether the evidence against the four designated individuals cited in it was collected by the US intelligence or whether some of it came from India too. Some inputs from India are likely.
10. Earlier on June 29,2009,the Department of Public Information of the UN Security Council had announced as follows: " The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee approved the addition of three entries to its Consolidated List of individuals and entities subject to the assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo set out in paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations." The three names added by the UN Committee to its list are those of Abu Mohammad Ameen al-Peshawari, Arif Qasmani and Mohammad Yahya Mujahid. The name of Nasir Javaid does not figure in the list issued by the UN Committee possibly because there is no evidence of his involvement with Al Qada and/or the Afghan Taliban. The evidence against the three persons cited in the notification of the UN Committee is the same as subsequently cited by the US Treasury Department.
11.The UN Committee notification has one additional detail which is not there in the Treasury Department notification ---- namely, all the three persons were in custody as of June,2009. While it does not mention where they were in custody, it must be in Pakistan. It also does not say when they were arrested.
12. However, in a report on the Mumbai terrorist attack of November,2008, carried by "Asia Times Online" on December 2,2008,Syed Saleem Shahzad, its Special Correspondent in Pakistan, had indicated that Arif Qasmani, whom he described as a millionaire businessman of Karachi, was already in detention in Pakistan because of the ISI's anger over the double role allegedly played by him---- namely, assisting the ISI in its operations in India through the LET and at the same time assisting the Pakistani Taliban in its operations against the Pakistan Army.
13. Shahzad reported as follows: "The most important asset of the ISI, the Laskhar-e-Taiba (LET), was split after 9/11. Several of its top-ranking commanders and office bearers joined hands with al-Qaeda militants. A millionaire Karachi-based businessman, Arif Qasmani, who was a major donor for ISI-sponsored LET operations in India, was arrested for playing a double game - he was accused of working with the ISI while also sending money to Pakistan's South Waziristan tribal area for the purchase of arms and ammunition for al-Qaeda militants."
14. Shahzad did not mention when Qasmani was arrested, but from the wording of his article it appeared that he must have been arrested before the 26/11 Mumbai strike. Earlier, the "Dawn" of Karachi had reported on December 29,2005, as follows: "The Sindh High Court asked the federal interior secretary on Wednesday to file, within 10 days, a rejoinder to a petition alleging that a man was being detained by a federal law enforcement agency unlawfully. Petitioner Javeria Arif submitted through Advocate Nihal Hashmi that her husband, Arif Qasmani, was picked up by law enforcement personnel from his KDA Scheme residence on Nov 29 for his suspected links with Al Qaeda and Taliban. No case was registered against him, nor was he produced before a magistrate for remand. The police were informed but was of no help to her. An additional advocate-general informed a division bench, comprising Justices Mushir Alam and Athar Saeed, that the provincial government had nothing to do with the matter but he required more time to make a formal statement on behalf of the police. Adjourning further hearing to Jan 19, the bench expressed its concern that, judging by the number of petitions being filed in this behalf, the incidence of ‘disappearance’ of people was on the increase. It observed that the government agencies were legally obliged to protect the life and liberty of citizens and they should act in accordance with the law."
15. On December 1,2005,Shahzad reported to the Italian news agency AKI ( Adnkronos International) as follows: "Arif Qasmani is a veteran jihadi, having fought against the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, and been associated with the armed struggle in Indian-held Kashmir. He was picked up by Pakistani security forces last October but released a few days later. Now Qasmani is once again missing. According to his family, he was in Karachi and departed for Lahore two days ago but since he left home his whereabouts are unknown." Around the same time, he reported to "AsiaTimes Online" as follows: "Arif Qasmani was a part of a high-level November 14 meeting in Islamabad held to initiate a process for peace between the Afghan resistance and coalition forces led by the US.”
16. The same day,Amir Mir, the well-known Pakistani journalist, who writes for sections of the Pakistani media and some of whose articles are also carried by sections of the Indian media, reported as follows: "One of the four Pakistanis who reportedly held a clandestine meeting with the visiting American Undersecretary of State for Public Affairs Karen Hughes and other senior US State Department officials at Serena Hotel in Islamabad on November 14, 2005, to broker a deal between the Taliban and the United States is believed to have been kidnapped by the Pakistani intelligence agencies.”
17. He added: “Previously linked with the now defunct Lashkar-e-Toiba, a militant outfit active in the Indian-administered Kashmir, Arif Qasmani is considered close to Javed Ibrahim Paracha, a former member of the National Assembly from Kohat district of the NWFP. Paracha, who is also the chairman of the World Prisoners' Relief Forum, claimed on November 17, 2005, that he was requested by the Americans during their Islamabad meeting to serve as a bridge between Washington, the Taliban and their Arab comrades for the purpose of 'reconciliation'. According to Paracha, Arif Qasmani has been picked up by the Pakistani intelligence agencies without any justification. "Qasmani went missing on Tuesday after he had left Karachi for Lahore by plane which was supposed to take off at 8 in the morning. His wife has informed me that Qasmani has not yet reached Lahore where he was supposed to hold a business meeting. I understand that he has been arrested by the sensitive agencies. He was earlier detained in August 2005. His family members now fear for his life", Paracha said.
18. He further reported: “Paracha, who is also Chairman International Rabita Jehad Council, said those who met the Americans on November 14 and discussed the possibility of negotiating with the Afghan resistance leaders included (besides him) Arif Qasmani, Khalid Khawaja and Shah Abdul Aziz of MMA from Karak district in NWFP. "There is every possibility that Qasmani has been detained for nvestigations in connection with the November 14 meeting", Paracha added. Khalid Khawaja, a former officer with the (ISI) Inter Services Intelligence said, "I have just met Arif Qasmani's wife in Karachi. She is much disturbed. She is shocked and believes that Qasmani has been kidnapped by the agencies who had previously detained him in August this year".Khawaja said the family of the kidnapped businessman is seriously considering approaching the court of law for his recovery. "I appeal to the government to inform his family members about his exact whereabouts. The government should ensure that Qasmani is recovered as early as possible", he added."
19. Thus, during his career, Arif Qasmani had helped the LET, the ISI, the TTP and the US State Department. He had helped the LET in its operations in India. He had helped the ISI by acting as its cut-out with the LET in order to maintain the deniability of the ISI's use of the LET against India. He had helped the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in its operations against the Pakistan Army and the ISI and he had helped the US State Department by acting as an intermediary between it and the so-called good Taliban. He was also acting as the cut-out of Dawood Ibrahim for funding terrorist attacks in India and of Al Qaeda for using Pakistani jihadi cells in India for its operations. He was also associated with Khalid Khawaja, a retired officer of the Pakistan Air Force who had served in the ISI. Khawaja's name first cropped up during the investigation into the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the journalist of the "Wall Street Journal", at Karachi in
January-February, 2002. Information regarding his alleged role in the Pearl's case had alleged that it was he who had told the kidnappers that Pearl was Jewish.
20. It is surprising that a man with such a controversial background should be moving in and out of informal custody in Pakistan since August 2005 and at the same time assisting the LET, Al Qaeda and the Taliban in their terrorist strikes, including the Mumbai attack of July,2006, and the blast of February,2007, in the Samjotha Express without ever being prosecuted under Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Act.
21. The State Department had known about him at least since 2005, if not earlier. Has the US Government now decided belatedly to act against him because he failed to deliver on the question of a peace deal with the so-called good Taliban? ( 4-7-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION AS GIVEN IN THE US TREASURY NOTIFICATION OF JULY 1,2009
FAZEEL-A-TUL SHAYKH ABU MOHAMMED AMEEN AL-PESHAWARI
AKAs:
Shaykh Aminullah
Sheik Aminullah
Shaykh Ameen
Abu Mohammad Aminullah Peshawari
Shaykh Aminullah al-Peshawari
Abu Mohammad Amin Bishawri
Abu Mohammad Shaykh Aminullah al Bishauri
Shaykh Abu Mohammed Ameen al-Peshawari
DOB:
Circa 1967
Alt. DOB:
Circa 1961
Alt. DOB:
Circa 1973
POB:
Konar Province, Afghanistan
Address:
Ganj District, Peshawar, Pakistan
ARIF QASMANI
AKAs:
Muhammad Arif Qasmani
Muhammad 'Arif Qasmani
Mohammad Arif Qasmani
Qasmani Baba
Arif Umer
Memon Baba
Baba Ji
DOB:
Circa 1944
Address:
House Number 136, KDA Scheme No. 1,
Tipu Sultan Road, Karachi, Pakistan
Nationality:
Pakistani
MOHAMMED YAHYA MUJAHID
AKAs:
Mohammad Yahya Aziz
Yahya Mujahid
DOB:
March 12, 1961
POB:
Lahore, Punjab Province, Pakistan
National ID Card No.: Pakistan, 35404-1577309-9
NASIR JAVAID
AKAs:
Naser Javed
Nasir Javed
Nasser Javid
Abu Ishmael
Haji Nasir Javed
Nasar Javed
Qari Naser Javed
DOB:
Circa 1956
Alt. DOB:
Circa 1958
Alt. DOB:
Circa 1965
POB:
Pakistan
FROM:
Gujranwala, Punjab province, Pakistan
Address:
Mansehra district, Northwest Frontier
Province, Pakistan
Nationality:
Pakistani
B.RAMAN
In a press note issued on July 1,2009, the US Department of Treasury gave the personal particulars of four persons--- a Pashtun born in Afghanistan, two Punjabis and a fourth person of
unclear ethnicity originating from Karachi----associated with the Lashkare-Toiba (LET),who were designated by the Department under Executive Order 13224 “as providing direct support to Al Qaeda and the LET and as facilitating terrorist attacks, including the July 2006 train bombing in Mumbai.”
2. The four persons so designated by the Treasury Department are:
(a).FAZEEL-A-TUL SHAYKH ABU MOHAMMED AMEEN AL-PESHAWARI born in the Konar Province of Afghanisan and living in Peshawar.
(b).ARIF QASMANI, a Pakistani national from Karachi.
(c).MOHAMMED YAHYA MUJAHID, a Pakistani national from Lahore.
(d).NASIR JAVAID, a Pakistani national from Gujranwala, Punjab, living in Manshera, NWFP.
3.The Treasury Department's notification does not specifically refer to Fazeel-A-Tul Shaykh Abu Mohammed Ameen Al-Peshawari (Ameen al-Peshawari) as an associate or an office-bearer of the LET. However, it says of him as follows: " He was providing assistance, including funding and recruits, to the al Qaida network. He has also provided funding and other resources to the Taliban, including explosive vests and other resources and actively facilitated the activities of anti-Coalition militants operating in Afghanistan by raising money in support of terrorist activities. In addition, he had begun a campaign to support militants in Pakistan. As of 2007, Ameen al-Peshawari was responsible for recruiting fighters and suicide bombers and for the acquisition of funds and equipment for militants in Afghanistan. Ameen al-Peshawari has also provided monetary compensation to families of fighters killed in Afghanistan and has been involved in anti-Coalition militia recruiting activities."
4.All the activities of Abu Mohammed al-Peshawari referred to in the notification relate to Afghanistan. No activities of his in relation to India have been cited.
5. However, Arif Qasmani of Karachi has been specifically named by the notification as involed in the Mumbai suburban train blasts of July,2006, and in the Samjotha Express blast of February, 2007. It says of him as follows: "Arif Qasmani is the chief coordinator for Lashkar-e Tayyiba's (LET) dealings with outside organizations and has provided significant support for LET terrorist operations. Qasmani has worked with LET to facilitate terrorist attacks, including the July 2006 train bombing in Mumbai, India, and the February 2007 Samjota Express bombing in Panipat, India. Qasmani conducted fundraising activities on behalf of LET in 2005 and utilized money that he received
from Dawood Ibrahim, an Indian crime figure and terrorist supporter, to facilitate the July 2006 train bombing in Mumbai, India. Since 2001, Arif Qasmani has also provided financial and other support and services to al Qaida, including facilitating the movement of al Qaida leaders and personnel in and out of Afghanistan, the return of foreign fighters to their respective countries, and the provision of supplies and weapons. In return for Qasmani's support, al Qaida provided Qasmani with operatives to support the July 2006 train bombing in Mumbai, India, and the February 2007 Samjota Express bombing in Panipat, India. In 2005, Qasmani provided Taliban leaders with a safe haven and a means to smuggle personnel, equipment, and weapons into Afghanistan."
6.From the notification, three significant points about Qasmani emerge: First, he received money from Dawood Ibrahim for the July 2006 bombings in Mumbai; second, he provided financial and logistics support to Al Qaeda and its leaders; and third, he provided safehaven to the leaders of the Afghan Taliban.
7. According to the notification, "Mohammed Yahya Mujahid is the head of the LET media department and has served as an LET media spokesman since at least mid-2001. In that capacity, Mujahid has issued statements to the press on behalf of LET on numerous occasions, including after the December 2001 LET attacks on the Indian Parliament, and following the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India. Mujahid's statements on behalf of LET have been reported by international news sources such as BBC News, the New York Times, the International Herald Tribune, and Asia Times Online. As of late 2007, Mujahid was influential among the LET central leadership."
8.The notification says that "Nasir Javaid is an LET official involved in LET operations and has served as an LET commander in Pakistan. From 2001 to at least 2008, Nasir Javaid was also involved in LET military training. In mid-2001, Javaid assumed command of an LET training center in Pakistan."
9. The notification does not specify whether the evidence against the four designated individuals cited in it was collected by the US intelligence or whether some of it came from India too. Some inputs from India are likely.
10. Earlier on June 29,2009,the Department of Public Information of the UN Security Council had announced as follows: " The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee approved the addition of three entries to its Consolidated List of individuals and entities subject to the assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo set out in paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 1822 (2008) adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations." The three names added by the UN Committee to its list are those of Abu Mohammad Ameen al-Peshawari, Arif Qasmani and Mohammad Yahya Mujahid. The name of Nasir Javaid does not figure in the list issued by the UN Committee possibly because there is no evidence of his involvement with Al Qada and/or the Afghan Taliban. The evidence against the three persons cited in the notification of the UN Committee is the same as subsequently cited by the US Treasury Department.
11.The UN Committee notification has one additional detail which is not there in the Treasury Department notification ---- namely, all the three persons were in custody as of June,2009. While it does not mention where they were in custody, it must be in Pakistan. It also does not say when they were arrested.
12. However, in a report on the Mumbai terrorist attack of November,2008, carried by "Asia Times Online" on December 2,2008,Syed Saleem Shahzad, its Special Correspondent in Pakistan, had indicated that Arif Qasmani, whom he described as a millionaire businessman of Karachi, was already in detention in Pakistan because of the ISI's anger over the double role allegedly played by him---- namely, assisting the ISI in its operations in India through the LET and at the same time assisting the Pakistani Taliban in its operations against the Pakistan Army.
13. Shahzad reported as follows: "The most important asset of the ISI, the Laskhar-e-Taiba (LET), was split after 9/11. Several of its top-ranking commanders and office bearers joined hands with al-Qaeda militants. A millionaire Karachi-based businessman, Arif Qasmani, who was a major donor for ISI-sponsored LET operations in India, was arrested for playing a double game - he was accused of working with the ISI while also sending money to Pakistan's South Waziristan tribal area for the purchase of arms and ammunition for al-Qaeda militants."
14. Shahzad did not mention when Qasmani was arrested, but from the wording of his article it appeared that he must have been arrested before the 26/11 Mumbai strike. Earlier, the "Dawn" of Karachi had reported on December 29,2005, as follows: "The Sindh High Court asked the federal interior secretary on Wednesday to file, within 10 days, a rejoinder to a petition alleging that a man was being detained by a federal law enforcement agency unlawfully. Petitioner Javeria Arif submitted through Advocate Nihal Hashmi that her husband, Arif Qasmani, was picked up by law enforcement personnel from his KDA Scheme residence on Nov 29 for his suspected links with Al Qaeda and Taliban. No case was registered against him, nor was he produced before a magistrate for remand. The police were informed but was of no help to her. An additional advocate-general informed a division bench, comprising Justices Mushir Alam and Athar Saeed, that the provincial government had nothing to do with the matter but he required more time to make a formal statement on behalf of the police. Adjourning further hearing to Jan 19, the bench expressed its concern that, judging by the number of petitions being filed in this behalf, the incidence of ‘disappearance’ of people was on the increase. It observed that the government agencies were legally obliged to protect the life and liberty of citizens and they should act in accordance with the law."
15. On December 1,2005,Shahzad reported to the Italian news agency AKI ( Adnkronos International) as follows: "Arif Qasmani is a veteran jihadi, having fought against the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, and been associated with the armed struggle in Indian-held Kashmir. He was picked up by Pakistani security forces last October but released a few days later. Now Qasmani is once again missing. According to his family, he was in Karachi and departed for Lahore two days ago but since he left home his whereabouts are unknown." Around the same time, he reported to "AsiaTimes Online" as follows: "Arif Qasmani was a part of a high-level November 14 meeting in Islamabad held to initiate a process for peace between the Afghan resistance and coalition forces led by the US.”
16. The same day,Amir Mir, the well-known Pakistani journalist, who writes for sections of the Pakistani media and some of whose articles are also carried by sections of the Indian media, reported as follows: "One of the four Pakistanis who reportedly held a clandestine meeting with the visiting American Undersecretary of State for Public Affairs Karen Hughes and other senior US State Department officials at Serena Hotel in Islamabad on November 14, 2005, to broker a deal between the Taliban and the United States is believed to have been kidnapped by the Pakistani intelligence agencies.”
17. He added: “Previously linked with the now defunct Lashkar-e-Toiba, a militant outfit active in the Indian-administered Kashmir, Arif Qasmani is considered close to Javed Ibrahim Paracha, a former member of the National Assembly from Kohat district of the NWFP. Paracha, who is also the chairman of the World Prisoners' Relief Forum, claimed on November 17, 2005, that he was requested by the Americans during their Islamabad meeting to serve as a bridge between Washington, the Taliban and their Arab comrades for the purpose of 'reconciliation'. According to Paracha, Arif Qasmani has been picked up by the Pakistani intelligence agencies without any justification. "Qasmani went missing on Tuesday after he had left Karachi for Lahore by plane which was supposed to take off at 8 in the morning. His wife has informed me that Qasmani has not yet reached Lahore where he was supposed to hold a business meeting. I understand that he has been arrested by the sensitive agencies. He was earlier detained in August 2005. His family members now fear for his life", Paracha said.
18. He further reported: “Paracha, who is also Chairman International Rabita Jehad Council, said those who met the Americans on November 14 and discussed the possibility of negotiating with the Afghan resistance leaders included (besides him) Arif Qasmani, Khalid Khawaja and Shah Abdul Aziz of MMA from Karak district in NWFP. "There is every possibility that Qasmani has been detained for nvestigations in connection with the November 14 meeting", Paracha added. Khalid Khawaja, a former officer with the (ISI) Inter Services Intelligence said, "I have just met Arif Qasmani's wife in Karachi. She is much disturbed. She is shocked and believes that Qasmani has been kidnapped by the agencies who had previously detained him in August this year".Khawaja said the family of the kidnapped businessman is seriously considering approaching the court of law for his recovery. "I appeal to the government to inform his family members about his exact whereabouts. The government should ensure that Qasmani is recovered as early as possible", he added."
19. Thus, during his career, Arif Qasmani had helped the LET, the ISI, the TTP and the US State Department. He had helped the LET in its operations in India. He had helped the ISI by acting as its cut-out with the LET in order to maintain the deniability of the ISI's use of the LET against India. He had helped the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in its operations against the Pakistan Army and the ISI and he had helped the US State Department by acting as an intermediary between it and the so-called good Taliban. He was also acting as the cut-out of Dawood Ibrahim for funding terrorist attacks in India and of Al Qaeda for using Pakistani jihadi cells in India for its operations. He was also associated with Khalid Khawaja, a retired officer of the Pakistan Air Force who had served in the ISI. Khawaja's name first cropped up during the investigation into the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the journalist of the "Wall Street Journal", at Karachi in
January-February, 2002. Information regarding his alleged role in the Pearl's case had alleged that it was he who had told the kidnappers that Pearl was Jewish.
20. It is surprising that a man with such a controversial background should be moving in and out of informal custody in Pakistan since August 2005 and at the same time assisting the LET, Al Qaeda and the Taliban in their terrorist strikes, including the Mumbai attack of July,2006, and the blast of February,2007, in the Samjotha Express without ever being prosecuted under Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Act.
21. The State Department had known about him at least since 2005, if not earlier. Has the US Government now decided belatedly to act against him because he failed to deliver on the question of a peace deal with the so-called good Taliban? ( 4-7-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION AS GIVEN IN THE US TREASURY NOTIFICATION OF JULY 1,2009
FAZEEL-A-TUL SHAYKH ABU MOHAMMED AMEEN AL-PESHAWARI
AKAs:
Shaykh Aminullah
Sheik Aminullah
Shaykh Ameen
Abu Mohammad Aminullah Peshawari
Shaykh Aminullah al-Peshawari
Abu Mohammad Amin Bishawri
Abu Mohammad Shaykh Aminullah al Bishauri
Shaykh Abu Mohammed Ameen al-Peshawari
DOB:
Circa 1967
Alt. DOB:
Circa 1961
Alt. DOB:
Circa 1973
POB:
Konar Province, Afghanistan
Address:
Ganj District, Peshawar, Pakistan
ARIF QASMANI
AKAs:
Muhammad Arif Qasmani
Muhammad 'Arif Qasmani
Mohammad Arif Qasmani
Qasmani Baba
Arif Umer
Memon Baba
Baba Ji
DOB:
Circa 1944
Address:
House Number 136, KDA Scheme No. 1,
Tipu Sultan Road, Karachi, Pakistan
Nationality:
Pakistani
MOHAMMED YAHYA MUJAHID
AKAs:
Mohammad Yahya Aziz
Yahya Mujahid
DOB:
March 12, 1961
POB:
Lahore, Punjab Province, Pakistan
National ID Card No.: Pakistan, 35404-1577309-9
NASIR JAVAID
AKAs:
Naser Javed
Nasir Javed
Nasser Javid
Abu Ishmael
Haji Nasir Javed
Nasar Javed
Qari Naser Javed
DOB:
Circa 1956
Alt. DOB:
Circa 1958
Alt. DOB:
Circa 1965
POB:
Pakistan
FROM:
Gujranwala, Punjab province, Pakistan
Address:
Mansehra district, Northwest Frontier
Province, Pakistan
Nationality:
Pakistani
WHY PAK TALIBAN NOW TARGETS SCIENTISTS & ENGINEERS?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.541
B.RAMAN
Why the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan is now targeting scientists and engineers working in Pakistan's strategic weaponry establishments such as the Army-run Heavy Mechanical Complex (HMC) at Taxila and the Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL), which is responsible for the development of Pakistan's military nuclear and missile capabilities. Both these establishments have come up with substantial Chinese assistance---the HMC since 1979 and the KRL since the 1980s.
2. This question should be of great concern to the Pakistani authorities following a reported attack by a single suicide bomber riding on a motor-bike on a bus in which scientists, engineers and others working in a Pakistani strategic establishment were traveling on the evening of July 2 on the Rawalpindi-Peshawar road. Initial reports had said that at least six persons were killed and 36 others injured when the suicide bomber rammed his motor-cycle fitted with an explosive device against the bus. The Pakistani authorities subsequently claimed that the suicide bomber was the only fatality.
3. The are conflicting versions of the establishment in which the persons traveling in the bus were working. While the "Dawn" of Karachi and the "Daily Times" of Lahore described them as the staff of the KRL, the "News" has described them as the staff of the HMC. Amir Mir, the well-known Pakistani correspondent, has described them as the staff of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). One thing seems to be certain--- those traveling in the bus were working either in the HMC or in the KRC or both. If they really belonged to the ISI as reported by Amir Mir and were not scientists and engineers as reported by other sources, the possibility is that they were part of the physical security set-up at these establishments.
4.Even though no claim of responsibility has so far been made by the TTP or any of the organisations associated with it, the needle of suspicion points to the TTP which had in the past similarly targeted buses carrying the staff of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the Islamabad/Rawalpindi area and Air Force officers in the Sargodha area. The HMC manufactures, inter alia, tanks and armoured personnel carriers with Chinese assistance.
5. Since the commando raid of the Pakistan Army into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007, there has been a wave of suicide attacks in the non-tribal areas on the Pakistan Army, the Special Services Group, which led the commando raid, the Air Force, the Navy, the ISI, the Federal Investigation Agency and the Police, but there has not been any attack on scientists and engineers working in the military-industrial-nuclear-missile complex. They are amongst the most popular of Pakistan's security bureaucracy. Pakistani society venerates them for giving Pakistan a nuclear and missile capability and for strengthening its capability for the production of arms and ammunition. Attacking them runs the risk of antagonising the Pakistani society----- including the mainstream fundamentalist parties which lionise these scientists and engineers.
6.If it turns out that those traveling by the bus were scientists and engineers and not ISI personnel as claimed by Amir Mir and if it further turns out that it was the Pakistani Taliban which carried out the attack, why did it take the risk? The only possible answer is that the Taliban had calculated that the only way of exercising pressure on the military to slow down, if not halt, its military operations against the Taliban is by threatening to target strategic establishments such as the HMC and the KRC. The Armed Forces and the Police have so far taken in their stride the increasing suicide attacks on their personnel and establishments. Will they treat with equal equanimity attacks on scientists and engineers and strategic weaponry establishments if such attacks are repeated or will they once again make peace with the Taliban to halt such attacks? An answer to this question will depend on the Taliban's capacity to keep such attacks sustained.
7. The attack on the scientists and engineers, if true, coming in the wake of the suicide attack on some Army personnel in
Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir can be interpreted as indicating the Taliban's determination to fight with no holds barred----- even to the extent of damaging the strategic capabilities of Pakistan either in respect of Kashmir or in respect of its nuclear, missile and other military arsenal --- in order to force the army to stop its operations in the Pashtun tribal belt. (3-7-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. (E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Text of Amir Mir’s Analysis As carried by sections of the Pakistani media
" The unending spate of lethal suicide bombings across Pakistan has killed 465 people and injured 1121 in 36 attacks carried out by human bombs in the first six months of 2009 - between January 2 and July 2 - literally turning the country into the suicide bombing capital of the world.
“The July 2 attack in Rawalpindi on a bus carrying the staffers of the Inter Services Intelligence was the 36th incident of suicide bombing since the beginning of 2009. Data compiled by the Pakistani authorities show that the human bombs struck 36 times in the first six months of 2009 in various parts of Pakistan and killed at least 90 people a month on average. While the per week average killing for the first 180 days of 2009 comes to 18, the daily average casualty rate due to suicide attacks stood at three persons.
“ Available figures show that the human bombs struck four times in January 2009, killing 21 people and injuring 52. The month of February saw seven suicide hits, killing 118 people and injuring 158. March proved worst for Pakistanis as six human bombs exploded themselves killing 130 people and injuring 147. The deadliest suicide attack of 2009 came on March 27, targeting a mosque on the Peshawar-Torkham Highway in the Jamrud sub-division of the Khyber Agency in FATA during Friday congregation, which killed 85 persons, including over a dozen security forces personnel.
“In five incidents of suicide bombings carried out in April 2009, 103 people were killed and 137 injured. The human bombs killed 63 people in five more attacks conducted in May 2009 and injured 286 others. The worst hit of the month was carried out on May 27, 2009 when 35 people were killed and over 200 injured in Lahore, after a massive bomb attack targeted the provincial headquarters of the ISI. The blast was so powerful that it bulldozed a part of the ISI building killing a serving Colonel of the Pakistan Army besides demolished the nearby Rescue 15 building, which was adjacent to the head office of the Capital City Police Officer (CCPO) Lahore.
“However, the month of June 2009 saw the highest number of suicide attacks as eight deadly hits killed 101 people and injured 231 others. The worst hit of the month was carried out on June 9, 2009 when at least 23 persons, including many foreigners working for the United Nations, were killed and many others iinjured as a suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden truck into Peshawar’s lone five-star Pearl Continental Hotel, adjoining the residence of the Corps Commander Peshawar.
“In yet another incident of suicide bombing on June 12, 2009, a known religious scholar Dr Sarfraz Naeemi was martyred, along with five others, as a 17-year-old boy blew himself inside the Jamia Naeemia premises in Garhi Shahu area of Lahore, soon after the Friday prayers. On June 26, 2009, in the first ever incident of suicide bombing in Azad Kashmir, three army soldiers were killed and three wounded as the bomber blew himself up after approaching a military vehicle. On June 30, 2009, five people were killed and 11 seriously injured in the first ever incident of suicide bombing in the Kalat area of Balochistan, targeting a hotel.
“In the first suicide attack of July, a human bomb riding a motorbike struck an ISI staff members’ bus in Rawalpindi, killings six people....
“According to the figures compiled by the Ministry of Interior, a total of 2267 people have so far been killed in 158 incidents of suicide attacks between July 2, 2007 and July 2, 2009, in the aftermath of the bloody Operation Silence carried out against the fanatic Lal Masjid clerics in the heart of Islamabad by the security forces exactly two years ago which killed Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi and many others.
“The year 2007 was considered to be the bloodiest year since Pakistan joined the war against the al-Qaeda, Taliban and other militant groups. During the year, a series of deadly suicide attacks and roadside bombings rocked the four provinces of the country as well as the federal capital, Islamabad, claiming the lives of more than 1,100 people. The dangerous trend of suicide strikes, targeting the Pakistani security forces touched alarming heights in 2007, averaging more than one hit a week.
“While Benazir Bhutto’s 27 December 2007 assassination in Rawalpindi was the most high-profile suicide attack of the year 2007, there were total 56 incidents of suicide bombings across Pakistan. Figures compiled by the Ministry of Interior show that Pakistan witnessed a ten-fold increase in the incidents of suicide bombings in 2007 as compared to 2006. The year 2007 witnessed 56 suicide hits, killing 837 people and injuring 1227 others, mostly belonging to the law enforcement agencies. In fact, there had been only 12 such attacks all over Pakistan between 1 January and 3 July 2007, killing 75 people.
“Yet the turning point came with the Operation Silence against the Lal Masjid clerics, killing hundreds. The rest of 44 suicide attacks took place between 4 July and 27 December 2007 after the Lal Masjid action was launched, spreading to Karachi, Quetta, Peshawar, Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Islamabad etc, killing 567 people, mostly belonging to the Pakistan Army, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the police. The number of suicide attacks rose from 56 in 2007 to 66 in 2008, killing 965 people during that year compared with the 837 people killed by human bombs in 2007. The bombers killed 78 people a month on average in 2008 across Pakistan, compared with the average of 70 killings a month in 2007. But if the brutal trend of suicide strikes recorded across Pakistan in the first six months of the year 2009 is anything to go by (465 people killed in 36 attacks), it may turn out to be the worst year ever for the people of Pakistan."
B.RAMAN
Why the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan is now targeting scientists and engineers working in Pakistan's strategic weaponry establishments such as the Army-run Heavy Mechanical Complex (HMC) at Taxila and the Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL), which is responsible for the development of Pakistan's military nuclear and missile capabilities. Both these establishments have come up with substantial Chinese assistance---the HMC since 1979 and the KRL since the 1980s.
2. This question should be of great concern to the Pakistani authorities following a reported attack by a single suicide bomber riding on a motor-bike on a bus in which scientists, engineers and others working in a Pakistani strategic establishment were traveling on the evening of July 2 on the Rawalpindi-Peshawar road. Initial reports had said that at least six persons were killed and 36 others injured when the suicide bomber rammed his motor-cycle fitted with an explosive device against the bus. The Pakistani authorities subsequently claimed that the suicide bomber was the only fatality.
3. The are conflicting versions of the establishment in which the persons traveling in the bus were working. While the "Dawn" of Karachi and the "Daily Times" of Lahore described them as the staff of the KRL, the "News" has described them as the staff of the HMC. Amir Mir, the well-known Pakistani correspondent, has described them as the staff of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). One thing seems to be certain--- those traveling in the bus were working either in the HMC or in the KRC or both. If they really belonged to the ISI as reported by Amir Mir and were not scientists and engineers as reported by other sources, the possibility is that they were part of the physical security set-up at these establishments.
4.Even though no claim of responsibility has so far been made by the TTP or any of the organisations associated with it, the needle of suspicion points to the TTP which had in the past similarly targeted buses carrying the staff of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the Islamabad/Rawalpindi area and Air Force officers in the Sargodha area. The HMC manufactures, inter alia, tanks and armoured personnel carriers with Chinese assistance.
5. Since the commando raid of the Pakistan Army into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007, there has been a wave of suicide attacks in the non-tribal areas on the Pakistan Army, the Special Services Group, which led the commando raid, the Air Force, the Navy, the ISI, the Federal Investigation Agency and the Police, but there has not been any attack on scientists and engineers working in the military-industrial-nuclear-missile complex. They are amongst the most popular of Pakistan's security bureaucracy. Pakistani society venerates them for giving Pakistan a nuclear and missile capability and for strengthening its capability for the production of arms and ammunition. Attacking them runs the risk of antagonising the Pakistani society----- including the mainstream fundamentalist parties which lionise these scientists and engineers.
6.If it turns out that those traveling by the bus were scientists and engineers and not ISI personnel as claimed by Amir Mir and if it further turns out that it was the Pakistani Taliban which carried out the attack, why did it take the risk? The only possible answer is that the Taliban had calculated that the only way of exercising pressure on the military to slow down, if not halt, its military operations against the Taliban is by threatening to target strategic establishments such as the HMC and the KRC. The Armed Forces and the Police have so far taken in their stride the increasing suicide attacks on their personnel and establishments. Will they treat with equal equanimity attacks on scientists and engineers and strategic weaponry establishments if such attacks are repeated or will they once again make peace with the Taliban to halt such attacks? An answer to this question will depend on the Taliban's capacity to keep such attacks sustained.
7. The attack on the scientists and engineers, if true, coming in the wake of the suicide attack on some Army personnel in
Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir can be interpreted as indicating the Taliban's determination to fight with no holds barred----- even to the extent of damaging the strategic capabilities of Pakistan either in respect of Kashmir or in respect of its nuclear, missile and other military arsenal --- in order to force the army to stop its operations in the Pashtun tribal belt. (3-7-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. (E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Text of Amir Mir’s Analysis As carried by sections of the Pakistani media
" The unending spate of lethal suicide bombings across Pakistan has killed 465 people and injured 1121 in 36 attacks carried out by human bombs in the first six months of 2009 - between January 2 and July 2 - literally turning the country into the suicide bombing capital of the world.
“The July 2 attack in Rawalpindi on a bus carrying the staffers of the Inter Services Intelligence was the 36th incident of suicide bombing since the beginning of 2009. Data compiled by the Pakistani authorities show that the human bombs struck 36 times in the first six months of 2009 in various parts of Pakistan and killed at least 90 people a month on average. While the per week average killing for the first 180 days of 2009 comes to 18, the daily average casualty rate due to suicide attacks stood at three persons.
“ Available figures show that the human bombs struck four times in January 2009, killing 21 people and injuring 52. The month of February saw seven suicide hits, killing 118 people and injuring 158. March proved worst for Pakistanis as six human bombs exploded themselves killing 130 people and injuring 147. The deadliest suicide attack of 2009 came on March 27, targeting a mosque on the Peshawar-Torkham Highway in the Jamrud sub-division of the Khyber Agency in FATA during Friday congregation, which killed 85 persons, including over a dozen security forces personnel.
“In five incidents of suicide bombings carried out in April 2009, 103 people were killed and 137 injured. The human bombs killed 63 people in five more attacks conducted in May 2009 and injured 286 others. The worst hit of the month was carried out on May 27, 2009 when 35 people were killed and over 200 injured in Lahore, after a massive bomb attack targeted the provincial headquarters of the ISI. The blast was so powerful that it bulldozed a part of the ISI building killing a serving Colonel of the Pakistan Army besides demolished the nearby Rescue 15 building, which was adjacent to the head office of the Capital City Police Officer (CCPO) Lahore.
“However, the month of June 2009 saw the highest number of suicide attacks as eight deadly hits killed 101 people and injured 231 others. The worst hit of the month was carried out on June 9, 2009 when at least 23 persons, including many foreigners working for the United Nations, were killed and many others iinjured as a suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden truck into Peshawar’s lone five-star Pearl Continental Hotel, adjoining the residence of the Corps Commander Peshawar.
“In yet another incident of suicide bombing on June 12, 2009, a known religious scholar Dr Sarfraz Naeemi was martyred, along with five others, as a 17-year-old boy blew himself inside the Jamia Naeemia premises in Garhi Shahu area of Lahore, soon after the Friday prayers. On June 26, 2009, in the first ever incident of suicide bombing in Azad Kashmir, three army soldiers were killed and three wounded as the bomber blew himself up after approaching a military vehicle. On June 30, 2009, five people were killed and 11 seriously injured in the first ever incident of suicide bombing in the Kalat area of Balochistan, targeting a hotel.
“In the first suicide attack of July, a human bomb riding a motorbike struck an ISI staff members’ bus in Rawalpindi, killings six people....
“According to the figures compiled by the Ministry of Interior, a total of 2267 people have so far been killed in 158 incidents of suicide attacks between July 2, 2007 and July 2, 2009, in the aftermath of the bloody Operation Silence carried out against the fanatic Lal Masjid clerics in the heart of Islamabad by the security forces exactly two years ago which killed Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi and many others.
“The year 2007 was considered to be the bloodiest year since Pakistan joined the war against the al-Qaeda, Taliban and other militant groups. During the year, a series of deadly suicide attacks and roadside bombings rocked the four provinces of the country as well as the federal capital, Islamabad, claiming the lives of more than 1,100 people. The dangerous trend of suicide strikes, targeting the Pakistani security forces touched alarming heights in 2007, averaging more than one hit a week.
“While Benazir Bhutto’s 27 December 2007 assassination in Rawalpindi was the most high-profile suicide attack of the year 2007, there were total 56 incidents of suicide bombings across Pakistan. Figures compiled by the Ministry of Interior show that Pakistan witnessed a ten-fold increase in the incidents of suicide bombings in 2007 as compared to 2006. The year 2007 witnessed 56 suicide hits, killing 837 people and injuring 1227 others, mostly belonging to the law enforcement agencies. In fact, there had been only 12 such attacks all over Pakistan between 1 January and 3 July 2007, killing 75 people.
“Yet the turning point came with the Operation Silence against the Lal Masjid clerics, killing hundreds. The rest of 44 suicide attacks took place between 4 July and 27 December 2007 after the Lal Masjid action was launched, spreading to Karachi, Quetta, Peshawar, Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Islamabad etc, killing 567 people, mostly belonging to the Pakistan Army, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and the police. The number of suicide attacks rose from 56 in 2007 to 66 in 2008, killing 965 people during that year compared with the 837 people killed by human bombs in 2007. The bombers killed 78 people a month on average in 2008 across Pakistan, compared with the average of 70 killings a month in 2007. But if the brutal trend of suicide strikes recorded across Pakistan in the first six months of the year 2009 is anything to go by (465 people killed in 36 attacks), it may turn out to be the worst year ever for the people of Pakistan."
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
PAK TALIBAN MORE THAN A MATCH FOR THE ARMY
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO 540
B.RAMAN
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) headed by Baitullah Mehsud and its various constituent units in different sub-tribal areas headed by local sub-tribal chiefs have proved themselves to be more than a match for the Pakistan Army as it struggles to cope with a spreading arc of Taliban presence and operations right across the Pashtun tribal belt and with its undamaged ability to hit beyond the frontlines in cities and cantonments located in non-tribal areas whenever it wants.
2. Widespread Pashtun anger against the US and the Pakistani military continues to be the main motivating force of the TTP. There are no signs----at least not yet--- that feelings of Pashtun nationalism influence the TTP's operations. The TTP sees itself more as a Pashtun self-defence movement to protect the Pashtuns against attempts to change their way of life by the Pakistani authorities allegedly at the instance of the US. The TTP asserts the right of the Pashtuns to have their lives and criminal justice system regulated by the Sharia if they so desire without being dictated to on this subject by non-Pashtun elements. It also asserts the right of the Pashtuns to govern themselves according to their tribal and sub-tribal customs without interference by Pakistani civil servants and military officers. It wants the tribes and the sub-tribes to be left alone to manage their affairs in their territory as they please without any intereference from Islamabad. It strongly adheres to traditions of Pashtun solidarity wherever they are located in Pakistan or Afghanistan and traditions of Pashtun hospitality to their guests----even if such guests be the Arabs of Al Qaeda. While it accepts the right of any Muslim---Pashtun or non-Pashtun, Arab or non-Arab--- to take shelter in Pashtun territory if they are faced with danger from non-Muslims, it rejects any role for non-Muslims----whether American or non-American---in Pashtun territory.
3. It looks upon the post-9/11 operations of the US against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, with the assistance of Pakistan, as an attempt to advance a non-Muslim and a non-Pashtun agenda in the Pashtun areas. The fact that there has been hardly any Pashtun input from Pakistan into the formulation of the so-called Af-Pak strategy of the Obama Administration has made its strategy strongly suspect in the TTP's eyes.
4.While the TTP enjoys a growing measure of support among the tribes and sub-tribes of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), its support base in the rest of the NWFP and in the large Pashtun community of Karachi, which has reportedly even more Pashtuns than Peshawar, continues to be thin because of the strong influence of the progressive Awami National Party (ANP) in those areas. The US policy towards the Pashtuns, which tends to be influenced by Pakistani experts such as Ahmed Rashid, who seek more the applause of American audiences than of the Pashtun populace, has not had the benefit of the intellectual inputs of the sons of the Pashtun soil, who understand the feelings of their fellow Pashtuns better than experts like Ahmed Rashid, who look at the Pashtun problem more from the geostrategic aspect than from the angle of Pashtun self-respect.
5.Next to the Punjabis, the Pashtuns have always contributed since the birth of Pakistan in 1947 a large number of soldiers and officers to the Pakistan Army (about 20 per cent plus). The FATA and the Malakand Division of the NWFP have a large number of trained and experienced ex-servicemen. It would not be an exaggeration to say that there is hardly a Pashtun family in the FATA, which does not have an ex-serviceman among its members. Taking advantage of the failure of the Pakistan Army to look after these ex-servicemen and keep them on its side, the TTP has managed to mobilise many of them and has been using their services not only for training its cadres but also for the execution of its operations.
6. While young new recruits have been in the forefront of its suicide operations in the non-tribal and tribal areas, the ex-servicemen have been playing an important role in its conventional military operations and in its guerilla strikes. The TTP has a more comprehensive and well thought-out strategy for countering the Pakistan Army than the Army has for countering the TTP. The TTP has been using a good repertoire of militaty and sub-military tactics--- ambushes, frontal attacks, diversionary strikes and suicide terrorism--- in its fight against the Army.
After having got the Army bogged down in certain parts of the Swat Valley, it has spread its diversionary attacks to the Bajaur Agency,the Kurram Agency and North Waziristan. It has tried to pre-empt an expected military strike in South Waziristan, the stronghold of the Mehsuds, by further activating the fighting in the Kurram and North Waziristan Agencies. It has prevented the diversion of Pakistani Army reinforcements to South Waziristan from Swat by fresh movements and attacks in the Swat Valley. Even Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy for the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, has conceded that claims of a Pakistani victory in Swat could be premature.
7. The coherent strategy of the TTP has not been matched by an equally coherent one of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) of Pakistan. He has been struggling to counter the co-ordinated strategy of the TTP with a bits and pieces strategy depending on where the pressure from the TTP comes from. Today in Swat, tomorrow in Bajaur, the day after in South Waziristan, then in Kurram and North Waziristan---so it goes. There is no proacive element in his strategy. He is fire-fighting and not waging a pro-active war of attrition against the TTP. The Pakistan Army has been suffering a lot of attrition.
8. Unless and until there is a re-thinking on the strategy imparting to it greater coherence, the Pakistan Army may not be able to make a quick headway in its operations against the TTP. (1-7-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) headed by Baitullah Mehsud and its various constituent units in different sub-tribal areas headed by local sub-tribal chiefs have proved themselves to be more than a match for the Pakistan Army as it struggles to cope with a spreading arc of Taliban presence and operations right across the Pashtun tribal belt and with its undamaged ability to hit beyond the frontlines in cities and cantonments located in non-tribal areas whenever it wants.
2. Widespread Pashtun anger against the US and the Pakistani military continues to be the main motivating force of the TTP. There are no signs----at least not yet--- that feelings of Pashtun nationalism influence the TTP's operations. The TTP sees itself more as a Pashtun self-defence movement to protect the Pashtuns against attempts to change their way of life by the Pakistani authorities allegedly at the instance of the US. The TTP asserts the right of the Pashtuns to have their lives and criminal justice system regulated by the Sharia if they so desire without being dictated to on this subject by non-Pashtun elements. It also asserts the right of the Pashtuns to govern themselves according to their tribal and sub-tribal customs without interference by Pakistani civil servants and military officers. It wants the tribes and the sub-tribes to be left alone to manage their affairs in their territory as they please without any intereference from Islamabad. It strongly adheres to traditions of Pashtun solidarity wherever they are located in Pakistan or Afghanistan and traditions of Pashtun hospitality to their guests----even if such guests be the Arabs of Al Qaeda. While it accepts the right of any Muslim---Pashtun or non-Pashtun, Arab or non-Arab--- to take shelter in Pashtun territory if they are faced with danger from non-Muslims, it rejects any role for non-Muslims----whether American or non-American---in Pashtun territory.
3. It looks upon the post-9/11 operations of the US against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, with the assistance of Pakistan, as an attempt to advance a non-Muslim and a non-Pashtun agenda in the Pashtun areas. The fact that there has been hardly any Pashtun input from Pakistan into the formulation of the so-called Af-Pak strategy of the Obama Administration has made its strategy strongly suspect in the TTP's eyes.
4.While the TTP enjoys a growing measure of support among the tribes and sub-tribes of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), its support base in the rest of the NWFP and in the large Pashtun community of Karachi, which has reportedly even more Pashtuns than Peshawar, continues to be thin because of the strong influence of the progressive Awami National Party (ANP) in those areas. The US policy towards the Pashtuns, which tends to be influenced by Pakistani experts such as Ahmed Rashid, who seek more the applause of American audiences than of the Pashtun populace, has not had the benefit of the intellectual inputs of the sons of the Pashtun soil, who understand the feelings of their fellow Pashtuns better than experts like Ahmed Rashid, who look at the Pashtun problem more from the geostrategic aspect than from the angle of Pashtun self-respect.
5.Next to the Punjabis, the Pashtuns have always contributed since the birth of Pakistan in 1947 a large number of soldiers and officers to the Pakistan Army (about 20 per cent plus). The FATA and the Malakand Division of the NWFP have a large number of trained and experienced ex-servicemen. It would not be an exaggeration to say that there is hardly a Pashtun family in the FATA, which does not have an ex-serviceman among its members. Taking advantage of the failure of the Pakistan Army to look after these ex-servicemen and keep them on its side, the TTP has managed to mobilise many of them and has been using their services not only for training its cadres but also for the execution of its operations.
6. While young new recruits have been in the forefront of its suicide operations in the non-tribal and tribal areas, the ex-servicemen have been playing an important role in its conventional military operations and in its guerilla strikes. The TTP has a more comprehensive and well thought-out strategy for countering the Pakistan Army than the Army has for countering the TTP. The TTP has been using a good repertoire of militaty and sub-military tactics--- ambushes, frontal attacks, diversionary strikes and suicide terrorism--- in its fight against the Army.
After having got the Army bogged down in certain parts of the Swat Valley, it has spread its diversionary attacks to the Bajaur Agency,the Kurram Agency and North Waziristan. It has tried to pre-empt an expected military strike in South Waziristan, the stronghold of the Mehsuds, by further activating the fighting in the Kurram and North Waziristan Agencies. It has prevented the diversion of Pakistani Army reinforcements to South Waziristan from Swat by fresh movements and attacks in the Swat Valley. Even Richard Holbrooke, the US special envoy for the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, has conceded that claims of a Pakistani victory in Swat could be premature.
7. The coherent strategy of the TTP has not been matched by an equally coherent one of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) of Pakistan. He has been struggling to counter the co-ordinated strategy of the TTP with a bits and pieces strategy depending on where the pressure from the TTP comes from. Today in Swat, tomorrow in Bajaur, the day after in South Waziristan, then in Kurram and North Waziristan---so it goes. There is no proacive element in his strategy. He is fire-fighting and not waging a pro-active war of attrition against the TTP. The Pakistan Army has been suffering a lot of attrition.
8. Unless and until there is a re-thinking on the strategy imparting to it greater coherence, the Pakistan Army may not be able to make a quick headway in its operations against the TTP. (1-7-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies,Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, June 29, 2009
MUMBAI 26/11: BBC'S UNLIKELY STORY
B.RAMAN
Under its "Newsnight" programme, British Broadcasting Corporation 2 is reportedly planning to show at 10-30 PM on June 29, 2009, an investigative story on the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 26,2008, by Richard Watson, its correspondent. An advance version of the programme disseminated to the media in the UK and India shows that as a result of his investigation, Watson came to the conclusion that spotters belonging to a Mumbai-based sleeper cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba ( LET) must have been communicating to the LET's controlling officers in
Pakistan details of the police deployments and movements in and around the targeted areas on the basis of which they were able to give precise instructions to the terrorists participating in the multiple attacks. He questions the Mumbai police version that the controllers were able to give such instructions purely on the basis of their visual observations from the TV coverage of the attacks as they were taking place.
2. As reported by "TheTelegraph" of the UK, Watson says as follows: "How did the leaders know the police positions in such detail? Mumbai police say they were watching live TV in Pakistan. But these instructions seem remarkably precise for that. I know the kind of live-shots used in these situations and they would be unlikely to yield that kind of detail. It is far more likely that they had spotters on the ground who were feeding back information to their leaders about the police movements. If this is true then it means a Lashkar e-Taiba cell in Mumbai
which played a crucial role in the attacks which is still undiscovered."
3. His conclusion is based on his assessment of the communications intelligence collected by the police and not on the basis of any independent evidence collected by him in addition to what the Mumbai Police had collected.
4. The fact that the LET has been having sleeper cells in Mumbai is well known since the twin explosions of August,2003. It is also a reasonable possibility that the Mumbai Police has not been able to identify and neutralise all the sleeper cells of the LET in Mumbai. That is why acts of terrorism keep taking place from time to time despite the neutralisation of many cells in Mumbai and other cities. Recently, a sleeper cell headed by a Nepal-based LET operative was neutralised by the Delhi Police.
5. To say that the LET must still be having unearthed sleeper cells in Mumbai is one thing and to assert that the spotters of an LET sleeper cell in Mumbai must have been passing on details of police deployments around the targeted areas to the controllers in Pakistan during the attack in Novembere,2008, is something totally different.
6. The Mumbai terrorist attack lasted nearly over 60 hours. Nationals of many Western countries and Israel were among those taken hostage by the terrorists. The intelligence agencies of at least India, the US and Israel were electronically monitoring the telephone calls from and to the attacked areas on a minute-to-minute basis. Of all the intelligence agencies of the world, the National Security Agency (NSA). the electronic intelligence agency of the US, has deployed the maximum technical assets in the Af-Pak region since 9/11 to monitor the communications of Al Qaeda, the LET and other associates. Once the terrorist attacks started, the NSA must have turned all its assets in the region towards Mumbai to monitor all in-coming and out-going communications. So too the Indian intelligence.
7. The Indian and the US intelligence agencies were able to intercept all communications passing between the terrorists who had occupied the two hotels and the Narriman House and their controlling officers in Pakistan. In addition to contemporaneously monitoring telephone conversations, intelligence agencies have also arrangements for automatic recording of all conversations in a terrorism situation so that if they contemporaneously miss any conversation, they can refer to the recordings.
8. Had there been LET spotters around the areas targeted, who were in independent communication with the controllers in Pakistan their conversations---- whether through the Internet or otherwise--- must have also been intercepted contemporaneously or recorded and noticed subsequently. No intelligence agency----neither Indian nor the US nor of any other country--- has spoken of any such conversation with Pakistan by elements not participating in the attacks. This would show that apart from the 10 terrorists of the LET, who participated in the attacks, nobody else was in independent communication with the controllers in Pakistan.
9. The terrorist attacks were covered from different camera angles by camera teams from over 50 TV channels of the world. If the controllers in Pakistan had been able to see all their live transmissions, they would have had the minutest details of the police deployments. During the Black September kidnapping of some Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympics in 1972, the terrorists, who had taken up position with the hostages inside a house in the games village, were able to get details of the police deployments by watching the TV inside the house. At that time, there were hardly half a dozen channels and their technical equipment was not very good. If they were able to get so
many details by watching so few channels, it should not be surprising that the Pakistan-based controllers of the Mumbai attacks were able to get a lot more details in such precision. (29-6-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Under its "Newsnight" programme, British Broadcasting Corporation 2 is reportedly planning to show at 10-30 PM on June 29, 2009, an investigative story on the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 26,2008, by Richard Watson, its correspondent. An advance version of the programme disseminated to the media in the UK and India shows that as a result of his investigation, Watson came to the conclusion that spotters belonging to a Mumbai-based sleeper cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba ( LET) must have been communicating to the LET's controlling officers in
Pakistan details of the police deployments and movements in and around the targeted areas on the basis of which they were able to give precise instructions to the terrorists participating in the multiple attacks. He questions the Mumbai police version that the controllers were able to give such instructions purely on the basis of their visual observations from the TV coverage of the attacks as they were taking place.
2. As reported by "TheTelegraph" of the UK, Watson says as follows: "How did the leaders know the police positions in such detail? Mumbai police say they were watching live TV in Pakistan. But these instructions seem remarkably precise for that. I know the kind of live-shots used in these situations and they would be unlikely to yield that kind of detail. It is far more likely that they had spotters on the ground who were feeding back information to their leaders about the police movements. If this is true then it means a Lashkar e-Taiba cell in Mumbai
which played a crucial role in the attacks which is still undiscovered."
3. His conclusion is based on his assessment of the communications intelligence collected by the police and not on the basis of any independent evidence collected by him in addition to what the Mumbai Police had collected.
4. The fact that the LET has been having sleeper cells in Mumbai is well known since the twin explosions of August,2003. It is also a reasonable possibility that the Mumbai Police has not been able to identify and neutralise all the sleeper cells of the LET in Mumbai. That is why acts of terrorism keep taking place from time to time despite the neutralisation of many cells in Mumbai and other cities. Recently, a sleeper cell headed by a Nepal-based LET operative was neutralised by the Delhi Police.
5. To say that the LET must still be having unearthed sleeper cells in Mumbai is one thing and to assert that the spotters of an LET sleeper cell in Mumbai must have been passing on details of police deployments around the targeted areas to the controllers in Pakistan during the attack in Novembere,2008, is something totally different.
6. The Mumbai terrorist attack lasted nearly over 60 hours. Nationals of many Western countries and Israel were among those taken hostage by the terrorists. The intelligence agencies of at least India, the US and Israel were electronically monitoring the telephone calls from and to the attacked areas on a minute-to-minute basis. Of all the intelligence agencies of the world, the National Security Agency (NSA). the electronic intelligence agency of the US, has deployed the maximum technical assets in the Af-Pak region since 9/11 to monitor the communications of Al Qaeda, the LET and other associates. Once the terrorist attacks started, the NSA must have turned all its assets in the region towards Mumbai to monitor all in-coming and out-going communications. So too the Indian intelligence.
7. The Indian and the US intelligence agencies were able to intercept all communications passing between the terrorists who had occupied the two hotels and the Narriman House and their controlling officers in Pakistan. In addition to contemporaneously monitoring telephone conversations, intelligence agencies have also arrangements for automatic recording of all conversations in a terrorism situation so that if they contemporaneously miss any conversation, they can refer to the recordings.
8. Had there been LET spotters around the areas targeted, who were in independent communication with the controllers in Pakistan their conversations---- whether through the Internet or otherwise--- must have also been intercepted contemporaneously or recorded and noticed subsequently. No intelligence agency----neither Indian nor the US nor of any other country--- has spoken of any such conversation with Pakistan by elements not participating in the attacks. This would show that apart from the 10 terrorists of the LET, who participated in the attacks, nobody else was in independent communication with the controllers in Pakistan.
9. The terrorist attacks were covered from different camera angles by camera teams from over 50 TV channels of the world. If the controllers in Pakistan had been able to see all their live transmissions, they would have had the minutest details of the police deployments. During the Black September kidnapping of some Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympics in 1972, the terrorists, who had taken up position with the hostages inside a house in the games village, were able to get details of the police deployments by watching the TV inside the house. At that time, there were hardly half a dozen channels and their technical equipment was not very good. If they were able to get so
many details by watching so few channels, it should not be surprising that the Pakistan-based controllers of the Mumbai attacks were able to get a lot more details in such precision. (29-6-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, June 28, 2009
CHINESE AID TO PAKISTAN IN COUNTER-TERRORISM: RESPONSE TO US REQUEST?
B.RAMAN
Replying to the debate on the budgetary demands of the Ministry of the Interior in the National Assembly on June 24,2009, Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, said: “Due to the efforts of the President and the Prime Minister, the Chinese Government has provided $290 million for capacity building of our security forces.” Even though he did not specifically say so, the capacity-building he was referring to is in the field of counter-terrorism. This would be in addition to continuing Chinese assistance to the Pakistani Armed Forces to strengthen their
capability against their Indian counterparts.
2. The decision of the Chinese authorities to assist Pakistani capacity-building in counter-terrorism was officially conveyed to Malik when he visited Beijing and Shanghai from June 9 to 12,2009. The visit was preceded by the Pakistan Government’s handing over to the Chinese of 10 members of the Uighur diaspora in Pakistan despite objections from the Amnesty International, which feared that these Uighurs might be executed by China without proper trial, The Pakistani authorities, who officially revealed the handing-over on June 5,2009, as reported by the "News" of June 6, claimed that these Uighurs, who were rounded up during the Pakistan Army's counter-insurgency operations in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), belonged to the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). They have not indicated when they were rounded up. However, it is understood that the Amnesty International has been taking up their case since March. This would mean that they must have been rounded up in or before March,2009.
3. The "News" of June 6 reported as follows: "According to some sources in Islamabad, the Chinese militants were extradited despite opposition by the Amnesty International. In March 2009, Tim Parritt, Deputy Director of the Amnesty International’s Asia-Pacific Programme, had observed that whatever these militants were accused of, the risks posed to them were extremely grave, if forcibly returned to China. He had maintained that under the international law, states were obliged not to expel, return or extradite any person to a country where they risk torture or other ill-treatment. However, the Pakistani authorities insist that all those who had been extradited to Beijing were involved in terrorist activities both in China and in Pakistan and had also developed links with al-Qaeda network in the tribal areas of Pakistan. They said the fact that the ETIM militants had extended their network of terrorist activities to Pakistan was evident from a threat they had conveyed to the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad, saying they intended to kidnap Chinese diplomats and consular officers stationed in the Pakistani federal capital with a view to highlighting their cause. The Chinese mission subsequently informed the Pakistani authorities in a letter that some members of the ETIM had already reached Islamabad and planned to kidnap their staffers from the federal capital. The letter reportedly pointed out that terrorist groups located in Pakistan, including al-Qaeda, had been providing support to the ETIM activists for the likely kidnappings. Subsequent investigations had established that the anonymous threat was issued by none other than the East Turkistan Islamic Movement and that the would-be kidnappers had first travelled to Jalalabad in Afghanistan to finalise their plans."
4. During his stay in Beijing, Malik met State Councillor and Minister for Public Security Meng Jianzhu, the Communist Party of China Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkong and the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, who hosted a dinner for him. There were no reports of any meeting with President Hu Jintao or Prime Minister Wen Jiabo.
5.Talking to pressmen in Beijing, Malik said: " We have signed a number of agreements to build the capacity of our law enforcing agencies. We have signed agreements worth $ 300 million to acquire state of the art equipment to combat terrorism. The first consignment of these most needed equipment would be reaching Pakistan within three weeks. We want to ensure that our law enforcing agencies are well equipped, so that they could thwart with full force militancy. The equipment Pakistan needed included most modern mobile scanners that can detect hidden explosives and drugs. Initially, we would start employing these equipment in the metropolitan cities under threat of terrorism, like Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi and then gradually we plan to cover the entire country. "
6.On June 12,2009, a blogspot of the "People's Daily" of China devoted to military issues had the following commentary: "Will China play a more "direct" role in both the Pakistan and Afghanistan conflicts? During the past two days, both Afghanistan and Pakistan are sending envoys to China to ask for China’s "direct" help in their fight against militants. The previous attempts to draw China into the conflicts by both
NATO and US met with little success as China preferred to stay in the background and aid only in forms of financial and hardware support. China’s previous rejection to joining the military coalition is understandable as others have noted; while China does not view NATO/US missions in Afghanistan with suspicion compared to other Shanghai Co-operation Organisation states but allowing a military alliance to use China as a military supply route seem to undermine the Chinese Security-Umbrella that took 60 years and four wars to build. In addition, such an act violates China’s core foreign policy doctrine of non-interference in others' internal affairs. At the same time, the core Chinese
military doctrine is changing with the release of the new “Outline of Military Training and Evaluation” which for the first time placed focus on Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) role for the PLA outside of China’s borders and anti-terror operation is considered part of the MOOTW. China is hosting the first “Non-traditional Security Forum of Armed Forces of ASEAN, China, Japan and ROK , something unthinkable just a few years ago. Maybe China is ready to move out of the “hide my capabilities and bide my time” phase to the “make some contributions” phase to be in line of what Hu coined the “harmonious world” (a.k.a, making the world safe for Confucianism) in his “Go Abroad” policy shift. It is also noted that both the Pakistan and Afghanistan’s request is coordinated and without "US/NATO involvement" which makes the request a bit more politically acceptable in China and the statement by Rehman Malik that "Pakistan has handed Chinese nationals accused of insurgent activity back to China and will continue to do so" is clearly aimed at audiences in China. Judging from China's Foreign Ministry Press Release , China might be ready to take a more direct role. China is ready to further expand and deepen our cooperation in various fields on the basis of mutual benefit so as to push forward our comprehensive partnership of cooperation."
7.Some weeks ago, the "Los Angeles Time" had reported that Richard Holbrooke, the US Special envoy on the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, had visited China and requested it to play a more active role in assisting Pakistan in counter-terrorism. Is the new "direct role" by China under its newly-formulated MOOTW doctrine an immediate response to the US request? In this connection, reference is invited to my article of May 27,2009 titled "Obama And Counter-Insurgency in Chinese Colours" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers33/paper3216.html .
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Replying to the debate on the budgetary demands of the Ministry of the Interior in the National Assembly on June 24,2009, Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, said: “Due to the efforts of the President and the Prime Minister, the Chinese Government has provided $290 million for capacity building of our security forces.” Even though he did not specifically say so, the capacity-building he was referring to is in the field of counter-terrorism. This would be in addition to continuing Chinese assistance to the Pakistani Armed Forces to strengthen their
capability against their Indian counterparts.
2. The decision of the Chinese authorities to assist Pakistani capacity-building in counter-terrorism was officially conveyed to Malik when he visited Beijing and Shanghai from June 9 to 12,2009. The visit was preceded by the Pakistan Government’s handing over to the Chinese of 10 members of the Uighur diaspora in Pakistan despite objections from the Amnesty International, which feared that these Uighurs might be executed by China without proper trial, The Pakistani authorities, who officially revealed the handing-over on June 5,2009, as reported by the "News" of June 6, claimed that these Uighurs, who were rounded up during the Pakistan Army's counter-insurgency operations in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), belonged to the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). They have not indicated when they were rounded up. However, it is understood that the Amnesty International has been taking up their case since March. This would mean that they must have been rounded up in or before March,2009.
3. The "News" of June 6 reported as follows: "According to some sources in Islamabad, the Chinese militants were extradited despite opposition by the Amnesty International. In March 2009, Tim Parritt, Deputy Director of the Amnesty International’s Asia-Pacific Programme, had observed that whatever these militants were accused of, the risks posed to them were extremely grave, if forcibly returned to China. He had maintained that under the international law, states were obliged not to expel, return or extradite any person to a country where they risk torture or other ill-treatment. However, the Pakistani authorities insist that all those who had been extradited to Beijing were involved in terrorist activities both in China and in Pakistan and had also developed links with al-Qaeda network in the tribal areas of Pakistan. They said the fact that the ETIM militants had extended their network of terrorist activities to Pakistan was evident from a threat they had conveyed to the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad, saying they intended to kidnap Chinese diplomats and consular officers stationed in the Pakistani federal capital with a view to highlighting their cause. The Chinese mission subsequently informed the Pakistani authorities in a letter that some members of the ETIM had already reached Islamabad and planned to kidnap their staffers from the federal capital. The letter reportedly pointed out that terrorist groups located in Pakistan, including al-Qaeda, had been providing support to the ETIM activists for the likely kidnappings. Subsequent investigations had established that the anonymous threat was issued by none other than the East Turkistan Islamic Movement and that the would-be kidnappers had first travelled to Jalalabad in Afghanistan to finalise their plans."
4. During his stay in Beijing, Malik met State Councillor and Minister for Public Security Meng Jianzhu, the Communist Party of China Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkong and the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, who hosted a dinner for him. There were no reports of any meeting with President Hu Jintao or Prime Minister Wen Jiabo.
5.Talking to pressmen in Beijing, Malik said: " We have signed a number of agreements to build the capacity of our law enforcing agencies. We have signed agreements worth $ 300 million to acquire state of the art equipment to combat terrorism. The first consignment of these most needed equipment would be reaching Pakistan within three weeks. We want to ensure that our law enforcing agencies are well equipped, so that they could thwart with full force militancy. The equipment Pakistan needed included most modern mobile scanners that can detect hidden explosives and drugs. Initially, we would start employing these equipment in the metropolitan cities under threat of terrorism, like Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi and then gradually we plan to cover the entire country. "
6.On June 12,2009, a blogspot of the "People's Daily" of China devoted to military issues had the following commentary: "Will China play a more "direct" role in both the Pakistan and Afghanistan conflicts? During the past two days, both Afghanistan and Pakistan are sending envoys to China to ask for China’s "direct" help in their fight against militants. The previous attempts to draw China into the conflicts by both
NATO and US met with little success as China preferred to stay in the background and aid only in forms of financial and hardware support. China’s previous rejection to joining the military coalition is understandable as others have noted; while China does not view NATO/US missions in Afghanistan with suspicion compared to other Shanghai Co-operation Organisation states but allowing a military alliance to use China as a military supply route seem to undermine the Chinese Security-Umbrella that took 60 years and four wars to build. In addition, such an act violates China’s core foreign policy doctrine of non-interference in others' internal affairs. At the same time, the core Chinese
military doctrine is changing with the release of the new “Outline of Military Training and Evaluation” which for the first time placed focus on Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) role for the PLA outside of China’s borders and anti-terror operation is considered part of the MOOTW. China is hosting the first “Non-traditional Security Forum of Armed Forces of ASEAN, China, Japan and ROK , something unthinkable just a few years ago. Maybe China is ready to move out of the “hide my capabilities and bide my time” phase to the “make some contributions” phase to be in line of what Hu coined the “harmonious world” (a.k.a, making the world safe for Confucianism) in his “Go Abroad” policy shift. It is also noted that both the Pakistan and Afghanistan’s request is coordinated and without "US/NATO involvement" which makes the request a bit more politically acceptable in China and the statement by Rehman Malik that "Pakistan has handed Chinese nationals accused of insurgent activity back to China and will continue to do so" is clearly aimed at audiences in China. Judging from China's Foreign Ministry Press Release , China might be ready to take a more direct role. China is ready to further expand and deepen our cooperation in various fields on the basis of mutual benefit so as to push forward our comprehensive partnership of cooperation."
7.Some weeks ago, the "Los Angeles Time" had reported that Richard Holbrooke, the US Special envoy on the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, had visited China and requested it to play a more active role in assisting Pakistan in counter-terrorism. Is the new "direct role" by China under its newly-formulated MOOTW doctrine an immediate response to the US request? In this connection, reference is invited to my article of May 27,2009 titled "Obama And Counter-Insurgency in Chinese Colours" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers33/paper3216.html .
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, June 27, 2009
AL QAEDA JUSTIFIES TALIBAN ATTACKS ON PAK ARMY
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO. 539
B.RAMAN
Since February last, a debate has been going on in the jihadi circles in Pakistan over the wisdom of the attacks launched by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) headed by Baitullah Mehsud, its Amir, against the Pakistani Armed Forces and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
2.Some of the jihadi organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) have been uncomfortable over the attacks launched by the TTP on the Pakistani Armed Forces and the ISI. They are of the view that the TTP should focus its attacks on the US and other NATO troops in Afghanistan.
3.Even the Afghan Taliban headed by its Amir Mulla Mohammad Omar has been critical of the TTP.
4.The only jihadi organizations supportive of the tactics of the TTP are the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), which is an anti-Shia organization.They are of the view that since the Pakistan Army has been collaborating with the US forces in their operations against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, attacks on it and the ISI are justified.
5.Till now, Al Qaeda was silent in this debate. In a message addressed to the Pakistani nation on June 3,2009, on the fighting in the Swat Valley, Osama bin Laden has justified the attacks of the TTP on the Pakistan Army by describing the Government of Asif Ali Zardari as a Government of kafirs and by denouncing the Pakistan Army under Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani as an army of kafirs.
6.According to his arguments, since the Government of Zardari and the Army under Kayani have let themselves be used by a kafir state like the US for killing faithful Muslims, who wanted to live according to the Sharia, they have become kafirs and ceased to be true Muslims.
7.bin Laden says: “ There is a response to those who deprecatorily question: How do the Mujahideen fight the Pakistani Army, which is a Muslim army? The Pakistani Army is the one which came to the tribal region to fight them in agreement with America and in response to its demands. It should be clear if a Muslim supported kafirs against Muslims, his faith will recoil. He will become a kafir and apostate…. Who stood by America the Christian and who supported it? Isn’t that Zardari, his Government and the Army? How would you judge? He who supports kafirs becomes one of them. He must be fought against even if he fasted, prayed and claimed he is a Muslim…..The Pakistani Army is with America in the same trench against Islam. It is the duty of the honest people of Islam to fight them.”
8.bin Laden has compared the Pakistani Army under Kayani to the Afghan Army under Najibullah, which allegedly let itself be used by the Soviet Army for killing true Muslims in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda remnants in Pakistan expect Kayani to meet the fate of Najibullah. They point out that religious clerics in Pakistan had issued fatwas against Najibullah for co-operating with the Soviet Army and ask how can they now support Kayani, who has been co-operating with the US army.
9.In their propaganda, Al Qaeda remnants in Pakistan have sought to address the question as to why Al Qaeda has not been able to carry out another 9/11 in the US Homeland. They attribute this to its preoccupation with the fighting against the US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
10.At the same time, they claim that Al Qaeda has not given up its plans for another 9/11 in the US Homeland. They believe that the growing Pashtun anger against the US and the exodus of over two million Pashtun refugees from their homes as a result of the anti-TTP operations allegedly forced on the Pakistan Army by the US have created favourable conditions for planning another 9/11 in the US Homeland. They also believe that just as the “martyrs” of 9/11 came from the Arab world, the “martyrs” of the next 9/11 will come from the Pashtun world.
11. Al Qaeda remnants in Pakistan say that bin Laden would soon be coming out with a fitting rejoinder to President Barack Obama’s Cairo message addressed to the Muslims.
12.My earlier comments on a version of the same audio message
of June 3 as disseminated by Al Jazeera may be seen at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers33/paper3229.html. Kindly also see my earlier article of June 7,2009, titled “Anti-Taliban Operation Projected as Anti-Pashtun” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers33/paper3238.html ( 27-6-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Since February last, a debate has been going on in the jihadi circles in Pakistan over the wisdom of the attacks launched by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) headed by Baitullah Mehsud, its Amir, against the Pakistani Armed Forces and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
2.Some of the jihadi organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) have been uncomfortable over the attacks launched by the TTP on the Pakistani Armed Forces and the ISI. They are of the view that the TTP should focus its attacks on the US and other NATO troops in Afghanistan.
3.Even the Afghan Taliban headed by its Amir Mulla Mohammad Omar has been critical of the TTP.
4.The only jihadi organizations supportive of the tactics of the TTP are the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), which is an anti-Shia organization.They are of the view that since the Pakistan Army has been collaborating with the US forces in their operations against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, attacks on it and the ISI are justified.
5.Till now, Al Qaeda was silent in this debate. In a message addressed to the Pakistani nation on June 3,2009, on the fighting in the Swat Valley, Osama bin Laden has justified the attacks of the TTP on the Pakistan Army by describing the Government of Asif Ali Zardari as a Government of kafirs and by denouncing the Pakistan Army under Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani as an army of kafirs.
6.According to his arguments, since the Government of Zardari and the Army under Kayani have let themselves be used by a kafir state like the US for killing faithful Muslims, who wanted to live according to the Sharia, they have become kafirs and ceased to be true Muslims.
7.bin Laden says: “ There is a response to those who deprecatorily question: How do the Mujahideen fight the Pakistani Army, which is a Muslim army? The Pakistani Army is the one which came to the tribal region to fight them in agreement with America and in response to its demands. It should be clear if a Muslim supported kafirs against Muslims, his faith will recoil. He will become a kafir and apostate…. Who stood by America the Christian and who supported it? Isn’t that Zardari, his Government and the Army? How would you judge? He who supports kafirs becomes one of them. He must be fought against even if he fasted, prayed and claimed he is a Muslim…..The Pakistani Army is with America in the same trench against Islam. It is the duty of the honest people of Islam to fight them.”
8.bin Laden has compared the Pakistani Army under Kayani to the Afghan Army under Najibullah, which allegedly let itself be used by the Soviet Army for killing true Muslims in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda remnants in Pakistan expect Kayani to meet the fate of Najibullah. They point out that religious clerics in Pakistan had issued fatwas against Najibullah for co-operating with the Soviet Army and ask how can they now support Kayani, who has been co-operating with the US army.
9.In their propaganda, Al Qaeda remnants in Pakistan have sought to address the question as to why Al Qaeda has not been able to carry out another 9/11 in the US Homeland. They attribute this to its preoccupation with the fighting against the US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
10.At the same time, they claim that Al Qaeda has not given up its plans for another 9/11 in the US Homeland. They believe that the growing Pashtun anger against the US and the exodus of over two million Pashtun refugees from their homes as a result of the anti-TTP operations allegedly forced on the Pakistan Army by the US have created favourable conditions for planning another 9/11 in the US Homeland. They also believe that just as the “martyrs” of 9/11 came from the Arab world, the “martyrs” of the next 9/11 will come from the Pashtun world.
11. Al Qaeda remnants in Pakistan say that bin Laden would soon be coming out with a fitting rejoinder to President Barack Obama’s Cairo message addressed to the Muslims.
12.My earlier comments on a version of the same audio message
of June 3 as disseminated by Al Jazeera may be seen at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers33/paper3229.html. Kindly also see my earlier article of June 7,2009, titled “Anti-Taliban Operation Projected as Anti-Pashtun” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers33/paper3238.html ( 27-6-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2gmail.com )
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