INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--- PAPER NO. 629
B.RAMAN
The two suicide attacks against army vehicles in the Cantonment area of Lahore on March 12,2010, which caused 45 fatalities, nine of them of military personnel, were followed by six low-intensity blasts in non-military areas which did not cause any fatalities. The Pashtun Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its Punjabi associate the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) are reported to have claimed responsibility for the two suicide blasts. No responsibility has been claimed for the subsequent low-intensity blasts.
2. The suicide blasts highlight the continuing capability of the TTP to operate in non-tribal areas with the help of its Punjabi associates despite the losses suffered by it in the Pashtun belt in recent weeks due to the effective missile strikes by US Drones (pilotless planes) against TTP hide-outs in North and South Waziristan.
3. The selection of the targets by the TTP and the LEJ for their three major strikes this week in Lahore reflects their continuing anger against the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), which is the police agency for counter-terrorism coming under the Ministry of the Interior, the police of Punjab, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Army. This anger, which came to the fore after the Army's commando raid in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July 2007, has been kept alive by the USA's Drone strikes and by the Pakistani military operations in the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and in South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). These military operations are seen by the TTP and its Punjabi associates as undertaken under US pressure. The anti-US and the anti-Army anger are fanning each other.
4. The focus of the retaliatory attacks have been in the NWFP and the FATA, from where many of the Pashtun recruits of the Frontier Corps,
a para-military unit officered by the Army, come, and in Punjab from where the Punjabi soldiers of the Army come. By keeping up the attacks in Lahore and other places in Punjab, including Rawalpindi, and in the Pashtun belt, the TTP and its Punjabi associates are trying to create a divide between the Punjabi officer class and their Punjabi and Pashtun soldiers and thereby weaken their loyalty to the officers.
5. There have already been indications of some dilution of discipline and loyalty among the Pashtuns of the FC, but there are as yet no indications of a similar dilution among the Punjabi soldiers of the Army. The military leadership would be worried that if the jihadis keep up the pressure it could over a period of time have a negative impact on the Punjabi soldiers and this could affect the Army's capability against India.
6. The Army's concern is how to keep up the seeming co-operation with the US against Al Qaeda and the Taliban without letting it weaken its capability against India. It cannot discontinue its co-operation with the US which has kept the Pakistani economy afloat. The Pakistani State badly needs the cash flow from the US.By expanding their operations in Punjab, the TTP and its Punjabi associates are seeking to convey a message to the military leadership that its continued support to the US operations in the FATA and Afghanistan could weaken the loyalty of its Punjabi and Pashtun soldiers and dilute its capability against India.
7. The TTP, despite the availability of a large number of Pashtun suicide bombers, would not be effective in Punjab without the co-operation of Punjabi terrorist organisations, which provide local sanctuaries, logistics and recruits. There are principally five Punjabi terrorist organisations---the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the anti- Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ). Of these, the LET has not been affected by the anti-Army anger. It continues to maintain its loyalty to the Army. It follows a dual policy of co-operating with Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban against the US and with the Pakistan Army against India. For reasons not clear, the HUM has not been very active in recent months.
8. The HUJI, the JEM and the LEJ have been whole-heartedly co-operating with the TTP in its anti-Army operations. Whereas the LET pays equal attention to the jihad against the US and India, the HUJI, the JEM, the LEJ and the TTP are for the moment paying greater attention to their jihad against the US and the Pakistani Army than to their jihad against India. They prefer to leave the responsibility for the jihad against India to the LET.
9. According to Amir Mir, the well-known Pakistani journalist who writes for the "News" (March 13,2010), 1,217 persons were killed in 80 suicide bomber attacks during 2009. This was the higest figure of fatalities in a year since the Lal Masjid raid. Of the 1,217 fatalities, 863 were of civilians and the remaining 354 belonged to the security and law-enforcement agencies. Of them, 137 belonged to the police, 102 were Army officers and Jawans, 51 were FC personnel, 28 were staff members of the Inter-Services Intelligence, 22 belonged to the Khasadar Force, 12 belonged to the Pakistan Rangers and two others were employees of the Pakistan Navy. On an average, 72 civilians and 30 security and law-enforcement agencies’ personnel lost their lives every month in 2009 due to suicide bombings.
10. According to him, there has been a steep rise in fatalities due to suicide bombings between January 1 and March 12 this year as compared to the corresponding period of last year. There have been 321 fatalities in 15 suicide bombings till March 12 this year as against only 105 during the corresponding period last year.
11. He writes: "Authorities investigating the unending spate of suicide bombings are of the view most of these attacks have been carried out by the Punjabi Taliban belonging to four sectarian-cum-Jihadi groups which are working in tandem with the Pashtun-dominated Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. They believe several South Punjab-based members of the banned Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, who had taken part in the Afghan war, have now tied up with the TTP to carry out suicide attacks across Pakistan, especially targeting key military installations. South Punjab has grabbed the attention of Pakistani authorities over the past few months because of the involvement of the Taliban in a spate of Fidayeen-style suicide bombings, including the one targeting the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi on October 10, 2009."
12. What would be the impact of these attacks and the resulting fatalities on the morale of the Punjabi soldiers? It is likely that many of the civilians killed were the relatives of soldiers. The Army could come to the conclusion that the only way it could maintain the morale of its Punjabi soldiers is by intensifying its proxy war against India while pretending to co-operate with the US against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.One of the tempting options for the Army will be to wean the HUJI and the JEM away from the TTP by persuading them to join with the LET against India. If it succeeds, it could reduce the pressure on the Army.
13. The increase in anti- Pakistan Army terrorism in Punjab has to be closely monitored by India in order to assess its impact on Pakistan's proxy war against India. ( 13-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, March 12, 2010
TALIBAN & LEJ SEND STRONG MESSAGE TO KAYANI & PASHA
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR-- PAPER NO 628
B.RAMAN
In an apparent message to Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, and Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), two suicide bombers struck at military vehicles moving through the cantonment area of Lahore on March 12,2010, killing at least 39 persons, six of them army personnel, and injuring 95 others.
2. While no claim of responsibility has so far been made, the needle of suspicion points at the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as the Pakistani Taliban is known, and its Punjabi terror associate the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ). Police sources in Lahore suspect that the attacks were in reprisal for the stepped-up Drone (pilotless plane) strikes by the US, the arrests of some Afghan Taliban leaders by the Pakistani authorities and the reported deaths since the beginning of this year of three important terrorist leaders due to the Drone attacks---- Hakimullah Mehsud, the Amir of the TTP, whose death has so far been denied by the TTP,Qari Mohammad Zafar of the LEJ and Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, the Amir of the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan (IMET). While the still unadmitted ( by the TTP) death of Hakinullah was reported to have taken place in January, the other two deaths were reported to have taken place in February.
3. The TTP and other organisations associated with it such as the LEJ have been threatening the Government and its military-intelligence establishment with reprisal attacks if the Drone strikes and the military operations in South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency are not called off and the army reinforcements sent there withdrawn.
4 The twin suicide attacks against military vehicles in Lahore took place two days after Gen.Kayani was reported to have given an extension of service to Pasha, who is due to retire later this month, and a few days before the expected arrival of Kayani and Pasha in Washington DC for talks with their US counterparts. One could expect more reprisal attacks on military targets in the coming days to step up pressure on the Army and the ISI to reverse the present policy of co-operation with the US. ( 12-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
In an apparent message to Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, and Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), two suicide bombers struck at military vehicles moving through the cantonment area of Lahore on March 12,2010, killing at least 39 persons, six of them army personnel, and injuring 95 others.
2. While no claim of responsibility has so far been made, the needle of suspicion points at the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as the Pakistani Taliban is known, and its Punjabi terror associate the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ). Police sources in Lahore suspect that the attacks were in reprisal for the stepped-up Drone (pilotless plane) strikes by the US, the arrests of some Afghan Taliban leaders by the Pakistani authorities and the reported deaths since the beginning of this year of three important terrorist leaders due to the Drone attacks---- Hakimullah Mehsud, the Amir of the TTP, whose death has so far been denied by the TTP,Qari Mohammad Zafar of the LEJ and Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, the Amir of the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan (IMET). While the still unadmitted ( by the TTP) death of Hakinullah was reported to have taken place in January, the other two deaths were reported to have taken place in February.
3. The TTP and other organisations associated with it such as the LEJ have been threatening the Government and its military-intelligence establishment with reprisal attacks if the Drone strikes and the military operations in South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency are not called off and the army reinforcements sent there withdrawn.
4 The twin suicide attacks against military vehicles in Lahore took place two days after Gen.Kayani was reported to have given an extension of service to Pasha, who is due to retire later this month, and a few days before the expected arrival of Kayani and Pasha in Washington DC for talks with their US counterparts. One could expect more reprisal attacks on military targets in the coming days to step up pressure on the Army and the ISI to reverse the present policy of co-operation with the US. ( 12-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
THE MAOIST INSURGENCY IN INDIA
B.RAMAN
Given below are my replies to a set of questions on the Maoist insurgency in India e-mailed to me by a journalist of a Brazilian online journal:
1 Who are the Maoists in India nowadays?
The Maoists are the cadres of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), who are fighting against the State in the tribal areas of Central India-----mainly in Andhra Pradesh,Chattisgarh, Jharkand, Orissa and West Bengal.They also have some activity in Maharashtra and Bihar. It is essentially a movement of Maoist ideologues for the capture of political power through the barrel of the gun by exploiting the economic grievances of the poor tribals of central India.
2. How did they appear? Do they keep the same ideology from the Cold War?
It is a movement inspired by the ideology of Mao Zedong. They believe in Mao's tactics of capture of political power through a rural revolt of poor and exploited peasants and landless workers.Among the foreign ideological influences on them are those of the Chinese Communist Party under Mao, the Shining Path of Peru and the Maoists of Nepal. Even though the Chinese Communists discarded much of Maoist ideology after his death, his followers in India continue to follow them. They look upon the present leaders of China as revisionists.
3 What is the relation with the Communist Party?
They do not agree with the ideology of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and other leftist parties which are against violence and which believe in acquiring political power by contesting in elections. The Maoists are fighting against the present Government of CPI (Marxist) in West Bengal which came to power through elections.
4 What are the main objectives of the group?
Capture of political power through a rural insurgency of the rural poor in order to work for the uplift of the poor people. It is essentially a movement of the rural poor and the backward tribals. It has no popular support in the urban areas and from the industrial workers.
5 Maoists and Naxalites are the same thing?
The Maoists' violent struggle originally started in the 1960s in a village called Naxalbari in West Bengal. They used to be called Naxalites. They have now spread to other areas outside West Bengal and call themselves Maoists. Yes, the Naxalites and the Maoists are one and the same.
6 Can we compare them to radical Islamist groups?
One cannot. The jihadi terrorism is an urban movement. The Maoist movement is a rural insurgency. The jihadi terrorism is a religious movement against non-Muslims. The Maoist movement has nothing to do with religion. The Maoists don't believe in religion. The Maoist movement is a movement of the rural have-nots. The Maoists are Indian citizens. It is an indigenous insurgent movement. The jihadis are a mix of radicalised Muslims from India and Pakistan. They are trained in Pakistan by its Inter-Services Intelligence with the help of Pakistani jihadi organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). The jihadi movement is a global movement. The Maoist movement is not.
7 Are the Maoists more dangerous than Al Qaeda? Why?
Al Qaeda is a terrorist organisation with a global political and religious agenda. The Maoists are an insurgent organisation with a purely Indian and social class agenda. Al Qaeda believes in indiscriminate killing of civilians. The Maoists believe in targeted killing of civilians. Apart from the security forces, the Maoists kill only those civilians whom they look upon as class enemies such as landlords and forest contractors. Al Qaeda has till now not posed a threat to India's internal security because it has practically no support in the Indian Muslim community. The Maoists pose a serious threat to India's internal security because they have considerable support from the rural poor in the tribal areas of Central India.
8 From where does their philosophy come from?
Already answered above
9 Do the Maoists have support from sectors or regions in India?
Already answered above
10 Why and how the Government have to deal with them?
The Government has to follow a two-pronged policy. It has to undertake a crash programme for the economic and social development of the poor tribals in Central India and take legal action against landlords and forest contractors and government officials exploiting and harassing the poor tribals. At the same time, it has to take action against the armed cadres of the Maoists and their leaders. It should not succumb to violence. It should show a caring attitude to the poor tribals.
11 In which extension this support makes more difficult the operations of the authorities?
The operations of the authorities are rendered difficult by the failure of the Government to modernise rural policing, poor road communications in the rural areas, and the lack of co-operation from the people of the areas who have sympathy for the Maoists.
12 How does the modus operandi work? Is it similar to the Al Qaeda’s one?
It has nothing to do with Al Qaeda. It is a rural insurgent movement which has to be dealt with using a mix of techniques----better rural policing, better attention to the grievances and problems of the rural poor, crash development of the rural areas, and strengthening the capability of the security forces to collect intelligece from the rural areas and prevent the Maoists from moving in large groups and attacking the security forces.The Maoists don't use improvised explosive devices. They use land mines. They often use weapons captured from the security forces. The Maoist modus operandi is more like the modus operandi used by the communist insurgents of Malaya, Thailand and Burma in the 1950s and the 1960s.
13 To deny the existence of a group or just combat could lead to a reinforcement of Maoists?
Question not clear
14 The strategies to fight against them are the same that they use with Al Qaeda?
Already answered above.
15 Can the Maoists make a major attack as Mumbai in 2008?
The Maoists have made many major attacks on the security forces, overran their posts, and captured large quantities of arms and ammunition. But they did not receive the kind of attention the LET received in Mumbai on 26/11 because they operate in rural areas and not in urban areas. They operate far away from the TV cameras. They don't attack iconic targets. They attack class targets in rural areas.
16 Are there links with terrorists groups in others countries?
They have ideological ties of solidarity with Maoists in countries such as Nepal and the Philippines. They don't have operational links.
17 Is there any peace agreement between the Government and the Maoists? What can we expect in a closer future?
There is no peace agreement. The Government is prepared to hold talks with them on their grievances if they give up the use of violence for achieving political and economic objectives and surrender their arms and ammunition. They are not prepared to. The Maoists pose a typical dilemma to Govt. policy-makers----security vs development. Without security, there can be no development.Without development, there can be no security.How to harmonise the requirements of security and development?.No answer to this question has been found so far.(12-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Given below are my replies to a set of questions on the Maoist insurgency in India e-mailed to me by a journalist of a Brazilian online journal:
1 Who are the Maoists in India nowadays?
The Maoists are the cadres of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), who are fighting against the State in the tribal areas of Central India-----mainly in Andhra Pradesh,Chattisgarh, Jharkand, Orissa and West Bengal.They also have some activity in Maharashtra and Bihar. It is essentially a movement of Maoist ideologues for the capture of political power through the barrel of the gun by exploiting the economic grievances of the poor tribals of central India.
2. How did they appear? Do they keep the same ideology from the Cold War?
It is a movement inspired by the ideology of Mao Zedong. They believe in Mao's tactics of capture of political power through a rural revolt of poor and exploited peasants and landless workers.Among the foreign ideological influences on them are those of the Chinese Communist Party under Mao, the Shining Path of Peru and the Maoists of Nepal. Even though the Chinese Communists discarded much of Maoist ideology after his death, his followers in India continue to follow them. They look upon the present leaders of China as revisionists.
3 What is the relation with the Communist Party?
They do not agree with the ideology of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and other leftist parties which are against violence and which believe in acquiring political power by contesting in elections. The Maoists are fighting against the present Government of CPI (Marxist) in West Bengal which came to power through elections.
4 What are the main objectives of the group?
Capture of political power through a rural insurgency of the rural poor in order to work for the uplift of the poor people. It is essentially a movement of the rural poor and the backward tribals. It has no popular support in the urban areas and from the industrial workers.
5 Maoists and Naxalites are the same thing?
The Maoists' violent struggle originally started in the 1960s in a village called Naxalbari in West Bengal. They used to be called Naxalites. They have now spread to other areas outside West Bengal and call themselves Maoists. Yes, the Naxalites and the Maoists are one and the same.
6 Can we compare them to radical Islamist groups?
One cannot. The jihadi terrorism is an urban movement. The Maoist movement is a rural insurgency. The jihadi terrorism is a religious movement against non-Muslims. The Maoist movement has nothing to do with religion. The Maoists don't believe in religion. The Maoist movement is a movement of the rural have-nots. The Maoists are Indian citizens. It is an indigenous insurgent movement. The jihadis are a mix of radicalised Muslims from India and Pakistan. They are trained in Pakistan by its Inter-Services Intelligence with the help of Pakistani jihadi organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). The jihadi movement is a global movement. The Maoist movement is not.
7 Are the Maoists more dangerous than Al Qaeda? Why?
Al Qaeda is a terrorist organisation with a global political and religious agenda. The Maoists are an insurgent organisation with a purely Indian and social class agenda. Al Qaeda believes in indiscriminate killing of civilians. The Maoists believe in targeted killing of civilians. Apart from the security forces, the Maoists kill only those civilians whom they look upon as class enemies such as landlords and forest contractors. Al Qaeda has till now not posed a threat to India's internal security because it has practically no support in the Indian Muslim community. The Maoists pose a serious threat to India's internal security because they have considerable support from the rural poor in the tribal areas of Central India.
8 From where does their philosophy come from?
Already answered above
9 Do the Maoists have support from sectors or regions in India?
Already answered above
10 Why and how the Government have to deal with them?
The Government has to follow a two-pronged policy. It has to undertake a crash programme for the economic and social development of the poor tribals in Central India and take legal action against landlords and forest contractors and government officials exploiting and harassing the poor tribals. At the same time, it has to take action against the armed cadres of the Maoists and their leaders. It should not succumb to violence. It should show a caring attitude to the poor tribals.
11 In which extension this support makes more difficult the operations of the authorities?
The operations of the authorities are rendered difficult by the failure of the Government to modernise rural policing, poor road communications in the rural areas, and the lack of co-operation from the people of the areas who have sympathy for the Maoists.
12 How does the modus operandi work? Is it similar to the Al Qaeda’s one?
It has nothing to do with Al Qaeda. It is a rural insurgent movement which has to be dealt with using a mix of techniques----better rural policing, better attention to the grievances and problems of the rural poor, crash development of the rural areas, and strengthening the capability of the security forces to collect intelligece from the rural areas and prevent the Maoists from moving in large groups and attacking the security forces.The Maoists don't use improvised explosive devices. They use land mines. They often use weapons captured from the security forces. The Maoist modus operandi is more like the modus operandi used by the communist insurgents of Malaya, Thailand and Burma in the 1950s and the 1960s.
13 To deny the existence of a group or just combat could lead to a reinforcement of Maoists?
Question not clear
14 The strategies to fight against them are the same that they use with Al Qaeda?
Already answered above.
15 Can the Maoists make a major attack as Mumbai in 2008?
The Maoists have made many major attacks on the security forces, overran their posts, and captured large quantities of arms and ammunition. But they did not receive the kind of attention the LET received in Mumbai on 26/11 because they operate in rural areas and not in urban areas. They operate far away from the TV cameras. They don't attack iconic targets. They attack class targets in rural areas.
16 Are there links with terrorists groups in others countries?
They have ideological ties of solidarity with Maoists in countries such as Nepal and the Philippines. They don't have operational links.
17 Is there any peace agreement between the Government and the Maoists? What can we expect in a closer future?
There is no peace agreement. The Government is prepared to hold talks with them on their grievances if they give up the use of violence for achieving political and economic objectives and surrender their arms and ammunition. They are not prepared to. The Maoists pose a typical dilemma to Govt. policy-makers----security vs development. Without security, there can be no development.Without development, there can be no security.How to harmonise the requirements of security and development?.No answer to this question has been found so far.(12-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, March 8, 2010
TERRORISTS TARGET LAHORE AGAIN
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO. 627
B.RAMAN
At least 11 persons are reported to have been killed in a suicide bomb attack on a rented building of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) of Pakistan in the residential Model Town area of Lahore on the morning of March 8,2010. The large quantity of explosive used brought down the entire building.
2. This is the first terrorist attack in Lahore this year. Last year, there were five as follows:
15 October: Terrorists attacked offices of law enforcement agencies.
12 June: A prominent anti-Taliban cleric killed by a suicide bomber at his religious school
27 May: A car bomb attack on police buildings killed 23 persons.
30 March: Gunmen attacked a police academy, killing eight people
3 March: Gunmen killed six police guards in an ambush of the Sri Lankan cricket team
3. The latest attack has taken place after an interval of about five months. There are two possibilities--- either it was carried out by the Terhrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to demonstrate that it still had the capability to attack targets in the non-tribal areas despite the losses suffered by it since the beginning of this year----including the reported but unconfirmed death of its Amir Hakimullah Mehsud after he was injured in a missile strike by a Drone (unmanned) plane of the US in January--- or it was carried out by the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) in retaliation for the reported death of its leader Qari Mohammad Zafar in a US Drone strike in North Waziristan on February 24,2010. The greater possibility is that the latest attack was carried out by a bomber of the LEJ, which has been operating jointly with the TTP and Al Qaeda and which has the capability for spectacular strikes in Lahore.
4. Police and FIA-connected targets and a target of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have been attacked in Lahore since the beginning of last year because of the terrorists' calculation that instability in Lahore could make the Army and the FIA go slow in their operations against the TTP and the Punjabi Taliban. The targeting of the FIA and the ISI in recent months is due to their being perceived by the TTP and the LEJ as working in close co-operation with the US intelligence agencies in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The FIA has also been in receipt of increasing assistance from the US for strengthening its counter-terrorism capability.
5. The Lahore attack came a day after sections of the Pakistani media had claimed that the Pakistani intelligence agencies had managed to arrest Adam Gadahn, the American convert to Islam, who heads the As-Sahab, the propaganda wing of Al Qaeda from a hide-out in a Pashtun inhabited area of Karachi where a large number of Mehsuds from South Waziristan live. Western sources have expressed skepticism about the correctness of the Pakistani claim.
6. If the Pakistani claim proves to be correct, this is a significant breakthrough in the fight against Al Qaeda. If the Pakistani authorities allow the US agencies to interrogate him, they could have fairly correct information regarding the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. As mentioned by me in my note of February 22,2010 titled "Are Bin Laden & Zawahiri in Karachi?" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3681.html, "sources in Mr.Altaf Hussain's organisation are now alleging that not only leaders of the Afghan Taliban, but also many absconding elements of Al Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden, and his No.2 Ayman al-Zawahiri, have shifted to Karachi from North Waziristan to escape the intensified Drone (unmanned planes) attacks by the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and that they have been given shelter by their Pashtun sympathisers in Karachi. They further allege that the Pakistani authorities and some of the political leaders are aware of this."
7. There is no reason to believe that the Lahore attack might have been connected with Gadahn's claimed capture, but retaliatory attacks in Karachi, Rawalpindi and Lahore are likely if it turns out that he has in fact been captured. Whether Gadahn has been captured in Karachi or not, there is a need for an intensified hunt to smoke out Al Qaeda leaders and members from Karachi. After Tora Bora in 2001-02, many of them including Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and bin Laden himself had taken shelter in Karachi, but they ran away from Karachi after Ramzi Binalshib was captured.
8. If the capture of Gadahn in Karachi proves to be correct, there is bound to be panic in the terrorist hide-outs in Karachi and the others taking shelter there might flee back to the tribal areas or might try to escape to Yemen. Strong surveillance to prevent this is necessary. (8-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
At least 11 persons are reported to have been killed in a suicide bomb attack on a rented building of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) of Pakistan in the residential Model Town area of Lahore on the morning of March 8,2010. The large quantity of explosive used brought down the entire building.
2. This is the first terrorist attack in Lahore this year. Last year, there were five as follows:
15 October: Terrorists attacked offices of law enforcement agencies.
12 June: A prominent anti-Taliban cleric killed by a suicide bomber at his religious school
27 May: A car bomb attack on police buildings killed 23 persons.
30 March: Gunmen attacked a police academy, killing eight people
3 March: Gunmen killed six police guards in an ambush of the Sri Lankan cricket team
3. The latest attack has taken place after an interval of about five months. There are two possibilities--- either it was carried out by the Terhrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to demonstrate that it still had the capability to attack targets in the non-tribal areas despite the losses suffered by it since the beginning of this year----including the reported but unconfirmed death of its Amir Hakimullah Mehsud after he was injured in a missile strike by a Drone (unmanned) plane of the US in January--- or it was carried out by the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) in retaliation for the reported death of its leader Qari Mohammad Zafar in a US Drone strike in North Waziristan on February 24,2010. The greater possibility is that the latest attack was carried out by a bomber of the LEJ, which has been operating jointly with the TTP and Al Qaeda and which has the capability for spectacular strikes in Lahore.
4. Police and FIA-connected targets and a target of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have been attacked in Lahore since the beginning of last year because of the terrorists' calculation that instability in Lahore could make the Army and the FIA go slow in their operations against the TTP and the Punjabi Taliban. The targeting of the FIA and the ISI in recent months is due to their being perceived by the TTP and the LEJ as working in close co-operation with the US intelligence agencies in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The FIA has also been in receipt of increasing assistance from the US for strengthening its counter-terrorism capability.
5. The Lahore attack came a day after sections of the Pakistani media had claimed that the Pakistani intelligence agencies had managed to arrest Adam Gadahn, the American convert to Islam, who heads the As-Sahab, the propaganda wing of Al Qaeda from a hide-out in a Pashtun inhabited area of Karachi where a large number of Mehsuds from South Waziristan live. Western sources have expressed skepticism about the correctness of the Pakistani claim.
6. If the Pakistani claim proves to be correct, this is a significant breakthrough in the fight against Al Qaeda. If the Pakistani authorities allow the US agencies to interrogate him, they could have fairly correct information regarding the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. As mentioned by me in my note of February 22,2010 titled "Are Bin Laden & Zawahiri in Karachi?" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3681.html, "sources in Mr.Altaf Hussain's organisation are now alleging that not only leaders of the Afghan Taliban, but also many absconding elements of Al Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden, and his No.2 Ayman al-Zawahiri, have shifted to Karachi from North Waziristan to escape the intensified Drone (unmanned planes) attacks by the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and that they have been given shelter by their Pashtun sympathisers in Karachi. They further allege that the Pakistani authorities and some of the political leaders are aware of this."
7. There is no reason to believe that the Lahore attack might have been connected with Gadahn's claimed capture, but retaliatory attacks in Karachi, Rawalpindi and Lahore are likely if it turns out that he has in fact been captured. Whether Gadahn has been captured in Karachi or not, there is a need for an intensified hunt to smoke out Al Qaeda leaders and members from Karachi. After Tora Bora in 2001-02, many of them including Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and bin Laden himself had taken shelter in Karachi, but they ran away from Karachi after Ramzi Binalshib was captured.
8. If the capture of Gadahn in Karachi proves to be correct, there is bound to be panic in the terrorist hide-outs in Karachi and the others taking shelter there might flee back to the tribal areas or might try to escape to Yemen. Strong surveillance to prevent this is necessary. (8-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, March 4, 2010
FRESH FEARS OF MARITIME TERRORISM
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.626
B.RAMAN
The years following the Al Qaeda attack on the US naval ship USS Cole in Aden in October,2000, saw an increase in fears of sea-borne terrorism either on coastal targets or on sea-moving targets such as oil/gas tankers, container ships etc. There were also fears of a possible Al Qaeda-inspired attack to block maritime choke-points such as the Malacca Strait.
2. These fears were caused by the flow of human intelligence as well as by the interrogation of arrested suspects. These fears reached the zenith in the months following the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. Consequently, there was increased international and regional co-operation in the form of exchange of intelligence and assessments, joint or co-ordinated naval patrolling, joint naval exercises, intensified action against piracy in the Malacca Strait etc.
3. Post-2005, these fears got diluted partly due to the absence of any terrorist attack from the sea, partly due to the preoccupation of Al Qaeda and its allies with land-based operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and partly due to the effective action taken against piracy in the Malacca Strait region.
4.In recent months, there has been a revival of the fears about a possible maritime terrorist strike due to the following reasons: Firstly, an increase in incidents of piracy by Somali/Yemeni pirates and the inability of the international community to deal effectively with the problem till now; secondly, an increase in the activities of Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia, both of which have a large number of sea-faring men who might be prepared to help Al Qaeda in sea-borne attacks; thirdly, the successful sea-borne terrorist strikes mounted by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) on land-based targets in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, and the failure of the Indian Navy and other Navies operating in the seas of the region to detect the plans of the LET and the movement of the LET boat carrying the terrorists from Karachi to Mumbai; and fourthly, the strengthening of physical security for land-based targets, which has necessitated the terrorists once again turning their attention to sea-based targets.
5. The enormous publicity, which the LET got for its sea-borne attack in Mumbai, demonstrated the propaganda value of sea-borne attacks, where the surprise element is more. It is to be expected that not only Al Qaeda, but also other Al Qaeda allied elements such as those of the Jemmah Islamiyah and the Yemeni and Somali members of Al Qaeda might once again be tempted to think in terms of acts of maritime terrorism to prove that their capabilities are intact.
6. It is in this context that one has to see reports from Singapore that an unidentified terrorist g.roup is planning attacks against oil tankers in the Malacca Strait.The Singapore Shipping Association has been quoted as saying on March 2,2010, that it had received an advisory from the Singapore Navy Information Fusion Centre about "an indication that a terrorist group is planning attacks on oil tankers in the Malacca Strait." It added: "This does not preclude possible attacks on other large vessels with dangerous cargo." The Navy Centre's advisory reportedly said:"The terrorists' intent is probably to achieve widespread publicity and showcase that it remains a viable group." It reminded shipping operators that the militants could use smaller vessels such as dinghies and speedboats to attack oil tankers. It recommended that ships should "strengthen their onboard security measures and adopt community reporting to increase awareness and strengthen the safety of all seafarers," according to the Association.
7. It is necessay for the Indian counter-terrorism agencies too and the Indian Navy and Coast Guard to re-focus on the likelihood of fresh sea-borne terrorist strikes against Indian targets either on land or on the high seas in the waters to the west of India. Protection of sealanes against pirates and terrorists acting separatrely of each other or in tandem and prevention and countering of acts of maritime terrorism require close regional co-operation with the navies of countries such as the US, Japan, China,Pakistan,Sri Lanka, the ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Australia. Such co-operation should address issues such as intelligence collection and sharing, joint or co-ordinated operations, mutual assistance on the high seas, joint exercises etc. It is important for India to take the initiative in this matter.
8. The two joint counter-terrorism exercises between India and China held so far were land-based. The first was held in Yunnan and the second in Karnataka. The next Sino-Indian joint exercise should focus on co-ordinated action and mutual assistance against maritime terrorism with the involvement of the navies of not only India and China, but also the US, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan and Australia. We should not allow the continuing differences with China over the border dispute to come in the way of evolving a co-operative mechanism against maritime terrorism and piracy.
9. Our adversarial relationship with Pakistan would not permit us to think in terms of joint maritime counter-terrorism exercises with Pakistan, but intelligence-sharing arrangements should be possible and advisable despite the continuing serious differences between the two countries on the issue of Pakistani inaction against terrorism.We must develop slowly habits of mutual assistance with Pakistan----in the field of investigation of terrorism-related cases and prevention of maritime terrorist incidents.( 5-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary ( retd), Cabinet Secretariat. Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The years following the Al Qaeda attack on the US naval ship USS Cole in Aden in October,2000, saw an increase in fears of sea-borne terrorism either on coastal targets or on sea-moving targets such as oil/gas tankers, container ships etc. There were also fears of a possible Al Qaeda-inspired attack to block maritime choke-points such as the Malacca Strait.
2. These fears were caused by the flow of human intelligence as well as by the interrogation of arrested suspects. These fears reached the zenith in the months following the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. Consequently, there was increased international and regional co-operation in the form of exchange of intelligence and assessments, joint or co-ordinated naval patrolling, joint naval exercises, intensified action against piracy in the Malacca Strait etc.
3. Post-2005, these fears got diluted partly due to the absence of any terrorist attack from the sea, partly due to the preoccupation of Al Qaeda and its allies with land-based operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and partly due to the effective action taken against piracy in the Malacca Strait region.
4.In recent months, there has been a revival of the fears about a possible maritime terrorist strike due to the following reasons: Firstly, an increase in incidents of piracy by Somali/Yemeni pirates and the inability of the international community to deal effectively with the problem till now; secondly, an increase in the activities of Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia, both of which have a large number of sea-faring men who might be prepared to help Al Qaeda in sea-borne attacks; thirdly, the successful sea-borne terrorist strikes mounted by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) on land-based targets in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, and the failure of the Indian Navy and other Navies operating in the seas of the region to detect the plans of the LET and the movement of the LET boat carrying the terrorists from Karachi to Mumbai; and fourthly, the strengthening of physical security for land-based targets, which has necessitated the terrorists once again turning their attention to sea-based targets.
5. The enormous publicity, which the LET got for its sea-borne attack in Mumbai, demonstrated the propaganda value of sea-borne attacks, where the surprise element is more. It is to be expected that not only Al Qaeda, but also other Al Qaeda allied elements such as those of the Jemmah Islamiyah and the Yemeni and Somali members of Al Qaeda might once again be tempted to think in terms of acts of maritime terrorism to prove that their capabilities are intact.
6. It is in this context that one has to see reports from Singapore that an unidentified terrorist g.roup is planning attacks against oil tankers in the Malacca Strait.The Singapore Shipping Association has been quoted as saying on March 2,2010, that it had received an advisory from the Singapore Navy Information Fusion Centre about "an indication that a terrorist group is planning attacks on oil tankers in the Malacca Strait." It added: "This does not preclude possible attacks on other large vessels with dangerous cargo." The Navy Centre's advisory reportedly said:"The terrorists' intent is probably to achieve widespread publicity and showcase that it remains a viable group." It reminded shipping operators that the militants could use smaller vessels such as dinghies and speedboats to attack oil tankers. It recommended that ships should "strengthen their onboard security measures and adopt community reporting to increase awareness and strengthen the safety of all seafarers," according to the Association.
7. It is necessay for the Indian counter-terrorism agencies too and the Indian Navy and Coast Guard to re-focus on the likelihood of fresh sea-borne terrorist strikes against Indian targets either on land or on the high seas in the waters to the west of India. Protection of sealanes against pirates and terrorists acting separatrely of each other or in tandem and prevention and countering of acts of maritime terrorism require close regional co-operation with the navies of countries such as the US, Japan, China,Pakistan,Sri Lanka, the ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Australia. Such co-operation should address issues such as intelligence collection and sharing, joint or co-ordinated operations, mutual assistance on the high seas, joint exercises etc. It is important for India to take the initiative in this matter.
8. The two joint counter-terrorism exercises between India and China held so far were land-based. The first was held in Yunnan and the second in Karnataka. The next Sino-Indian joint exercise should focus on co-ordinated action and mutual assistance against maritime terrorism with the involvement of the navies of not only India and China, but also the US, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan and Australia. We should not allow the continuing differences with China over the border dispute to come in the way of evolving a co-operative mechanism against maritime terrorism and piracy.
9. Our adversarial relationship with Pakistan would not permit us to think in terms of joint maritime counter-terrorism exercises with Pakistan, but intelligence-sharing arrangements should be possible and advisable despite the continuing serious differences between the two countries on the issue of Pakistani inaction against terrorism.We must develop slowly habits of mutual assistance with Pakistan----in the field of investigation of terrorism-related cases and prevention of maritime terrorist incidents.( 5-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary ( retd), Cabinet Secretariat. Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
WHAT NEXT IN PAKISTAN'S PASHTUN BELT?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.625
B.RAMAN
The Pakistan Army and the US intelligence are making headway in the battle against jihadi terrorism --- the indigenous as well as the global varieties--- in Pakistan's Pashtun tribal belt in the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
2. They are working in tandem in some places such as the Swat Valley of the Malakand Division and South Waziristan in the FATA and separately of each other in co-ordinated, but not joint operations in other areas such as the Bajaur and the North Waziristan Agencies of the FATA. While the Pakistan Army has been exclusively handling the ground situation in the Bajaur Agency with very little US involvement, the US has been keeping up relentless pressure on the terrorists in North Waziristan and occasionally in South Waziristan through its Drone (pilotless planes) strikes.
3.There is a gentlemen's agreement between Islamabad and Washington that the former will keep making proforma protests against the Drone strikes without trying to stop them. If Pakistan protests really and vehemently, the US will have to stop them. The US is able to continue them because the Pakistani protests are a charade. Pakistan knows it is benefiting from the Drone strikes and wants them to continue. Fears that disproportionate civilian casualties might add to anti-American feelings have been belied. Civilian casualties there have been, but they are not as heavy as made out by some US analysts. Even the Pakistani civil society and the local tribal population no longer protest against the civilian casualties. They have realised that by eliminating the jihadi terrorist leaders of not only Al Qaeda, but also indigenous organisations such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) and trans-border organisations such as the anti-Chinese Islamic Movement of East Turkestan (IMET) the US has given them some relief from the intimidation and terror imposed on the local population by these terrorist groups.
4. There are signs of a jihadi fatigue in the Pakistani Pashtun belt. This fatigue should account for the remarkable decline in public protests over the Drone strikes. It has also contributed to the increasing flow of valuable intelligence to the US agencies. Almost all the successful US Drone strikes were intelligence-driven. Initially, the intelligence came overwhelmingly from technical sources. Now, they are coming more and more from human sources. When there is popular fatigue with the terrorists, intelligence flow improves. We are witnessing this in the tribal belt.
5. The remarkable successes of the US intelligence in North Waziristan have been accompanied by the headway made by the Pakistani security forces in the Swat Valley, South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency. These operations cannot be described as successful in terms of identified terrorist leaders neutralised by the Pakistan Army. Many of the terrorist leaders operating in these areas have escaped capture by the Pakistan Army. Their trained followers have dispersed and peeled off. They have retained a capability for re-grouping and striking back at a later stage if the Army pressure eases.
6. Despite this, the Pakistan Army operations have been successful in the sense that it has been able to re-establish territorial control over Swat, South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency and deny the use of this territory to the terrorists. Is this territorial control ephemeral or will it be enduring? The training and equipment given by the US to Pakistani para-military forces such as the Frontier Corps have improved their morale and made them fight better to wrest control of the territory from the terrorists, but their ability to hold on to the "newly liberated" territory in the face of a renewed assault is yet to be tested.
7. Any comprehensive operation in this area has to have three components---liberate, hold on to it and develop. Only the first component is now being attempted by the Army with US assistance. US policy-makers and Pakistani civilian leaders are yet to pay attention to the other two components. Holding on to the "liberated" territory demands massive investments for a crash development of roads and other means of communications. One sees no signs of any such investments and related activity. It also demands a robust civilian governing machinery which enforces the civilian authority, brings the liberated areas into the national political mainstream from which the entire FATA had remained excluded ever since Pakistan became independent in 1947 and undertakes massive economic development programmes.
8. The elected civilian Government in Islamabad has shown very little interest in the civilian follow-up to the military actions. It has left all the initiatives in the FATA in the hands of the Army. There is hardly any thinking or discussion in Islamabad or the rest of the country on how to increase the extent and effectiveness of the civilian governing machinery in the tribal belt. The civilian leaders have no interest in the tasks of governance in the tribal areas. Even US policy-makers and experts have shown not much inteterest in following up on the military successes by undertaking a programme for changing the political and economic landscape of the tribal areas.
9. This total lack of interest in "what next" could facilitate re-grouping and a come-back by the terrorists and insurgents. (4-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The Pakistan Army and the US intelligence are making headway in the battle against jihadi terrorism --- the indigenous as well as the global varieties--- in Pakistan's Pashtun tribal belt in the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
2. They are working in tandem in some places such as the Swat Valley of the Malakand Division and South Waziristan in the FATA and separately of each other in co-ordinated, but not joint operations in other areas such as the Bajaur and the North Waziristan Agencies of the FATA. While the Pakistan Army has been exclusively handling the ground situation in the Bajaur Agency with very little US involvement, the US has been keeping up relentless pressure on the terrorists in North Waziristan and occasionally in South Waziristan through its Drone (pilotless planes) strikes.
3.There is a gentlemen's agreement between Islamabad and Washington that the former will keep making proforma protests against the Drone strikes without trying to stop them. If Pakistan protests really and vehemently, the US will have to stop them. The US is able to continue them because the Pakistani protests are a charade. Pakistan knows it is benefiting from the Drone strikes and wants them to continue. Fears that disproportionate civilian casualties might add to anti-American feelings have been belied. Civilian casualties there have been, but they are not as heavy as made out by some US analysts. Even the Pakistani civil society and the local tribal population no longer protest against the civilian casualties. They have realised that by eliminating the jihadi terrorist leaders of not only Al Qaeda, but also indigenous organisations such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) and trans-border organisations such as the anti-Chinese Islamic Movement of East Turkestan (IMET) the US has given them some relief from the intimidation and terror imposed on the local population by these terrorist groups.
4. There are signs of a jihadi fatigue in the Pakistani Pashtun belt. This fatigue should account for the remarkable decline in public protests over the Drone strikes. It has also contributed to the increasing flow of valuable intelligence to the US agencies. Almost all the successful US Drone strikes were intelligence-driven. Initially, the intelligence came overwhelmingly from technical sources. Now, they are coming more and more from human sources. When there is popular fatigue with the terrorists, intelligence flow improves. We are witnessing this in the tribal belt.
5. The remarkable successes of the US intelligence in North Waziristan have been accompanied by the headway made by the Pakistani security forces in the Swat Valley, South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency. These operations cannot be described as successful in terms of identified terrorist leaders neutralised by the Pakistan Army. Many of the terrorist leaders operating in these areas have escaped capture by the Pakistan Army. Their trained followers have dispersed and peeled off. They have retained a capability for re-grouping and striking back at a later stage if the Army pressure eases.
6. Despite this, the Pakistan Army operations have been successful in the sense that it has been able to re-establish territorial control over Swat, South Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency and deny the use of this territory to the terrorists. Is this territorial control ephemeral or will it be enduring? The training and equipment given by the US to Pakistani para-military forces such as the Frontier Corps have improved their morale and made them fight better to wrest control of the territory from the terrorists, but their ability to hold on to the "newly liberated" territory in the face of a renewed assault is yet to be tested.
7. Any comprehensive operation in this area has to have three components---liberate, hold on to it and develop. Only the first component is now being attempted by the Army with US assistance. US policy-makers and Pakistani civilian leaders are yet to pay attention to the other two components. Holding on to the "liberated" territory demands massive investments for a crash development of roads and other means of communications. One sees no signs of any such investments and related activity. It also demands a robust civilian governing machinery which enforces the civilian authority, brings the liberated areas into the national political mainstream from which the entire FATA had remained excluded ever since Pakistan became independent in 1947 and undertakes massive economic development programmes.
8. The elected civilian Government in Islamabad has shown very little interest in the civilian follow-up to the military actions. It has left all the initiatives in the FATA in the hands of the Army. There is hardly any thinking or discussion in Islamabad or the rest of the country on how to increase the extent and effectiveness of the civilian governing machinery in the tribal belt. The civilian leaders have no interest in the tasks of governance in the tribal areas. Even US policy-makers and experts have shown not much inteterest in following up on the military successes by undertaking a programme for changing the political and economic landscape of the tribal areas.
9. This total lack of interest in "what next" could facilitate re-grouping and a come-back by the terrorists and insurgents. (4-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, March 1, 2010
JIHADI TERRORISM IN INDIA: THE SAUDI CONNECTION
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 624
B.RAMAN
During his just-concluded visit (February 27 to March 1, 2010) to Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh is reported to have taken up with the Saudi leaders the question of Pakistan’s continued sponsorship of terrorism against India and sought their good offices for persuading Pakistan to act against anti-Indian terrorism directed from Pakistani territory.
2. Like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia has been following a dual policy on terrorism. It has taken ruthless action against Al Qaeda elements posing a threat to its internal security. At the same time, it has avoided taking action against Wahabi organizations which have been supporting terrorism in other countries. Many of the so-called charity organizations, which have been funding terrorist organizations in other countries including India and Bangladesh, are of Saudi origin. Despite international pressure on Saudi Arabia to act against such charity organizations and stop the flow of funds to global jihadi terrorism, the action taken by the Saudi authorities has been unsatisfactory.
3.It would be futile to expect that Saudi Arabia could be of assistance to India in dealing with jihadi terrorism emanating from Pakistan or Bangladesh. There has been a long history of links between jihadi terrorist elements in India and Saudi Arabia ever since the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December,1992. In December 1993, coinciding with the first anniversary of the demolition of the masjid , there was a number of explosions in different railway trains in North India. The interrogation of one of the suspects arrested during the investigation revealed that the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) had organised them.
4. The suspect also alleged that C.A.M.Basheer, who was the President of the SIMI in the 1980s, had, along with one or two other members of the SIMI, attended a training course in the use of arms and ammunition and explosives in a camp of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) of Pakistan in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) run by one Salauddin, a Sudanese national, in the late 1980s. During the training, the JEI arranged a meeting between the SIMI activists and Lal Singh, alias Manjit Singh of the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), Canada, who was then living in Lahore. Lal Singh was arrested by the Gujarat Police in the middle of 1992 when he crossed over into India.
5. The JEI urged the SIMI and the ISYF to co-operate with each other for the "liberation" of the Sikhs of Punjab and the Kashmiris of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). The co-operation project was code-named "K-2", standing for Kashmir-Khalistan. It was also stated that Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the then Amir of the JEI, had nominated Amirul Azim, the then Propaganda Secretary of the JEI, as the co-ordinator of the project.
6. The suspect also stated that the JEI had asked Basheer to send more members of the SIMI to Pakistan for training, but he could not do so due to logistic problems. In the early 1990s, Amirul Azim, accompanied by Salauddin, the Sudanese instructor, entered India via Bangladesh and met Basheer and his associates for discussing their future plans. They were told that in view of the difficulties experienced by them in sending more activists to Pakistan for training, instructions had been given to the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), the Kashmiri terrorist organisation, which is a wing of the JEI, to train SIMI cadres in its camps in J&K itself. The SIMI was asked to send its future batches to J&K for training.
7. Despite intensive searches by the police of different States, Basheer and his associates, who had allegedly undergone training in Pakistan, could not be arrested. Basheer, who must now be around 48, is from Parambayam in Kerala. After studying in the Union Christian College, Aluva, near Kochi, he worked for a brief while in the Safdarjung airport of New Delhi before taking to terrorism and absconding. Subsequent reports indicated that he had taken up residence in Saudi Arabia from where he was guiding the activities of the SIMI in India and organising its branches in other countries of the Gulf. In Saudi Arabia, he was also reported to have floated a new organisation called
the Muslim Development Force .
8. In 1992, the "Time" magazine of the US had carried an interview with one Commander Abu Abdel Aziz, with a picture of his in his henna-dyed beard and Afghan style fatigue. After the "Time", "al-Sharq al-Awsat", a Saudi-owned, London-based daily, ran a front-page story on Abu Abdel Aziz and his activities in Bosnia. In August 1994, "Al-Sirat Al-Mustaqeem (The Straight Path)", an Islamic journal published in Pakistan (Issue No. 33), carried an interview with Abu Abdel Aziz. The journal, without identifying his nationality, reported that Abu Abdel Aziz spoke perfect Urdu and that he had spent extended periods in Kashmir. It was stated that Abu Abdel Aziz's followers, believed to be mostly Indian Muslims from the Gulf, were part of the seventh battalion of the Bosnian Army (SEDMI KORPUS, ARMIJA REPUBLIKE BH).
9. In the interview, he made the following points:
* "I was one of those who heard about Jihad in Afghanistan when it started. I used to hear about it, but was hesitant about (the purity and intention of) this Jihad. One of those who came to our land (presumably Saudi Arabia) was Sheikh Dr. Abdallah Azzam. I heard him rallying the youth to come forth and (join him) to go to Afghanistan. This was in 1984 -- I think. I decided to go and check the matter for myself. This was the beginning (of my journey with) Jihad. Then the conquest of Kabul came.
* "A new Jihad started in Bosnia, (we moved there), and we are with it. As to Arab Mujahideen (in Bosnia), they do not have a separate battalion. There is a battalion for non-Bosnian fighters. Arabs are a minority compared to those of the Mujahideen (gathered from around the World). This battalion is under a unified command and is called Kateebat al-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Battalion), or "El-Mudzahidin" as they call them in Bosnian. Militarily, it has a link to the Bosnian government under the general command of the Bosnian Armed Forces. It is in fact part of the seventh battalion (SEDMI KORPUS, ARMIJA REPUBLIKE BH) of the Bosnian Army. I am a field commander under the "General Unified Armed Command". We have full jurisdiction in the region we are responsible for (Editor's note: Mostly central Bosnia). The general command of the Muslim forces wants to see results, it does not dictate strategy or action.
* "I met several prominent Ulema. Among them Sheikh Nasir ad-Din al-Albani, Sheikh Abdel Aziz Bin Baz and Sheikh Muhammad Bin Otheimin and others in the Gulf area. Sheikh Nasir ad-Din al-Albani is one of the great Ulema of this time and one seeks guidance in the light of his knowledge and view. (I say) in my last meeting with him, he was supportive of Jihad in Bosnia-Herzeg (as a religious duty). However, he told us not to attack - that is we, the Arab Mujahideen.Since we were the smaller the Sheikh was afraid we might get killed in large numbers if we engaged people in the fight. However, he requested that we dig in and be at the most advanced defense-lines (Khat ad-Difa` al-Awwal) to defend those persecuted.
* "The rest of the Ulema support Jihad by any means (defensive or offensive). You must understand that - militarily speaking - the number of those killed in defense is (far) higher than those killed in attack. This is due to the fact that in attack, clashes and skirmishes take place between Mujahideen and Kuffar (non-believers).The Kafir (unbeliever) does not throw himself arbitrarily in the cross-fire for fear of killing his companions. This fact lowers the number of the dead and this is the most important fact of the matter.
* "Jihad in Kashmir is still going on. It is healthy. Our Kashmiri brothers have achieved a lot. Some of our Mujahideen brethren, whether Arab or (Ajam non-Arab), such as the Pakistanis and our brethren from South-East Asia, have also helped. Their actions have been very successful, especially in the lands under Indian government control. Mujahideen execute hit-and-run operations. However there is a lack of support by Islamic governments and a lack of media coverage by Islamic outlets, on the level of atrocity and destruction by the non-believers in those lands."
10. Subsequently, this Abu Abdel Aziz appeared at a conference of the LET (Lashkar-e-Toiba) at its headquarters in Muridke, near Lahore, in November,1994. He was introduced to the audience as an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia, who was playing a heroic role in helping the Muslims of Bosnia in their fight against the Christian Serbs and in helping the Kashmiris fighting against the Government of India.
11. Other reports indicated that in May 1995, like-minded jihadi groups had formed a "Rapid Deployment Force" called "Katiba (Kateebat?) al Mujahideen" (Batallion of the Mujahideen) at a meeting held in the Philippines. The meeting was attended among others by "al-Sheikh Abu Abdul Aziz," described as the Chief Commander of the 7th Brigade of Muslim forces in Bosnia, Salamat Hashan, the Chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines), Abdul Karim, Chairman of the Islamic Front (Eritrea) and Prof. Hafiz Mohd Saeed, Amir MDI (Markaz Dawa Al Irshad, as the political wing of the LET was then known), Pakistan. "Al-Sheikh Abu Abdul Aziz" and Abu Abdel Aziz were probably identical, but one was not certain on the basis of available evidence.
12. The meeting reportedly agreed on the following (a) nationalities and frontiers on the basis of races was an un-Islamic perception; (b) to work in support of Muslims in all those parts of the world where action was being taken against them; (c) the Mujahideen of the newly formed Kateebat Al-Mujahideen would carry out militant operations and fight in Kashmir to eliminate un-Islamic perceptions of nationalities and frontiers.
13. Till 1997, Abu Abdel Aziz either used to attend the annual conventions of the LET at Muridke or his recorded speeches used to be telecast or he used to speak over phone. He disappeared from public view thereafter. There were rumours in Islamic circles in Pakistan that he had been arrested by the Saudi authorities, apparently because of his suspected links with Osama bin Laden, who is against the Saudi monarchy. In August, 2001, the police of Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh claimed to have arrested one Abdul Aziz alias Ashrafi, who had fought in Bosnia and Chechnya. From published reports, it was not clear whether they had questioned him about the identity of Abu Abdel Aziz and other Indian Muslims from the Gulf, who had allegedly fought in Bosnia and their subsequent whereabouts.
14. The real identity of Abu Abdel Aziz still remains a mystery. If he was an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia, as claimed by the LET, what was his real name, to which part of India he belonged, what was his political affiliation, did he have any links with the SIMI? All that one could conjecture was that Basheer could not be operating under the alias Abu Abdel Aziz because the Pakistani Urdu media projected him as operating from Saudi Arabia since the early 1980s, whereas Basheer was reported to have moved over to Saudi Arabia only in the early 1990s, possibly after the Babri masjid demolition.
15. From the various reports received, one could make the following surmise:
* There were at least two Indian Muslims operating from Saudi Arabia and associated with jihadi terrorism.
* One of them referred to by Pakistani jihadis as Abu Abdel Aziz was linked to the LET. He had played what the jihadis considered as a legendary role in organising jihad in Bosnia and was also closely involved in assisting the jihadis in J&K.
* Basheer co-ordinated the activities of the SIMI in India and the Gulf from Saudi Arabia.
16. After the Gujarat riots of 2002 and coinciding with the 10th anniversary of the Babri Masjid demolition, reports started circulating in Pakistan that some of the Indian and Pakistani Muslims working in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, had started a drive for the collection of funds to be utilised for assisting the Muslim victims of the riots and for mounting acts of punishment terrorism in India to avenge the killings of Muslims in Gujarat. Compilations of Indian media reports about the anti-Muslim atrocities in Gujarat and video recordings of these atrocities were used as part of this fund collection drive.
17. In December 2002, the Tamil Nadu Police claimed to have unearthed a new organisation, apparently inspired and controlled by jihadi elements in Saudi Arabia, called the Muslim Defence Force (MDF). It was not clear whether this was identical with the Muslim Development Force of Basheer. Published reports about the Tamil Nadu Police's detection indicated as follows:
* One Abu Hamsa, alias Abdul Bari, an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia and associated with the LET, and one Abu Omar, a Pakistani Muslim working there, had together formed the MDF after the Gujarat riots. They had also met a Muslim leader from Tamil Nadu who had gone to Saudi Arabia on haj pilgrimage.
* On his return to Tamil Nadu, this leader held a clandestine meeting at Tenkasi in Tiruvelveli district, which was attended by about 30 Muslims. At this meeting, plans for organising MDF activities in India were discussed.
* Subsequently, two of those, who had attended the Tenkasi meeting, went to Sri Lanka (the Eastern Province?), where they were to have another meeting with Abu Hamsa, but he did not turn up from Saudi Arabia. They, therefore, returned to Tamil Nadu without meeting him.
* Abu Hamsa alias Abdul Bari was wanted in connection with an explosion in Andhra Pradesh. He had given instructions to his contacts in Tamil Nadu to organise the activities of the MDF and also to float another organisation called New Vision to propagate Islam amongst the so-called backward classes of the Hindu community and recruit them for jihad.
* The associates of Abu Hamsa in Tamil Nadu were instructed to form an elite force to establish hide-outs and protect jihadi terrorists visiting Tamil Nadu and to recruit youth for training in jihad at an undisclosed destination in the Gulf.
* Amongst those arrested by the Tamil Nadu police during their investigation into the activities of the MDF was Noohu Thambi Hamid Bakri, an alleged sympathiser of the LET. He was stated to be the principal of the Ayesha Siddique Arabic College for Women at Kayalpattinam and also the President of the All-India Tauhid Jamath Federation. He also used to be associated with an organisation called the Kayal Islamic Defence Force, which is now believed to be dormant.
* It was Hamid Bakri, accompanied by one Zakkaria, who had met Abu Hamsa in Saudi Arabia and subsequently gone to Sri Lanka for another meeting, which did not materialise.In November, 2002, Zakkaria was allegedly in receipt of Rs.1,50,000 from Abu Hamsa in Saudi Arabia through hawala.
18. None of the reports relating to the unearthing of the activities of the MDF in Tamil Nadu had referred to any role of Basheer in this connection. However, his name again cropped up as possibly amongst the dramatis personae associated with the series of explosions in Mumbai since December, 2002.
19.For some years now there have been indicators of the clandestine creation of a jihadi web in Mumbai, south India and possibly in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, with the SIMI and the LET playing an active role in this matter, either in tandem or separately of each other. Much of the inspiration and financial support for this came from Indian and Pakistani jihadi activists in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.
20. The LET receives funds from the so-called charity organizations in Saudi Arabia. It has an office in Saudi Arabia to make recruitment of jihadis from the Indian Muslim community living in Saudi Arabia. It also recruits from Muslims of other countries visiting Saudi Arabia for pilgrimage.
21. It would have been more useful if the Prime Minister had taken up with the Saudi authorities the question of their acting against the LET activities from Saudi territory and stopping the flow of funds to the LET from Saudi organizations. He should have also raised the issue of the activities of absconding SIMI elements from Saudi Arabia. ( 2-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
During his just-concluded visit (February 27 to March 1, 2010) to Saudi Arabia, Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh is reported to have taken up with the Saudi leaders the question of Pakistan’s continued sponsorship of terrorism against India and sought their good offices for persuading Pakistan to act against anti-Indian terrorism directed from Pakistani territory.
2. Like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia has been following a dual policy on terrorism. It has taken ruthless action against Al Qaeda elements posing a threat to its internal security. At the same time, it has avoided taking action against Wahabi organizations which have been supporting terrorism in other countries. Many of the so-called charity organizations, which have been funding terrorist organizations in other countries including India and Bangladesh, are of Saudi origin. Despite international pressure on Saudi Arabia to act against such charity organizations and stop the flow of funds to global jihadi terrorism, the action taken by the Saudi authorities has been unsatisfactory.
3.It would be futile to expect that Saudi Arabia could be of assistance to India in dealing with jihadi terrorism emanating from Pakistan or Bangladesh. There has been a long history of links between jihadi terrorist elements in India and Saudi Arabia ever since the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December,1992. In December 1993, coinciding with the first anniversary of the demolition of the masjid , there was a number of explosions in different railway trains in North India. The interrogation of one of the suspects arrested during the investigation revealed that the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) had organised them.
4. The suspect also alleged that C.A.M.Basheer, who was the President of the SIMI in the 1980s, had, along with one or two other members of the SIMI, attended a training course in the use of arms and ammunition and explosives in a camp of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) of Pakistan in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) run by one Salauddin, a Sudanese national, in the late 1980s. During the training, the JEI arranged a meeting between the SIMI activists and Lal Singh, alias Manjit Singh of the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), Canada, who was then living in Lahore. Lal Singh was arrested by the Gujarat Police in the middle of 1992 when he crossed over into India.
5. The JEI urged the SIMI and the ISYF to co-operate with each other for the "liberation" of the Sikhs of Punjab and the Kashmiris of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). The co-operation project was code-named "K-2", standing for Kashmir-Khalistan. It was also stated that Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the then Amir of the JEI, had nominated Amirul Azim, the then Propaganda Secretary of the JEI, as the co-ordinator of the project.
6. The suspect also stated that the JEI had asked Basheer to send more members of the SIMI to Pakistan for training, but he could not do so due to logistic problems. In the early 1990s, Amirul Azim, accompanied by Salauddin, the Sudanese instructor, entered India via Bangladesh and met Basheer and his associates for discussing their future plans. They were told that in view of the difficulties experienced by them in sending more activists to Pakistan for training, instructions had been given to the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), the Kashmiri terrorist organisation, which is a wing of the JEI, to train SIMI cadres in its camps in J&K itself. The SIMI was asked to send its future batches to J&K for training.
7. Despite intensive searches by the police of different States, Basheer and his associates, who had allegedly undergone training in Pakistan, could not be arrested. Basheer, who must now be around 48, is from Parambayam in Kerala. After studying in the Union Christian College, Aluva, near Kochi, he worked for a brief while in the Safdarjung airport of New Delhi before taking to terrorism and absconding. Subsequent reports indicated that he had taken up residence in Saudi Arabia from where he was guiding the activities of the SIMI in India and organising its branches in other countries of the Gulf. In Saudi Arabia, he was also reported to have floated a new organisation called
the Muslim Development Force .
8. In 1992, the "Time" magazine of the US had carried an interview with one Commander Abu Abdel Aziz, with a picture of his in his henna-dyed beard and Afghan style fatigue. After the "Time", "al-Sharq al-Awsat", a Saudi-owned, London-based daily, ran a front-page story on Abu Abdel Aziz and his activities in Bosnia. In August 1994, "Al-Sirat Al-Mustaqeem (The Straight Path)", an Islamic journal published in Pakistan (Issue No. 33), carried an interview with Abu Abdel Aziz. The journal, without identifying his nationality, reported that Abu Abdel Aziz spoke perfect Urdu and that he had spent extended periods in Kashmir. It was stated that Abu Abdel Aziz's followers, believed to be mostly Indian Muslims from the Gulf, were part of the seventh battalion of the Bosnian Army (SEDMI KORPUS, ARMIJA REPUBLIKE BH).
9. In the interview, he made the following points:
* "I was one of those who heard about Jihad in Afghanistan when it started. I used to hear about it, but was hesitant about (the purity and intention of) this Jihad. One of those who came to our land (presumably Saudi Arabia) was Sheikh Dr. Abdallah Azzam. I heard him rallying the youth to come forth and (join him) to go to Afghanistan. This was in 1984 -- I think. I decided to go and check the matter for myself. This was the beginning (of my journey with) Jihad. Then the conquest of Kabul came.
* "A new Jihad started in Bosnia, (we moved there), and we are with it. As to Arab Mujahideen (in Bosnia), they do not have a separate battalion. There is a battalion for non-Bosnian fighters. Arabs are a minority compared to those of the Mujahideen (gathered from around the World). This battalion is under a unified command and is called Kateebat al-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Battalion), or "El-Mudzahidin" as they call them in Bosnian. Militarily, it has a link to the Bosnian government under the general command of the Bosnian Armed Forces. It is in fact part of the seventh battalion (SEDMI KORPUS, ARMIJA REPUBLIKE BH) of the Bosnian Army. I am a field commander under the "General Unified Armed Command". We have full jurisdiction in the region we are responsible for (Editor's note: Mostly central Bosnia). The general command of the Muslim forces wants to see results, it does not dictate strategy or action.
* "I met several prominent Ulema. Among them Sheikh Nasir ad-Din al-Albani, Sheikh Abdel Aziz Bin Baz and Sheikh Muhammad Bin Otheimin and others in the Gulf area. Sheikh Nasir ad-Din al-Albani is one of the great Ulema of this time and one seeks guidance in the light of his knowledge and view. (I say) in my last meeting with him, he was supportive of Jihad in Bosnia-Herzeg (as a religious duty). However, he told us not to attack - that is we, the Arab Mujahideen.Since we were the smaller the Sheikh was afraid we might get killed in large numbers if we engaged people in the fight. However, he requested that we dig in and be at the most advanced defense-lines (Khat ad-Difa` al-Awwal) to defend those persecuted.
* "The rest of the Ulema support Jihad by any means (defensive or offensive). You must understand that - militarily speaking - the number of those killed in defense is (far) higher than those killed in attack. This is due to the fact that in attack, clashes and skirmishes take place between Mujahideen and Kuffar (non-believers).The Kafir (unbeliever) does not throw himself arbitrarily in the cross-fire for fear of killing his companions. This fact lowers the number of the dead and this is the most important fact of the matter.
* "Jihad in Kashmir is still going on. It is healthy. Our Kashmiri brothers have achieved a lot. Some of our Mujahideen brethren, whether Arab or (Ajam non-Arab), such as the Pakistanis and our brethren from South-East Asia, have also helped. Their actions have been very successful, especially in the lands under Indian government control. Mujahideen execute hit-and-run operations. However there is a lack of support by Islamic governments and a lack of media coverage by Islamic outlets, on the level of atrocity and destruction by the non-believers in those lands."
10. Subsequently, this Abu Abdel Aziz appeared at a conference of the LET (Lashkar-e-Toiba) at its headquarters in Muridke, near Lahore, in November,1994. He was introduced to the audience as an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia, who was playing a heroic role in helping the Muslims of Bosnia in their fight against the Christian Serbs and in helping the Kashmiris fighting against the Government of India.
11. Other reports indicated that in May 1995, like-minded jihadi groups had formed a "Rapid Deployment Force" called "Katiba (Kateebat?) al Mujahideen" (Batallion of the Mujahideen) at a meeting held in the Philippines. The meeting was attended among others by "al-Sheikh Abu Abdul Aziz," described as the Chief Commander of the 7th Brigade of Muslim forces in Bosnia, Salamat Hashan, the Chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines), Abdul Karim, Chairman of the Islamic Front (Eritrea) and Prof. Hafiz Mohd Saeed, Amir MDI (Markaz Dawa Al Irshad, as the political wing of the LET was then known), Pakistan. "Al-Sheikh Abu Abdul Aziz" and Abu Abdel Aziz were probably identical, but one was not certain on the basis of available evidence.
12. The meeting reportedly agreed on the following (a) nationalities and frontiers on the basis of races was an un-Islamic perception; (b) to work in support of Muslims in all those parts of the world where action was being taken against them; (c) the Mujahideen of the newly formed Kateebat Al-Mujahideen would carry out militant operations and fight in Kashmir to eliminate un-Islamic perceptions of nationalities and frontiers.
13. Till 1997, Abu Abdel Aziz either used to attend the annual conventions of the LET at Muridke or his recorded speeches used to be telecast or he used to speak over phone. He disappeared from public view thereafter. There were rumours in Islamic circles in Pakistan that he had been arrested by the Saudi authorities, apparently because of his suspected links with Osama bin Laden, who is against the Saudi monarchy. In August, 2001, the police of Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh claimed to have arrested one Abdul Aziz alias Ashrafi, who had fought in Bosnia and Chechnya. From published reports, it was not clear whether they had questioned him about the identity of Abu Abdel Aziz and other Indian Muslims from the Gulf, who had allegedly fought in Bosnia and their subsequent whereabouts.
14. The real identity of Abu Abdel Aziz still remains a mystery. If he was an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia, as claimed by the LET, what was his real name, to which part of India he belonged, what was his political affiliation, did he have any links with the SIMI? All that one could conjecture was that Basheer could not be operating under the alias Abu Abdel Aziz because the Pakistani Urdu media projected him as operating from Saudi Arabia since the early 1980s, whereas Basheer was reported to have moved over to Saudi Arabia only in the early 1990s, possibly after the Babri masjid demolition.
15. From the various reports received, one could make the following surmise:
* There were at least two Indian Muslims operating from Saudi Arabia and associated with jihadi terrorism.
* One of them referred to by Pakistani jihadis as Abu Abdel Aziz was linked to the LET. He had played what the jihadis considered as a legendary role in organising jihad in Bosnia and was also closely involved in assisting the jihadis in J&K.
* Basheer co-ordinated the activities of the SIMI in India and the Gulf from Saudi Arabia.
16. After the Gujarat riots of 2002 and coinciding with the 10th anniversary of the Babri Masjid demolition, reports started circulating in Pakistan that some of the Indian and Pakistani Muslims working in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, had started a drive for the collection of funds to be utilised for assisting the Muslim victims of the riots and for mounting acts of punishment terrorism in India to avenge the killings of Muslims in Gujarat. Compilations of Indian media reports about the anti-Muslim atrocities in Gujarat and video recordings of these atrocities were used as part of this fund collection drive.
17. In December 2002, the Tamil Nadu Police claimed to have unearthed a new organisation, apparently inspired and controlled by jihadi elements in Saudi Arabia, called the Muslim Defence Force (MDF). It was not clear whether this was identical with the Muslim Development Force of Basheer. Published reports about the Tamil Nadu Police's detection indicated as follows:
* One Abu Hamsa, alias Abdul Bari, an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia and associated with the LET, and one Abu Omar, a Pakistani Muslim working there, had together formed the MDF after the Gujarat riots. They had also met a Muslim leader from Tamil Nadu who had gone to Saudi Arabia on haj pilgrimage.
* On his return to Tamil Nadu, this leader held a clandestine meeting at Tenkasi in Tiruvelveli district, which was attended by about 30 Muslims. At this meeting, plans for organising MDF activities in India were discussed.
* Subsequently, two of those, who had attended the Tenkasi meeting, went to Sri Lanka (the Eastern Province?), where they were to have another meeting with Abu Hamsa, but he did not turn up from Saudi Arabia. They, therefore, returned to Tamil Nadu without meeting him.
* Abu Hamsa alias Abdul Bari was wanted in connection with an explosion in Andhra Pradesh. He had given instructions to his contacts in Tamil Nadu to organise the activities of the MDF and also to float another organisation called New Vision to propagate Islam amongst the so-called backward classes of the Hindu community and recruit them for jihad.
* The associates of Abu Hamsa in Tamil Nadu were instructed to form an elite force to establish hide-outs and protect jihadi terrorists visiting Tamil Nadu and to recruit youth for training in jihad at an undisclosed destination in the Gulf.
* Amongst those arrested by the Tamil Nadu police during their investigation into the activities of the MDF was Noohu Thambi Hamid Bakri, an alleged sympathiser of the LET. He was stated to be the principal of the Ayesha Siddique Arabic College for Women at Kayalpattinam and also the President of the All-India Tauhid Jamath Federation. He also used to be associated with an organisation called the Kayal Islamic Defence Force, which is now believed to be dormant.
* It was Hamid Bakri, accompanied by one Zakkaria, who had met Abu Hamsa in Saudi Arabia and subsequently gone to Sri Lanka for another meeting, which did not materialise.In November, 2002, Zakkaria was allegedly in receipt of Rs.1,50,000 from Abu Hamsa in Saudi Arabia through hawala.
18. None of the reports relating to the unearthing of the activities of the MDF in Tamil Nadu had referred to any role of Basheer in this connection. However, his name again cropped up as possibly amongst the dramatis personae associated with the series of explosions in Mumbai since December, 2002.
19.For some years now there have been indicators of the clandestine creation of a jihadi web in Mumbai, south India and possibly in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, with the SIMI and the LET playing an active role in this matter, either in tandem or separately of each other. Much of the inspiration and financial support for this came from Indian and Pakistani jihadi activists in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.
20. The LET receives funds from the so-called charity organizations in Saudi Arabia. It has an office in Saudi Arabia to make recruitment of jihadis from the Indian Muslim community living in Saudi Arabia. It also recruits from Muslims of other countries visiting Saudi Arabia for pilgrimage.
21. It would have been more useful if the Prime Minister had taken up with the Saudi authorities the question of their acting against the LET activities from Saudi territory and stopping the flow of funds to the LET from Saudi organizations. He should have also raised the issue of the activities of absconding SIMI elements from Saudi Arabia. ( 2-3-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)