INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.620
B.RAMAN
Two developments originating from Pakistan after the explosion in the German Bakery of Pune on February 13,2009, call for comments.
2. The first is the claim reportedly made by an individual to Ms.Nirupama Subramanian, the Islamabad-based correspondent of "The Hindu", the daily newspaper published from Chennai, claiming responsibility for the explosion on behlaf of an organisation called the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET)--Al Alami meaning international.
3. To quote from the paper (February 17): " Identifying himself as a spokesperson of a group calling itself the LET--Al Almi, an individual using the code name Abu Jindal said the bombing was carried out because of India's refusal to discuss the Kashmir issue in the coming talks with Pakistan. Abu Jindal said he was calling from Miramshah in North Waziristan and the telephone number used to make the call carried an area code common to the Waziristan tribal area and Bannu, the adjoining district in the North-West Frontier Province. When The Hindu tried calling back, though, a recorded voice message said the number was temporarily not in use. No past communique was issued by the LET--al Almi and terrorism experts in New Delhi told The Hindu that no such group was known to exist."
4. The expression "Al Alami" meaning "International" had been used in the past by Pakistan-based terrorist organisations, which claim to have an international presence. Two examples are the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which is a founding member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People and the Jamiatul-Mujahideen. After 9/11, there were some terrorist strikes in Pakistani territory directed against the US and other foreign targets----such as the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the reporter of the "Wall Street Journal ", the murder of the wife and daughter of a US diplomat with a hand grenade in an Islamabad church, a suicide attack outside the US consulate in Karachi etc. Pakistani investigators attributed these attacks as well as an unsuccessful attempt to kill Gen. Pervez Musharraf in Karachi to an organisation called the HUM--Al Alami.
5. On different occasions, Pakistani police officers gave different accounts of its background. Sometimes, they described it as the international wing of the HUM. Some other times, they described it as the wing of the HUM which represents it in the IIF. On other occasions, they described it as a spinter group of the HUM, which had split from it due to differences. They also said that the the HUM itself had started functioning under the name HUM--Al Alami after it was declared a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the US in 1997 because of its involvement in the kidnapping of some Western tourists in Jammu and Kashmir under the name Al Faran in 1995.
6.The HUM had never made a secret of its extensive presence abroad outside India, including in Southern Philippines, the Central Asian Republics, the Gulf countries, and Chechnya. In fact, it used to brag about it in interviews to Pakistani media. Next to the HUM, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the LET have a presence abroad outside India. While the HUJI's presence is confined to Bangladesh, the Arakan area of Myanmar, Southern Thailand, the Central Asian Republics, the Gulf countries and Chechnya, the LET is the only Pakistani organisation, which has a presence not only in Indonesia, Singapore and the Gulf countries, but also in the US and West Europe.
7. Whereas the HUM talks openly about its international presence, neither the HUJI nor the LET do so. The LET, in particular, which is close to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), never talks of its activities in the West lest the ISI be embarrassed.Till today, it has not admitted that David Coleman Headley and Hussain Rana, presently facing trial in Chicago, belonged to it.
8. The only occasions when the LET had referred to its interests in overseas targets other than India were with reference to the need for a jihad against the US troops in Iraq and the need for action against the Danish newspaper and its cartoonist for publishing cartoons of Prophet Mohammad in 2005. One never found in the past any reference to an Al Alami wing of the LET.
9. It will be difficult to establish the authenticity of the telephone call received by The Hindu correspondent as having really originated from a designated representative of an organisation called the LET--- Al Alami. If one presumes that such an organisation exists and that the call did originate from its spokesman, it would mark an attempt by elements based in Pakistan to project the LET---Al Alami as part of bin Laden's IIF unconnected with the Jamaat-ud-Dawa of Pakistan headed by Prof-Hafeez Mohammad Sayeed. It is similar to the attempt made after the 26/11 terrorist strikes to project them as having been carried out by a group of Indian Muslims called the Deccan (Southern) Mujahideen.
10. The second development calling for comments is the E-Mail received by the Karachi-based correspondent of "Asiatimes Online" purporting to be from Ilyas Kashmiri, a Pakistani national, who has been indicted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) along with Headley and Rana for conspiring to launch a terrorist attack on the offices of the Danish journal which carried the cartoons. According to well-informed Pakistani journalists such as Hamid Mir, Ilyas used to be in the Special Services Group (SSG) of the Pakistan Army before drifting into the world of terrorism----initially in Afghanistan, then In Kashmir and now in North Waziristan.
11. Till some years ago, he used to be responsible for the operations of the HUJI in J&K. He has since fallen out with the HUJI and now heads as organisation called the 313 Brigade based in North Waziristan. Headley, who had met Ilyas in Norh Waziristan, was a common cut-out of the LET and Ilyas. He was helping the LET in its acts of terrorism in India and Ilyas in his planned attack on the Danish journal. For details of Ilyas and his 313 Brigade, please see my earlier two articles titled :LET Revives 2003 Plan to Use US As Launching Pad for Terrorism in India at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers35%5Cpaper3481.html and The 313 Brigade at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.com/2009/11/313-brigade.html .
12.In the past, Ilyas had come to notice for his activities on behalf of the HUJI in J&K, but not in Indian territory outside Kashmir. But, HUJI cadres---from Pakistan as well as Bangladesh--- have been active in Indian territory outside J&K for many years.In the E-mail, Ilyas has sought to intimidate intending foreign participants in the World Cup Hockey league, the IPL Cricket League and the Commonwealth Games in India in the comming months into cancelling their participation by warning them of the consequences of their participation.
13. Since the terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore last year, foreign sports teams are not prepared to participate in any events in Pakistan, which has been totally boycotted. Ilyas' attempt to intimidate is part of a Pakistan-inspired Psywar to create similar nervousness among foreign sportsmen and sports officials about the likely dangers of participating in sports events in India.
14. Three prestigious sports events are to take place in India this year.The terrorists will look upon these events as providing an opportunity to publicise their cause and embarrass India. A similar attempt to intimidate sportsmen was made by the Khalistani terrorists at the time of the Asian Games in New Delhi in 1983.On getting information of their plans, Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, personally monitored the security arrangements through Rajiv Gandhi and Arun Singh and requested R.N.Kao, former chief of the R&AW, to co-ordinate the physical security. Kao did so with the help of K. Sankaran Nair, who had succeeded him as the chief of the R&AW.
15. Keeping in view the likely threats and the high-profile attempts at intimidation initiated by Ilyas, the Government should constitute a high-power committee of senior officials to monitor the situation on a day-to-day basis and coordinate the physical security. The matter should not be handled in a routine manner as the follow-up action on Headley's visits to India seem to have been handled . (17-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd ), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2gmail.com )
Wednesday, February 17, 2010
Tuesday, February 16, 2010
US LOOKING FOR TALIBAN HIDE-OUTS IN NON-TRIBAL AREAS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.619
B.RAMAN
US intelligence agencies have widened their hunt for the leaders of the Afghan Taliban in the non-tribal areas of Pakistan, particularly in Karachi.
2. This is reminiscent of the widening of the hunt for the leaders and senior operatives of Al Qaeda in the non-tribal areas in 2002-03 after they fled into Pakistan from Tora Bora in Afghanistan. This, inter alia, led to the capture of Abu Zubaidah in Faislabad in Pakistani Punjab in March,2002, Ramzi Binalshib in Karachi in September 2002 and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad in Rawalpindi in March,2003.The success of the US agencies in tracing them in the non-tribal areas and pressuring the Pakistani agencies to arrest them and hand them over to the US forced the other leaders, who had evaded capture, to flee to North Waziristan and take shelter there. They are now being hunted there by the Drones (unmanned planes) of the CIA.
3.Originally, the US agencies believed that the surviving leaders of the Afghan Taliban, including Mulla Mohammad Omar, were operating from the Pashtun majority areas of Balochistan, particularly from the refugee camps in the Quetta area. The collusion of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) with the Quetta-based leaders led to suggestions from the US field commanders in Afghanistan for extending the Drone strikes to the Quetta area to hit at the hide-outs of the Afghan leaders there.
4. In the wake of these suggestions, there were reports that the ISI has shifted the Afghan Taliban leaders to Karachi and helped them to get sanctuaries among the pro-Taliban elements in the local Pashtun community. Karachi is estimated to have more Pashtuns than Peshawar, the capital of the Pashtun-majority North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the party of Mohajirs headed by Altaf Hussain, who lives in exile in the UK, has been alleging for some months now that not only Afghan Taliban, but even some Pakistani Taliban leaders have taken shelter in the Pashtun community in Karachi and have been operating from there.
5.Till recently, the US was not taking these allegations seriously. It is now paying more attention to these allegations and US agencies have stepped up their intelligence collection efforts in Karachi-----particularly after attacks on NATO logistics convoys in the Karachi area.
6. The reported capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Afghan Taliban's operational commander and the deputy to Mullah Omar, in Karachi some days ago by the ISI at the instance of the US agencies has to be viewed in this context. The reports of his arrest have been denied by Mr.Rehman Mallik, the Pakistani Interior Minister,and Afghan Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid.
7.Other reports purported to be emanating from Taliban commanders have been quoted as claiming that Baradar has in fact been captured by the Americans, but in the Helmand province of Afghanistan where the US has launched an offensive against the Afghan Taliban and not in Karachi.
8. The report of his arrest in Karachi, if confirmed, would embarrass both the Pakistani authorities and the Afghan Taliban as this would lend some substance to the allegations of the MQM that the Taliban leadership is now operating from Karachi.
9. The speculation that the reported arrest of Baradar is a US-engineered charade and is part of its exercise to create a split in the Afghan Taliban by winning over associates of Mulla Omar does not carry conviction at present. ( 17-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
US intelligence agencies have widened their hunt for the leaders of the Afghan Taliban in the non-tribal areas of Pakistan, particularly in Karachi.
2. This is reminiscent of the widening of the hunt for the leaders and senior operatives of Al Qaeda in the non-tribal areas in 2002-03 after they fled into Pakistan from Tora Bora in Afghanistan. This, inter alia, led to the capture of Abu Zubaidah in Faislabad in Pakistani Punjab in March,2002, Ramzi Binalshib in Karachi in September 2002 and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad in Rawalpindi in March,2003.The success of the US agencies in tracing them in the non-tribal areas and pressuring the Pakistani agencies to arrest them and hand them over to the US forced the other leaders, who had evaded capture, to flee to North Waziristan and take shelter there. They are now being hunted there by the Drones (unmanned planes) of the CIA.
3.Originally, the US agencies believed that the surviving leaders of the Afghan Taliban, including Mulla Mohammad Omar, were operating from the Pashtun majority areas of Balochistan, particularly from the refugee camps in the Quetta area. The collusion of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) with the Quetta-based leaders led to suggestions from the US field commanders in Afghanistan for extending the Drone strikes to the Quetta area to hit at the hide-outs of the Afghan leaders there.
4. In the wake of these suggestions, there were reports that the ISI has shifted the Afghan Taliban leaders to Karachi and helped them to get sanctuaries among the pro-Taliban elements in the local Pashtun community. Karachi is estimated to have more Pashtuns than Peshawar, the capital of the Pashtun-majority North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the party of Mohajirs headed by Altaf Hussain, who lives in exile in the UK, has been alleging for some months now that not only Afghan Taliban, but even some Pakistani Taliban leaders have taken shelter in the Pashtun community in Karachi and have been operating from there.
5.Till recently, the US was not taking these allegations seriously. It is now paying more attention to these allegations and US agencies have stepped up their intelligence collection efforts in Karachi-----particularly after attacks on NATO logistics convoys in the Karachi area.
6. The reported capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Afghan Taliban's operational commander and the deputy to Mullah Omar, in Karachi some days ago by the ISI at the instance of the US agencies has to be viewed in this context. The reports of his arrest have been denied by Mr.Rehman Mallik, the Pakistani Interior Minister,and Afghan Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid.
7.Other reports purported to be emanating from Taliban commanders have been quoted as claiming that Baradar has in fact been captured by the Americans, but in the Helmand province of Afghanistan where the US has launched an offensive against the Afghan Taliban and not in Karachi.
8. The report of his arrest in Karachi, if confirmed, would embarrass both the Pakistani authorities and the Afghan Taliban as this would lend some substance to the allegations of the MQM that the Taliban leadership is now operating from Karachi.
9. The speculation that the reported arrest of Baradar is a US-engineered charade and is part of its exercise to create a split in the Afghan Taliban by winning over associates of Mulla Omar does not carry conviction at present. ( 17-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, February 14, 2010
AN ANTI-TERROR WAKE-UP CALL
FEBRUARY 14, 2010, 12:47 P.M. ET
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704543804575065023879360664.html?mod=WSJ-World-LEFTSecondNews
An Antiterror Wake-Up Call
By BAHUKUTUMBI RAMAN
India suffered its first major terrorist attacks since the 2008 Mumbai massacre Saturday with the bombing of a popular bakery in Pune. While the death toll, currently at nine, doesn't approach the 166 killed in Mumbai, the incident should provoke a rethink of the speed with which New Delhi revamps its approach to the war on terror.
Saturday's attack was a single act of terrorism directed at a soft target. It was not an act of suicidal terrorism, as the bomber left a backpack under a table and then left the building. The device may have been timed or remotely activated. The explosion took place when one of the bakery's clients tried to open the backpack. Such attacks require access to explosive material and basic knowledge of how to assemble a bomb. The terrorist may not have had any special expertise or training.
The Pune incident is unfortunately not a single event. India suffered a wide range of terrorist attacks by different individuals and groups over the years. The 2008 Mumbai massacre was a commando-style attack perpetrated by 10 Pakistani terrorists on multiple targets, and lasted three days. Between November 2007 and September 2008, a group of Muslims calling themselves the Indian Mujahedeen carried out a series of well-orchestrated serial explosions in various cities, including Jaipur and Bangalore.
After the Mumbai attacks, the Congress Party-led government considerably strengthened the country's counterterrorism machinery. Home Minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram has strengthened the capability of the special intervention forces, such as the National Security Guards, to put down commando-style attacks quickly by deploying them in important cities, instead of keeping them concentrated in New Delhi as was done before the Mumbai massacre. Mr. Chidambaram has introduced greater cohesion in the functioning of the intelligence agencies and personally coordinated follow-up action on the data collected.
Further, he has created a National Investigation Agency to investigate serious terrorist attacks with national ramifications. He has proposed the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center and a Ministry for Internal Security patterned after America's Department of Homeland Security. When these institutions are eventually created, all agencies responsible for counterterrorism would function under a single command. Mr. Chidambaram himself would oversee the entire apparatus.
Saturday's successful explosion at Pune shows the measures already taken by the government have not been as effective as hoped. Pune was known to be a target for terrorists. America's Federal Bureau of Investigation has been looking into frequent visits to India by David Headley, a U.S. citizen of Pakistani origin based in Chicago who belonged to the Lashkar-e-Taiba network and is alleged to have played a role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Mr. Headley is alleged to have scouted out possible targets in New Delhi and Pune, including an ashram close to the bakery attacked Saturday.
India's own National Investigation Agency undertook a separate investigation into Mr. Headley. The NIA's investigation identified other potential targets, such as a Jewish religious and cultural center—also located close to Saturday's attack—that was similar to the center attacked in Mumbai in 2008.
Pune has many technical universities and other institutions of learning which attract Muslim students from abroad. Many of Pune's Muslim youths interact with these students, and are becoming radicalized. Three members of the Indian Mujahedeen—information technology experts—were drawn from Pune's Muslim community.
Given this evidence, the government should have moved proactively to strengthen physical security in the area, in coordination with the owners of the vulnerable private establishments. According to Mr. Chidambaram, they were alerted about their vulnerability, but nothing more seems to have been done to help them in preventing a terrorist attack. There were too few arrests and interrogations of individuals associated with Mr. Headley.
All this shows that Mr. Chidambaram might have created the right institutional infrastructure for dealing with terrorism, but this infrastructure is yet to start working in a coordinated and effective manner. The result is that India's preventive capability continues to be weak. Institutions are important, but it is even more important to make them work as they should.
Mr. Raman served in India's external intelligence agency from 1968 to 1994 and on the National Security Advisory Board of the government of India from 2000 to 2002.
Copyright 2009 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704543804575065023879360664.html?mod=WSJ-World-LEFTSecondNews
An Antiterror Wake-Up Call
By BAHUKUTUMBI RAMAN
India suffered its first major terrorist attacks since the 2008 Mumbai massacre Saturday with the bombing of a popular bakery in Pune. While the death toll, currently at nine, doesn't approach the 166 killed in Mumbai, the incident should provoke a rethink of the speed with which New Delhi revamps its approach to the war on terror.
Saturday's attack was a single act of terrorism directed at a soft target. It was not an act of suicidal terrorism, as the bomber left a backpack under a table and then left the building. The device may have been timed or remotely activated. The explosion took place when one of the bakery's clients tried to open the backpack. Such attacks require access to explosive material and basic knowledge of how to assemble a bomb. The terrorist may not have had any special expertise or training.
The Pune incident is unfortunately not a single event. India suffered a wide range of terrorist attacks by different individuals and groups over the years. The 2008 Mumbai massacre was a commando-style attack perpetrated by 10 Pakistani terrorists on multiple targets, and lasted three days. Between November 2007 and September 2008, a group of Muslims calling themselves the Indian Mujahedeen carried out a series of well-orchestrated serial explosions in various cities, including Jaipur and Bangalore.
After the Mumbai attacks, the Congress Party-led government considerably strengthened the country's counterterrorism machinery. Home Minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram has strengthened the capability of the special intervention forces, such as the National Security Guards, to put down commando-style attacks quickly by deploying them in important cities, instead of keeping them concentrated in New Delhi as was done before the Mumbai massacre. Mr. Chidambaram has introduced greater cohesion in the functioning of the intelligence agencies and personally coordinated follow-up action on the data collected.
Further, he has created a National Investigation Agency to investigate serious terrorist attacks with national ramifications. He has proposed the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center and a Ministry for Internal Security patterned after America's Department of Homeland Security. When these institutions are eventually created, all agencies responsible for counterterrorism would function under a single command. Mr. Chidambaram himself would oversee the entire apparatus.
Saturday's successful explosion at Pune shows the measures already taken by the government have not been as effective as hoped. Pune was known to be a target for terrorists. America's Federal Bureau of Investigation has been looking into frequent visits to India by David Headley, a U.S. citizen of Pakistani origin based in Chicago who belonged to the Lashkar-e-Taiba network and is alleged to have played a role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Mr. Headley is alleged to have scouted out possible targets in New Delhi and Pune, including an ashram close to the bakery attacked Saturday.
India's own National Investigation Agency undertook a separate investigation into Mr. Headley. The NIA's investigation identified other potential targets, such as a Jewish religious and cultural center—also located close to Saturday's attack—that was similar to the center attacked in Mumbai in 2008.
Pune has many technical universities and other institutions of learning which attract Muslim students from abroad. Many of Pune's Muslim youths interact with these students, and are becoming radicalized. Three members of the Indian Mujahedeen—information technology experts—were drawn from Pune's Muslim community.
Given this evidence, the government should have moved proactively to strengthen physical security in the area, in coordination with the owners of the vulnerable private establishments. According to Mr. Chidambaram, they were alerted about their vulnerability, but nothing more seems to have been done to help them in preventing a terrorist attack. There were too few arrests and interrogations of individuals associated with Mr. Headley.
All this shows that Mr. Chidambaram might have created the right institutional infrastructure for dealing with terrorism, but this infrastructure is yet to start working in a coordinated and effective manner. The result is that India's preventive capability continues to be weak. Institutions are important, but it is even more important to make them work as they should.
Mr. Raman served in India's external intelligence agency from 1968 to 1994 and on the National Security Advisory Board of the government of India from 2000 to 2002.
Copyright 2009 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved
Saturday, February 13, 2010
WHY ATTACK ON GERMAN BAKERY IN PUNE?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.618
B.RAMAN
Statements and comments from Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister of the Government of India , and officials indicate that the explosion in the well-known and well-frequented German Bakery of Pune around 7 PM on February 13,2010, was an act of terrorism. The case is under investigation by the local police and possibly too by the National Investigation Agency (NIA), which came into being after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. According to the latest information, nine persons, including one foreigner, died in the explosion, which appears to have been not a sophisticated one, that could have required any special training. The expertise involved could have been locally acquired. One must control the reflex to point an accusing finger at Pakistan.
2.The NIA's first major investigation was into the travels and activities of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkare-Toiba (LET) and his associate Hussain Rana, also of Chicago, in India to collect operational information required for targeting by the LET. Some of the details collected by Headley were used by the LET in the 26/11 strikes in Mumbai. He had also collected target details about other places of interest including in New Delhi and Pune. These details had not been used till now though his interrogation by the FBI reportedly indicated that the LET was interested in another terrorist strike----this time in New Delhi.
3. Among the targets of interest to Headley in Pune was the local Chabad House, a Jewish cultural-cum-religious centre, which is frequented by Jewish visitors to Pune and the local Rajneesh Ashram frequented by the Western followers of Rajneesh, an Indian spiritual guru, who used to live in the US and was the mentor of some sections of Western youth. Both these places reconnoitred by Headley were near the German Bakery, but neither of them was attacked on February 13. Instead, the German Bakery was targeted.
4. Why the German Bakery? Why not the Chabad House or the Rajneesh Ashram? Why only one explosion? Why not serial explosions well orchestrated as organised by the Indian Mujahideen in Uttar Pradesh, Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmedabad and New Delhi between November 2007 and September,2008? Is it a lone wolf terrorist strike as one saw over Detroit on Christmas Day when a Nigerian tried unsuccessfully to blow up a US plane as it was getting ready to land in Detroit or did it involve a team of terrorists like the 26/11? What is the significance of the timing? Anything to do with the forthcoming resumption of Indo-Pakistan dialogue on February 25? The dialogue has been under suspension since 26/11. Did the timing have anything to do with the US-UK offensive against the Afghan Taliban in the Helmand province, which got going on Feb.13? Is it a carry-over of the anger against the Germans which Al Qaeda elements from Germany based in Pakistan's tribal belt have been showing since September last? Should India go ahead with the Feb.25 talks with Pakistan or put them on hold till a clear picture emerges?
5. These are questions which have to be addressed by the NIA and the policy-makers in Delhi as the investigation makes headway. The Govt. of India should keep an open mind and look into all possibilities and should avoid over or hasty reactions. Reconstruction and investigation of the explosion should have priority and not retaliation against it.
6. Annexed for ready reference is an article titled "Al Qaeda Warns Germans, Cites Mumbai" written by me on September 21,2008. (14-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
21-Sept-2009
Al Qaeda Warns Germans, Cites Mumbai - International Terrorism Monitor---Paper No. 558
By B. Raman
Al Qaeda has reportedly warned of a terrorist strike in Germany, similar to the past strikes by pro-Al Qaeda elements in Madrid (March 2004), London (July 2005) and Mumbai, if the German voters do not vote against the present Government of Germany in the elections being held on September 27, 2009.
2. The video message, the warning contained in it and the reference to Madrid are meant to influence the voting through intimidation and bring about a reversal of the German policy of participating in the NATO operations in Afghanistan. While the references to the Madrid and London attacks are clear, it is not clear from the message whether the reference to Mumbai seeks to recall the multiple explosions in suburban trains in July, 2006, or the commando-style attacks with hand-held weapons and explosives by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) on multiple-targets in November, 2008, or both. The responsibility for the July-2006 attacks has not been conclusively established so far.
3. The message seeks to give the impression of Al Qaeda being confident of carrying out its threat in reality if its warning is not heeded. A detailed analysis of the message by Nick Grace, an American counter-terrorism analyst, is available at the web site of the "Long War Journal" of the US, which monitors systematically all developments bearing on international terrorism. It may be seen at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/09/al_qaeda_warns_germa.php. The "Long War Journal" and its analyses enjoy a very high level of credibility in international counter-terrorism circles.
4. According to the analysis by Nick Grace, the warning message has been issued by Bekkay Harrach, alias Al Hafidh Abu Talha al Almani, a person of Moroccan origin, who grew up in Germany and then gravitated to Al Qaeda. He is presently believed to be somewhere in the Af-Pak region. Nick Grace points out in his analysis that this is the third warning issued by Harrach this year. Nick Grace says: "His previous warning to Germany, on Jan. 17, 2009, coincided with a massive car bomb attack on the heavily guarded German embassy in Kabul that was orchestrated by the notorious Haqqani Network. Four Afghan civilians and an American soldier died in the attack." His mention of the Haqqani network refers to Jalalludin Haqqani and his son Serajuddin Haqqani, who are reported to be operating from the North Waziristan area of Pakistan. While some sources attributed the huge explosion outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July last year to the LET, other sources suspected the Haqqani network to have been responsible. The Haqqani network is as close to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence as the LET.
5. To quote again from Nick Grace's analysis: Harrach has "warned that if Chancellor Angela Merkel is reelected on Sept. 27, Germany will be directly attacked." Nick Grace adds: "The latest video by Harrach is most striking because its themes and packaging are targeted almost exclusively for a Western audience. Speaking softly in fluent German, without the usual militant or religious props featured in past al Qaeda messages, he stares directly into the camera and only occasionally looks down to turn over the pages of his speech. He never wags his finger or raises his voice. The video carries no subtitling in Arabic. "
6. The picture of Harrach as he appears in the video message has been reproduced by the "Long War Journal" along with the analysis. He is clad in typical Western attire with a suit and a tie. His attire reminds one of the attire worn by the volunteers of the Hizbut Tehrir, which advises its followers to avoid dressing themselves in a manner typical of Muslims. It is likely that if Al Qaeda already has its volunteers in Germany to carry out the threat they may not be attired like Muslims and they may avoid going to mosques and other places frequented by Muslims in order not to draw suspicion upon themselves.
7. If Al Qaeda carries out the threat, will it be an attack with timed explosives as in Madrid and Mumbai--July 2006 or a suicide attack as in London or a commando-style attack with hand-held weapons as in Mumbai--26/11? Will it be an attack confined to public transportation systems as in Madrid, London and Mumbai-July 2006 or will it be in public places as in Mumbai--26/11? These are important questions, which would certainly be factored into by the German counter-terrorism authorities while planning their strategy to frustrate the plans of Al Qaeda.
8. The message, as analysed by Nick Grace, carries an implied assurance that the town of Kiel might not be attacked. This assurance is puzzling because on August 20, 2006, the German police had arrested a Muslim from the Lebanon studying in the Kiel University on a charge of placing a timed explosive device (a suitcase bomb) on a commuter train in Dortmund on July 31,2006. It failed to explode. They managed to identify him through a closed circuit TV footage, which showed him placing the suitcase in a train. Another suitcase bomb, timed to explode at the same time, had been placed in a train at Koblenz. That too failed to explode. It is not known whether the police were able to identify and arrest the person who placed the second suit case bomb. The German media had reported that the identification of the first man was made possible by a tip-off from an unnamed foreign intelligence agency. These two incidents had indicated as early as 2006 that pro-Al Qaeda elements were wanting to target the public transportation system in Germany.
9. This is the second instance when there has been a reference to Mumbai in messages attributed to Al Qaeda. In a telephonic message to the British Broadcasting Corporation in the second week of February, 2009, Mustafa Abu-al Yazid, who has been projected since 2007 as in charge of Al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan in liaison with the Neo Taliban of Mulla Mohammad Omar, warned India in the following words: “We send a short and succinct message to the Indian Government. The Mujahideen will never allow you to invade the Muslims and their lands in Pakistan. If you beguile yourselves into doing this, know well that you will pay a very heavy price, which you will regret much. We will call upon our whole Muslim nation, its Mujahideen and its martyrdom squads against you. We will strike your interests and your economic lifelines wherever they may be until you are demolished and bankrupt as America is being demolished and going bankrupt today. The Islamic nation which produced the audacious and heroic martyrs of Bombay, who struck you in the midst of your homes and humiliated you, is able to produce thousands more like them. You cannot be more powerful or have more ability than the Soviet Union which was destroyed on the rocks of the Afghanistan mountains nor Americans whose nose we rubbed in the dirt of Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia.” The authenticity of the message could not be established.
B.RAMAN
Statements and comments from Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister of the Government of India , and officials indicate that the explosion in the well-known and well-frequented German Bakery of Pune around 7 PM on February 13,2010, was an act of terrorism. The case is under investigation by the local police and possibly too by the National Investigation Agency (NIA), which came into being after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. According to the latest information, nine persons, including one foreigner, died in the explosion, which appears to have been not a sophisticated one, that could have required any special training. The expertise involved could have been locally acquired. One must control the reflex to point an accusing finger at Pakistan.
2.The NIA's first major investigation was into the travels and activities of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkare-Toiba (LET) and his associate Hussain Rana, also of Chicago, in India to collect operational information required for targeting by the LET. Some of the details collected by Headley were used by the LET in the 26/11 strikes in Mumbai. He had also collected target details about other places of interest including in New Delhi and Pune. These details had not been used till now though his interrogation by the FBI reportedly indicated that the LET was interested in another terrorist strike----this time in New Delhi.
3. Among the targets of interest to Headley in Pune was the local Chabad House, a Jewish cultural-cum-religious centre, which is frequented by Jewish visitors to Pune and the local Rajneesh Ashram frequented by the Western followers of Rajneesh, an Indian spiritual guru, who used to live in the US and was the mentor of some sections of Western youth. Both these places reconnoitred by Headley were near the German Bakery, but neither of them was attacked on February 13. Instead, the German Bakery was targeted.
4. Why the German Bakery? Why not the Chabad House or the Rajneesh Ashram? Why only one explosion? Why not serial explosions well orchestrated as organised by the Indian Mujahideen in Uttar Pradesh, Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmedabad and New Delhi between November 2007 and September,2008? Is it a lone wolf terrorist strike as one saw over Detroit on Christmas Day when a Nigerian tried unsuccessfully to blow up a US plane as it was getting ready to land in Detroit or did it involve a team of terrorists like the 26/11? What is the significance of the timing? Anything to do with the forthcoming resumption of Indo-Pakistan dialogue on February 25? The dialogue has been under suspension since 26/11. Did the timing have anything to do with the US-UK offensive against the Afghan Taliban in the Helmand province, which got going on Feb.13? Is it a carry-over of the anger against the Germans which Al Qaeda elements from Germany based in Pakistan's tribal belt have been showing since September last? Should India go ahead with the Feb.25 talks with Pakistan or put them on hold till a clear picture emerges?
5. These are questions which have to be addressed by the NIA and the policy-makers in Delhi as the investigation makes headway. The Govt. of India should keep an open mind and look into all possibilities and should avoid over or hasty reactions. Reconstruction and investigation of the explosion should have priority and not retaliation against it.
6. Annexed for ready reference is an article titled "Al Qaeda Warns Germans, Cites Mumbai" written by me on September 21,2008. (14-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
21-Sept-2009
Al Qaeda Warns Germans, Cites Mumbai - International Terrorism Monitor---Paper No. 558
By B. Raman
Al Qaeda has reportedly warned of a terrorist strike in Germany, similar to the past strikes by pro-Al Qaeda elements in Madrid (March 2004), London (July 2005) and Mumbai, if the German voters do not vote against the present Government of Germany in the elections being held on September 27, 2009.
2. The video message, the warning contained in it and the reference to Madrid are meant to influence the voting through intimidation and bring about a reversal of the German policy of participating in the NATO operations in Afghanistan. While the references to the Madrid and London attacks are clear, it is not clear from the message whether the reference to Mumbai seeks to recall the multiple explosions in suburban trains in July, 2006, or the commando-style attacks with hand-held weapons and explosives by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) on multiple-targets in November, 2008, or both. The responsibility for the July-2006 attacks has not been conclusively established so far.
3. The message seeks to give the impression of Al Qaeda being confident of carrying out its threat in reality if its warning is not heeded. A detailed analysis of the message by Nick Grace, an American counter-terrorism analyst, is available at the web site of the "Long War Journal" of the US, which monitors systematically all developments bearing on international terrorism. It may be seen at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/09/al_qaeda_warns_germa.php. The "Long War Journal" and its analyses enjoy a very high level of credibility in international counter-terrorism circles.
4. According to the analysis by Nick Grace, the warning message has been issued by Bekkay Harrach, alias Al Hafidh Abu Talha al Almani, a person of Moroccan origin, who grew up in Germany and then gravitated to Al Qaeda. He is presently believed to be somewhere in the Af-Pak region. Nick Grace points out in his analysis that this is the third warning issued by Harrach this year. Nick Grace says: "His previous warning to Germany, on Jan. 17, 2009, coincided with a massive car bomb attack on the heavily guarded German embassy in Kabul that was orchestrated by the notorious Haqqani Network. Four Afghan civilians and an American soldier died in the attack." His mention of the Haqqani network refers to Jalalludin Haqqani and his son Serajuddin Haqqani, who are reported to be operating from the North Waziristan area of Pakistan. While some sources attributed the huge explosion outside the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July last year to the LET, other sources suspected the Haqqani network to have been responsible. The Haqqani network is as close to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence as the LET.
5. To quote again from Nick Grace's analysis: Harrach has "warned that if Chancellor Angela Merkel is reelected on Sept. 27, Germany will be directly attacked." Nick Grace adds: "The latest video by Harrach is most striking because its themes and packaging are targeted almost exclusively for a Western audience. Speaking softly in fluent German, without the usual militant or religious props featured in past al Qaeda messages, he stares directly into the camera and only occasionally looks down to turn over the pages of his speech. He never wags his finger or raises his voice. The video carries no subtitling in Arabic. "
6. The picture of Harrach as he appears in the video message has been reproduced by the "Long War Journal" along with the analysis. He is clad in typical Western attire with a suit and a tie. His attire reminds one of the attire worn by the volunteers of the Hizbut Tehrir, which advises its followers to avoid dressing themselves in a manner typical of Muslims. It is likely that if Al Qaeda already has its volunteers in Germany to carry out the threat they may not be attired like Muslims and they may avoid going to mosques and other places frequented by Muslims in order not to draw suspicion upon themselves.
7. If Al Qaeda carries out the threat, will it be an attack with timed explosives as in Madrid and Mumbai--July 2006 or a suicide attack as in London or a commando-style attack with hand-held weapons as in Mumbai--26/11? Will it be an attack confined to public transportation systems as in Madrid, London and Mumbai-July 2006 or will it be in public places as in Mumbai--26/11? These are important questions, which would certainly be factored into by the German counter-terrorism authorities while planning their strategy to frustrate the plans of Al Qaeda.
8. The message, as analysed by Nick Grace, carries an implied assurance that the town of Kiel might not be attacked. This assurance is puzzling because on August 20, 2006, the German police had arrested a Muslim from the Lebanon studying in the Kiel University on a charge of placing a timed explosive device (a suitcase bomb) on a commuter train in Dortmund on July 31,2006. It failed to explode. They managed to identify him through a closed circuit TV footage, which showed him placing the suitcase in a train. Another suitcase bomb, timed to explode at the same time, had been placed in a train at Koblenz. That too failed to explode. It is not known whether the police were able to identify and arrest the person who placed the second suit case bomb. The German media had reported that the identification of the first man was made possible by a tip-off from an unnamed foreign intelligence agency. These two incidents had indicated as early as 2006 that pro-Al Qaeda elements were wanting to target the public transportation system in Germany.
9. This is the second instance when there has been a reference to Mumbai in messages attributed to Al Qaeda. In a telephonic message to the British Broadcasting Corporation in the second week of February, 2009, Mustafa Abu-al Yazid, who has been projected since 2007 as in charge of Al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan in liaison with the Neo Taliban of Mulla Mohammad Omar, warned India in the following words: “We send a short and succinct message to the Indian Government. The Mujahideen will never allow you to invade the Muslims and their lands in Pakistan. If you beguile yourselves into doing this, know well that you will pay a very heavy price, which you will regret much. We will call upon our whole Muslim nation, its Mujahideen and its martyrdom squads against you. We will strike your interests and your economic lifelines wherever they may be until you are demolished and bankrupt as America is being demolished and going bankrupt today. The Islamic nation which produced the audacious and heroic martyrs of Bombay, who struck you in the midst of your homes and humiliated you, is able to produce thousands more like them. You cannot be more powerful or have more ability than the Soviet Union which was destroyed on the rocks of the Afghanistan mountains nor Americans whose nose we rubbed in the dirt of Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia.” The authenticity of the message could not be established.
PUNE'S PAST JIHADI CONNECTIONS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO 617
B.RAMAN
Eight persons are reported to have been killed and 40 others injured in a suspected bomb blast in the well-known German bakery of Pune, which is often frequented by foreigners visiting Pune. The city also reportedly has a Chabad House, a Jewish cultural-cum-religious centre. Further details as to whether it was an act of terrorism, what kind of explosive was used etc are awaited.
2. Pune as a possible centre for jihadi activities came to notice in March 2002, when Abu Zubaidah, the then No.3 to Osama bin Laden, was arrested by the Pakistani authorities acting at the instance of the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in the house of an activist of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) at Faislabad in Pakistani Punjab and handed over to the FBI. He is now in the Guantanamo Bay Detention Centre in Cuba. Sections of the Pakistani media had reported at that time that Abu Zubaidah, a Palestinian, had studied computer science in Pune before crossing over into Pakistan and joining Al Qaeda.
3.In September-October,2008, the Mumbai Police had arrested four IT-savvy members of the Indian Mujahideen ( IM), who had played a role in sending E-mail messages in the name of the IM before and after the Ahmedabad blasts of July,2008, and before the New Delhi blasts of September,2008, by hacking into Wi-fi networks in Mumbai and Navin Mumbai. Three of them were from Pune. The four persons were:
* Mohammed Mansoor Asgar Peerbhoy aka Munawar aka Mannu. A 31-year-old resident of Pune, who was allegedly working for an American Internet company in its India office as a well-paid executive.
* Mubin Kadar Shaikh, a 24-year-old graduate of computer science from Pune.
* Asif Bashir Shaikh, a 22-year-old mechanical engineer from Pune. In addition to helping in sending the E-mail messages, he also reportedly played a role in planting 18 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Surat, all of which failed to explode.
* Mohammed Ismail Chaudhary, a 28-year-old computer mechanic, who is also suspected to have helped in planting the IEDs in Surat.
4. Peerbhoy was reported to have joined the IM while he was studying Arabic in Pune's Quran Foundation, which seems to have served as a favourite recruiting ground for jihadi terrorism. In this connection, reference is invited to my note titled INDIA AS POSSIBLE WEB OF CYBER TERRORISM at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2873.html
5. Pune and its Chabad House again figured prominently in recent media reports of the visits to India by David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the LET presently facing trial in Chicago on charges of helping the LET in carrying out the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai by collecting operational details about the targets to be attacked. Pune was one of the places reportedly visited by him for allegedly collecting target information for the LET. ( 13-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Eight persons are reported to have been killed and 40 others injured in a suspected bomb blast in the well-known German bakery of Pune, which is often frequented by foreigners visiting Pune. The city also reportedly has a Chabad House, a Jewish cultural-cum-religious centre. Further details as to whether it was an act of terrorism, what kind of explosive was used etc are awaited.
2. Pune as a possible centre for jihadi activities came to notice in March 2002, when Abu Zubaidah, the then No.3 to Osama bin Laden, was arrested by the Pakistani authorities acting at the instance of the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in the house of an activist of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) at Faislabad in Pakistani Punjab and handed over to the FBI. He is now in the Guantanamo Bay Detention Centre in Cuba. Sections of the Pakistani media had reported at that time that Abu Zubaidah, a Palestinian, had studied computer science in Pune before crossing over into Pakistan and joining Al Qaeda.
3.In September-October,2008, the Mumbai Police had arrested four IT-savvy members of the Indian Mujahideen ( IM), who had played a role in sending E-mail messages in the name of the IM before and after the Ahmedabad blasts of July,2008, and before the New Delhi blasts of September,2008, by hacking into Wi-fi networks in Mumbai and Navin Mumbai. Three of them were from Pune. The four persons were:
* Mohammed Mansoor Asgar Peerbhoy aka Munawar aka Mannu. A 31-year-old resident of Pune, who was allegedly working for an American Internet company in its India office as a well-paid executive.
* Mubin Kadar Shaikh, a 24-year-old graduate of computer science from Pune.
* Asif Bashir Shaikh, a 22-year-old mechanical engineer from Pune. In addition to helping in sending the E-mail messages, he also reportedly played a role in planting 18 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Surat, all of which failed to explode.
* Mohammed Ismail Chaudhary, a 28-year-old computer mechanic, who is also suspected to have helped in planting the IEDs in Surat.
4. Peerbhoy was reported to have joined the IM while he was studying Arabic in Pune's Quran Foundation, which seems to have served as a favourite recruiting ground for jihadi terrorism. In this connection, reference is invited to my note titled INDIA AS POSSIBLE WEB OF CYBER TERRORISM at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers29/paper2873.html
5. Pune and its Chabad House again figured prominently in recent media reports of the visits to India by David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the LET presently facing trial in Chicago on charges of helping the LET in carrying out the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai by collecting operational details about the targets to be attacked. Pune was one of the places reportedly visited by him for allegedly collecting target information for the LET. ( 13-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
ATTACKS ON NATO SUPPLIES IN KARACHI AREA
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.616
B.RAMAN
As US and UK troops get ready for a new offensive against the Afghan Taliban in the Helmand area of Afghanistan, suspected elements from the Tehrilk-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have attacked supplies meant for the NATO as they were being moved from Karachi after being unloaded from ships which had brought them to Karachi.
2. At least two incidents have been reported by the "Daily Times" of Lahore. In the first incident, which took place on January 29,2010, a convoy of trucks carrying supplies for the NATO forces in Afghanistan from the Karachi port was attacked by unidentified elements as the convoy was leaving the city through the Northern Bypass. In another incident reported on February 10,2010, a group of 18 armed men attacked and hijacked a convoy carrying logistic supplies to the NATO forces in the same area. The same paper has reported that unidentified elements tried unsuccessfully to attack the office of the Karachi Port Trust, but were beaten back by the security guards in the building. It has not given the date of the attack.
3. These attacks have come in the wake of reports that terrorists of the TTP, who were previously active in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan, have moved into Karachi and are trying to step up attacks on port establishments, logistics convoys and ships bringing supplies to Karachi.A 2000 USS Cole type attempt on a US ship visiting Karachi is a growing possibility.
4. In the meanwhile, localised elements associated with the ideology of the TTP, but not forming part of the TTP mainstream, have stepped up their attacks on the Pakistani security forces in the tribal belt. A suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden car into a khasadar (tribal police)patrol vehicle on February 10 in the Jamrud tehsil of Khyber Agency, killing 17 people, including 11 khasadar personnel. The incident took place on the Pak-Afghan highway.A Brigadier was killed and a Colonel and a Lieutenant were injured after suspected Taliban elements in Khyber Agency’s Tirah Valley attacked a rescue team sent to the scene of a crashed Cobra helicopter on February 10. Two occupants of the helicopter, including its pilot, were killed. No explanation has been forthcoming as to why a Brigadier was sent on the rescue mission.
5.According to an account published by the "News", two gunship helicopters were sent to the Tirah Valley, a remote and forested mountainous area of the Khyber Agency, to bomb hide-outs of militants belonging to the Lashkar-e-Islam led by Mangal Bagh. The militants managed to shoot down one of them. Two more helicopters were sent on a rescue mission. As the helicopters touched down, its occupants were attacked on the ground. (11-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
As US and UK troops get ready for a new offensive against the Afghan Taliban in the Helmand area of Afghanistan, suspected elements from the Tehrilk-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have attacked supplies meant for the NATO as they were being moved from Karachi after being unloaded from ships which had brought them to Karachi.
2. At least two incidents have been reported by the "Daily Times" of Lahore. In the first incident, which took place on January 29,2010, a convoy of trucks carrying supplies for the NATO forces in Afghanistan from the Karachi port was attacked by unidentified elements as the convoy was leaving the city through the Northern Bypass. In another incident reported on February 10,2010, a group of 18 armed men attacked and hijacked a convoy carrying logistic supplies to the NATO forces in the same area. The same paper has reported that unidentified elements tried unsuccessfully to attack the office of the Karachi Port Trust, but were beaten back by the security guards in the building. It has not given the date of the attack.
3. These attacks have come in the wake of reports that terrorists of the TTP, who were previously active in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan, have moved into Karachi and are trying to step up attacks on port establishments, logistics convoys and ships bringing supplies to Karachi.A 2000 USS Cole type attempt on a US ship visiting Karachi is a growing possibility.
4. In the meanwhile, localised elements associated with the ideology of the TTP, but not forming part of the TTP mainstream, have stepped up their attacks on the Pakistani security forces in the tribal belt. A suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden car into a khasadar (tribal police)patrol vehicle on February 10 in the Jamrud tehsil of Khyber Agency, killing 17 people, including 11 khasadar personnel. The incident took place on the Pak-Afghan highway.A Brigadier was killed and a Colonel and a Lieutenant were injured after suspected Taliban elements in Khyber Agency’s Tirah Valley attacked a rescue team sent to the scene of a crashed Cobra helicopter on February 10. Two occupants of the helicopter, including its pilot, were killed. No explanation has been forthcoming as to why a Brigadier was sent on the rescue mission.
5.According to an account published by the "News", two gunship helicopters were sent to the Tirah Valley, a remote and forested mountainous area of the Khyber Agency, to bomb hide-outs of militants belonging to the Lashkar-e-Islam led by Mangal Bagh. The militants managed to shoot down one of them. Two more helicopters were sent on a rescue mission. As the helicopters touched down, its occupants were attacked on the ground. (11-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
THE TEHRIK-E-TALIBAN PAKISTAN---AN UPDATE
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO 615
B.RAMAN
The death of three US soldiers (Marines?), living under civilian cover in the Lower Dir District of the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, in an explosion which a struck a convoy in which they were reportedly traveling with some Pakistani security forces personnel on February 3,2010, has been confirmed by the US Embassy in Islamabad.
2. Initially, the killed Americans were projected as journalists or as employees of the US Agency For International Development (AID), but subsequently, the US Embassy admitted that they were military personnel deployed in the area on a training-cum- civil construction mission. They were posted in the area to train personnel of the Frontier Corps (FC), a para-military unit headquartered in Peshawar and consisting largely of Pashtuns recruited in the NWFP and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
3.Since 2005, there have been many reported instances of the penetration of the FC by the Pakistani Taliban and collusion of many FC personnel with the Taliban. There were also instances of the desertions of a large number of FC personnel to the Taliban during the fighting in the South Waziristan area.
4. Despite such instances, the US had proposed a project for the training of the FC personnel by members of the US Special Forces units and for undertaking civil construction projects in remote rural areas in the hope of thereby helping the FC win the hearts and minds of the local tribals and weaning them away from supporting the Taliban. This project, which was accepted by the Pakistan Government, has been under implementation for over a year.
5.The training project has two components. Under the first component, selected commissioned officers of the FC are taken to the US for special training. Under the second component, selected non-commissioned officers and other ranks are trained locally in the NEFP, but not in the FATA.
6.The three US military personnel killed on February 3 were reportedly proceeding in a convoy escorted by the FC to attend the inauguration of a school for girls constructed by the voluntary labour of the FC personnel and the US trainers. Available details regarding the incident are confusing. Some reports suggest the explosion was triggered off either by a suicide bomber or through a remote control device as the convoy was proceeding to the venue of the function. If this was so, it is not clear, as to how, many girls, who had assembled at the venue, were injured. A possibility is that the explosion struck the convoy just as it arrived at the venue.
7.It is also not clear whether the explosion specifically targeted the US military personnel or it merely targeted the girls school because the Taliban is opposed to girls’ education and the US personnel who were there got killed. A person, who claimed to be the spokesman of the Pakistani Taliban, has claimed that the Taliban carried out the attack and alleged that the three US military personnel were actually working for Blackwater, a US security firm employed by the US Government for physical security and training purposes in the Af-Pak area.
8.The Dir area of the Malakand Division is the native place of Sufi Mohammad, the founder of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a component of the TTP, which had established its control over the Swat Valley of the Malakand Division under the leadership of Maulana Fazlullah, son-in-law of Sufi Mohammad, who is a native of Swat. In operations undertaken towards the end of 2008 and in the beginning of 2009, the Pakistani Army managed to eject the TNSM from the Malakand Division, including Lower and Upper Dir and Swat. Its leaders evaded capture or death and managed to escape.
9.The explosion of February 3 shows that while the TNSM and its associates in the area may have lost their territorial control in the area, they still have some capability for random attacks with explosive devices. The incident is unlikely to affect the training programme of the US. What is significant is not the success of the terrorists on February 3, but their inability to identify and target US military trainers till now despite the fact that they have been operating in the area for over a year now. This speaks well of the high level of security of the training programme.
10.In the meanwhile, rumours regarding the death of Hakimullah, the Amir of the TTP, on January 26, 2010, as a result of the injuries sustained by him in a US Drone strike on January 14,2010, continue to persist despite the repeated denial of these rumours by the TTP. There is no way of establishing the veracity of these rumours unless the TTP itself decides to admit the truth, if he is really dead, as it did after a delay in the case of the death of his predecessor Baitullah Mehsud in a Drone strike in August last.
11.What is clear is that despite the spectacular success of the TTP in getting seven CIA officers and one Jordanian intelligence officer killed in the Khost area of Afghanistan on December 30,2009, through a Jordanian double agent, it seems to be facing difficulties in Pakistani territory due to relentless air strikes by the US with its Drones and the Pakistani Army operations in the South Waziristan area. It has lost territorial control in the Mehsud area in South Waziristan and the disruption of its command and control has resulted in the senior leaders of the organization such as Hakimullah himself if he is still alive, Waliur Rehman, its leader in charge of South Waziristan, and Qari Hussain Mehsud, in charge of its suicide wing, being forced to move from place to place in non-Mehsud areas in order to escape attacks by the US Drones. This has added to their vulnerability and affected their ability to carry out spectacular terrorist strikes in the non-tribal areas. The TTP seems to be a weakened , but not a defeated force.
12. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article titled CIA: Alive & Kicking at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3610.html . (4-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The death of three US soldiers (Marines?), living under civilian cover in the Lower Dir District of the Malakand Division of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, in an explosion which a struck a convoy in which they were reportedly traveling with some Pakistani security forces personnel on February 3,2010, has been confirmed by the US Embassy in Islamabad.
2. Initially, the killed Americans were projected as journalists or as employees of the US Agency For International Development (AID), but subsequently, the US Embassy admitted that they were military personnel deployed in the area on a training-cum- civil construction mission. They were posted in the area to train personnel of the Frontier Corps (FC), a para-military unit headquartered in Peshawar and consisting largely of Pashtuns recruited in the NWFP and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
3.Since 2005, there have been many reported instances of the penetration of the FC by the Pakistani Taliban and collusion of many FC personnel with the Taliban. There were also instances of the desertions of a large number of FC personnel to the Taliban during the fighting in the South Waziristan area.
4. Despite such instances, the US had proposed a project for the training of the FC personnel by members of the US Special Forces units and for undertaking civil construction projects in remote rural areas in the hope of thereby helping the FC win the hearts and minds of the local tribals and weaning them away from supporting the Taliban. This project, which was accepted by the Pakistan Government, has been under implementation for over a year.
5.The training project has two components. Under the first component, selected commissioned officers of the FC are taken to the US for special training. Under the second component, selected non-commissioned officers and other ranks are trained locally in the NEFP, but not in the FATA.
6.The three US military personnel killed on February 3 were reportedly proceeding in a convoy escorted by the FC to attend the inauguration of a school for girls constructed by the voluntary labour of the FC personnel and the US trainers. Available details regarding the incident are confusing. Some reports suggest the explosion was triggered off either by a suicide bomber or through a remote control device as the convoy was proceeding to the venue of the function. If this was so, it is not clear, as to how, many girls, who had assembled at the venue, were injured. A possibility is that the explosion struck the convoy just as it arrived at the venue.
7.It is also not clear whether the explosion specifically targeted the US military personnel or it merely targeted the girls school because the Taliban is opposed to girls’ education and the US personnel who were there got killed. A person, who claimed to be the spokesman of the Pakistani Taliban, has claimed that the Taliban carried out the attack and alleged that the three US military personnel were actually working for Blackwater, a US security firm employed by the US Government for physical security and training purposes in the Af-Pak area.
8.The Dir area of the Malakand Division is the native place of Sufi Mohammad, the founder of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a component of the TTP, which had established its control over the Swat Valley of the Malakand Division under the leadership of Maulana Fazlullah, son-in-law of Sufi Mohammad, who is a native of Swat. In operations undertaken towards the end of 2008 and in the beginning of 2009, the Pakistani Army managed to eject the TNSM from the Malakand Division, including Lower and Upper Dir and Swat. Its leaders evaded capture or death and managed to escape.
9.The explosion of February 3 shows that while the TNSM and its associates in the area may have lost their territorial control in the area, they still have some capability for random attacks with explosive devices. The incident is unlikely to affect the training programme of the US. What is significant is not the success of the terrorists on February 3, but their inability to identify and target US military trainers till now despite the fact that they have been operating in the area for over a year now. This speaks well of the high level of security of the training programme.
10.In the meanwhile, rumours regarding the death of Hakimullah, the Amir of the TTP, on January 26, 2010, as a result of the injuries sustained by him in a US Drone strike on January 14,2010, continue to persist despite the repeated denial of these rumours by the TTP. There is no way of establishing the veracity of these rumours unless the TTP itself decides to admit the truth, if he is really dead, as it did after a delay in the case of the death of his predecessor Baitullah Mehsud in a Drone strike in August last.
11.What is clear is that despite the spectacular success of the TTP in getting seven CIA officers and one Jordanian intelligence officer killed in the Khost area of Afghanistan on December 30,2009, through a Jordanian double agent, it seems to be facing difficulties in Pakistani territory due to relentless air strikes by the US with its Drones and the Pakistani Army operations in the South Waziristan area. It has lost territorial control in the Mehsud area in South Waziristan and the disruption of its command and control has resulted in the senior leaders of the organization such as Hakimullah himself if he is still alive, Waliur Rehman, its leader in charge of South Waziristan, and Qari Hussain Mehsud, in charge of its suicide wing, being forced to move from place to place in non-Mehsud areas in order to escape attacks by the US Drones. This has added to their vulnerability and affected their ability to carry out spectacular terrorist strikes in the non-tribal areas. The TTP seems to be a weakened , but not a defeated force.
12. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article titled CIA: Alive & Kicking at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3610.html . (4-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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