THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY: ROLE OF TAHAWWUR HUSSAIN RANA

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.576

B.RAMAN

Given below are extracts from the affidavit filed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) against Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Canadian national of Pakistani origin, who was running an immigration consultancy firm, a company for the supply of meat to Muslims and a grocery shop in Chicago. He was arrested by the FBI at Chicago on October 18,2009, on a charge of being an accomplice of David Coleman Headley in plans to carry out terrorist strikes in Denmark and India. Headley had earlier been arrested on October 3,2009, when he was about to leave on a visit to Pakistan to discuss the plans for the Denmark attack with Ilyas Kashmiri of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) in Pakistan. The FBI recovered from his checked-in baggage video recordings made by Headley during two preparatory visits to Denmark after October 2008. The affidavit was filed by the FBI in the Northern District court of Illinois.

2. According to the affidavit, after his arrest, Rana made the following confessions to the FBI:

(1) He was aware that Headley had been affiliated with the Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorist organization for the past few years.

(2) He was aware that Headley had received training from the LET.

(3) He was aware that Headley had met with Ilyas Kashmiri within the past year,

(4) He was aware that Headley communicated with Individual A and LeT Member A. (both not identified in the affidavits against Headley and Rana)

(5) He was aware that Headley was angry about the cartoon depictions of the Prophet Mohammed,

(6) He (Rana) was offended by the cartoon depictions of the Prophet Mohammed.

(7) He had discussed the cartoonist and editor of the Jyllands-Posten of Denmark, which had published the cartoons, with Headley.

3. A perusal of the affidavit against Rana indicates the following:

(a). He enabled Headley to travel twice to Denmark as a representative of his immigration consultancy company.

(b). He arranged air tickets for the overseas travels of Headley.

(c). He interceded with the Pakistani Consul-General in Chicago in an attempt to get a five-year visa for Headley whom he falsely described as a White American. The Consul-General, Rana and Headley had attended the army cadet school of the Punjab Government at Hasan Abdal. The Consul-General had known Headley by his pre-2006 Pakistani name of Dawood Gilani. He did not know that Gilani, whom he had known, and Headley, "the white American" about whom Rana had spoken to him over telephone were one and the same. Rana wanted a five-year visa to be issued to Headley without Headley having to visit the Consulate.

(d). Most of the contacts of Individual A and LET member A were with Headley and not with Rana. Rana did have some contacts with Individual A, but not with LET member A.

(e). In the FBI affidavit against Headley, there are indications that he had visited India in the past---between 2006 and 2008. In the affidavit against Rana, there are no references to any visits made by him to India.

(f). In one of the conversations between Headley and Rana, one "Defence College" had figured as a possible target. It was not referred to as the "National Defence College". Nor was there any reference to its location. It needs to be underlined that additional information obtained during the interrogations of Headley and Rana does not figure in the two affidavits. The two affidavits largely summarise technical intelligence, which justified the two arrests.

(g). When the FBI checked the baggage of Headley after his arrest on October 3,2009, they found video-recordings of landmarks in Copenhagen made by him during his two visits to Denmark. There is no reference to any video-recordings made by him in India.

(h). The affidavit against Headley contains references to his past visits to Pakistan. The affidavit against Rana has no reference to any past visits to Pakistan.

4. The identities of the two Pakistanis referred to by the FBI affidavit against Headley as Individual A and LET member A remain unclear. The only clue figuring in the two affidavits is that Individual A was close to Major Haroon Ashiq, the principal accused in the case relating to the November 2008, assassination of Major-General Amir Faisal Alvi, who headed the Special Services Group (SSG) till 2005. He was sacked by Musharraf on a charge of unworthy conduct, which has not been specified so far. The two affidavits also indicate that Individual A was also arrested during the investigation of the case, but was released subsequently.

5. A check of past Pakistani media reports relating to the case indicates that one Maj. (retd) Abdul Basit of Karachi was arrested during the investigation into the activities of Haroon on behalf of Ilyas Kashmiri, but was not prosecuted. It is not clear whether Maj.Basit and Individual A could be one and the same. Another likely figure is Qari Saifullah Akhtar, Amir of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), whom Benazir Bhutto had suspected as behind the failed attempt to kill her at Karachi when she returned from political exile on October 17,2007, but there were no Pakistani media reports of his having been arrested and released during the investigation of Alvi's murder.

6. It is, however, clear that Individual A is an important person, who enjoys the confidence of Ilyas Kashmiri and could speak with authority on behalf of Ilyas. Headley's conversations with Individual A clearly bring out his admiration for Ilyas Kashmiri and his preference for working with Ilyas than with the LET. He describes the LET as an organisation with "rotten guts", which is not prepared to take risks. This is apparently because the LET is interested only in a terrorist attack in India and does not want to get involved in a terrorist attack in Denmark or in sany other Western country.

EXTRACTS FROM AFFIDAVIT AGAINST TAHAWWUR HUSSAIN RANA

RANA, who operated an immigration services business with offices in Chicago and elsewhere for which Headley at times claimed to work, among other things helped arrange and conceal Headley's travels to surveil potential targets for terrorist attacks and meet with others involved in planning acts of terrorism, discussed targets for terrorist attacks with Headley and helped to conceal the nature and purposes of Headley's travels.

In October 2008, Headley had posted a message to an internet discussion group – to which RANA also belonged – stating, with respect to the Danish cartoonists and others he identified as “making fun of Islam,” that “I feel disposed towards violence for the offending parties.”

In January 2009, after extensive correspondence with Individual A, in the course of which Individual A urged Headley to “try to go as early as possible" Headley traveled to Copenhagen, Denmark, but only after advising Individual A that he needed to consult with RANA first. RANA arranged portions of Headley's travel.

During that trip, Headley visited two different offices of the Jyllands-Posten – in Copenhagen and in Arhus, Denmark. As cover for his visits to the Jyllands-Posten offices, Headley falsely represented that he was visiting on behalf of RANA’s immigration services business, First World Immigration Services ; that First World was considering opening up offices in Denmark; and that he was interested in advertising the business in the Jyllands-Posten. While in Denmark, Headley instructed RANA to be alert for email from a Jyllands-Posten sales representative, and to ask First World’s Toronto and New York offices to “remember me,” in case a representative of the Jyllands-Posten called. To further the cover story of Headley, RANA, while in Chicago, replied to an email from the newspaper staff pretending to be Headley, who was overseas.

After visiting Denmark in January 2009, Headley traveled to Pakistan to meet with Individual A. During this trip, he traveled with Individual A to the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region in northwestern Pakistan and met with Ilyas Kashmiri. Headley returned to Chicago in mid-June 2009. During his trip to Pakistan, Headley sent his will to RANA. RANA responded by sending a coded message to establish a new email account.

In late July 2009, Headley traveled again to Copenhagen, Denmark, and to other locations in Europe. RANA again arranged portions of his travel. When Headley returned to the United States, he told a Customs and Border Patrol Inspector that he was traveling on business as a representative of RANA’s business, First WorldImmigration. Individual A’s luggage contained no papers or other documents relating to First World.

Following Headley's return to Chicago in August 2009, he kept RANA apprised of the developments concerning the lack ofcommunication with Ilyas Kashmiri.In early September 2009, Headley and RANA took a lengthy car ride during which they discussed, among other things, the general activities of Individual A, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and ( Ilyas) Kashmiri, including past terrorist acts, and Headley discussed with RANA five actions involving targets, including “Denmark.”

Headley kept RANA apprised of reports of Kashmiri’s death and advised Individual A that RANA was very upset at Kashmiri’s death.On or about September 20, 2009, Headley told an associate in Pakistan in a recorded telephone conversation words to the effect that he had spoken to RANA and they agreed that “business must go on.”

Defendant TAHAWWUR HUSSAIN RANA was born in Pakistan and is now a Canadian citizen who primarily resides in Chicago, Illinois. RANA, who has received medical training, is the owner of several businesses, including First World Immigration Services,which has offices in Chicago, New York, and Canada. RANA also owns a farm in Kinsman, Illinois, which is used to provide halal meat for Muslim customers, as well as a grocery store in Chicago.

Postings to a Yahoo group for graduates of a military school located in the Pakistani town of Hasan Abdal (a group that refers to itself as “abdalians”),reflect that both Headley and RANA have participated in the group and referred to their attendance at that school.

Headley at times has claimed to be a consultant with or representative of the First World Immigration Services, a company owned and operated by RANA. Surveillance of Headley's activities, as well as his phone conversations and email exchanges, reflect that Headley performs few services for First World. Headley has no known or reported employment other than with First World.

As discussed throughout this affidavit, Headley,RANA, Individual A and Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A have frequently used coded language and changed their methods of communications in order to conceal the nature and content of their communications. For example, on or about March 4, 2009, after acknowledging receipt of an email from Headley, RANA sent a response with the following pertinent content:"One of my brothers is Brigadier Movadat Hussain Rana and the other is Sibte Hassan Rana . They are in Rawalpindi. I really admire emails making it instant half mulaquat especially yahoo as it seems superior to hotmail. Talk to you later."

Records reveal that the email account “mov.monie@yahoo” was created on or about March 6, 2009, at a particular internet protocol address, the user of which was located at the Chicago business address of First World Immigration. That same day, Headley accessed the mov.monie@yahoo account from an internet protocol address in the United Arab Emirates, and sent an email from mov.monie@yahoo to RANA at his personal email address, asking RANA to contact Individual A.On or about October 3, 2009, as Headley was preparing to travel to Pakistan, he spoke to RANA in a conversation that was recorded. He asked RANA to create an email account using the Gmail service with the user name“liaqatbin11.” Headley instructed RANA to change the email account name after using it two or three times, and gave him directions for changing the name. Headley stated that the “liaqatbin” portion of the name would remain, but that the number 11 would change, and that to determine the second number, RANA should start by multiplying by two and subtracting two. Headley explained that the number used to multiply 11 would increase by one with each new account. Headley provided an example, and RANA worked the math out loud for determining several numbers.

Based on my (FBI agent's) review of communications between Headley and Individual A, I understand the references to “dr” and “doc” in the exchange to be references to RANA because, in part, Headley states in one of the messages that “doctor has gone to Canada,” and records demonstrate that RANA re-entered the United States from Canada near Detroit on or about January 1, 2009. In addition, as noted above, RANA has received medical training .I understand that the expression “Zihan saazi” refers to the act of one person [RANA] preparing someone else [ Headley] to perform an act.

In the December 25, 2008 email, Individual A asked Headley about RANA: “how’s the dr’s reaction on what all is happening, is he terrified or relaxed?”The next day, on or about December 26, 2008, Headley responded to Individual A,“Doc [RANA] is very relaxed.” Further, Headley related that RANA was providing direction to Headley, RANA is “trying to do Zihan saazi asking if this happens you should act like this and if that happens you should do that and fear nothing except God.”

Additionally, in the same December 26, 2008, email, Headley related to Individual A that, prior to departing for the Mickey Mouse project ( in Denmark), he needed to consult with RANA:"Yes I am ready for MMP but I think it will be better to go after new year as everything is shut down from Christmas to new year. Also doctor [RANA] has gone to Canada with his family till new year so I need to consult him [RANA] as well."

On or about Sunday, January 12, 2009, Headley emailed Individual A concerning his upcoming travel. Headley stated: “I am leaving WED night your time and will be at the location Thursday [January 15] night your time. Pray that I make a lot of money on the project.” RANA arranged for at least a portion of Headley's travel through Expedia, an online travel agency. On or about January 13, 2009, RANA received a confirmation email from Expedia relating to the first leg of Headley's travel from Chicago to New York through Philadelphia.

On or about January 15, 2009, Headley arrived in Frankfurt,Germany.On or about January 19, 2009, Headley emailed RANA, the subject of which was“Copenhagen”:Dear Doc,Sorry I missed your calls last night. . . . I checked out business opportunities here.They seem quite promising. I am going right now to see if I can put an ad for our company and also check the feasibility to open up an office here. . . .Bye for now". The same day, RANA responded, stating “Booking is for 24th at 10p.m.. Good luck, . . . Tahawwur.” Based on Headley's subsequent departure from Europe on January 24, 2009, I (FBI agent) understand that RANA told Headley that he had booked him on a flight on January 24, 2009.

On or about January 20, 2009, Headley sent an email to RANA, the subject of which was described “Copenhagen Important.” Headley stated in relevant part:"Dear Doc, Everything is fine here. I went to a newspaper to find out about advertising our company. I gave him my card so they might call any of the 3 offices to verify.Ask NY and Toronto offices to remember me. The rates are pretty steep, like 3000 dollars for the front page, for one time. The sales guy's name was [name omitted] and he asked for our email to give detailed prices. I gave our business email, so keep alert for his mail." I (FBI agent) understand Headley's statement “Ask NY and Toronto offices to remember me” to be a request to RANA to take additional steps to preserve the cover story for Headley's visit to the newspaper.Later that same day, on or about January 20, 2009, Headley sent another email to defendant RANA, the subject of which was described “Copenhagen.” Headley remained concerned that an employee from the newspaper would contact First World Immigration. Headley asked RANA to “please confirm on the receipt of these emails.” Further, Headley reminded RANA to alert First World’s employees to the possibility of incoming communications resulting from his contacts with the newspaper. Headley wrote: "I will leave this hotel Thursday morning and go to another city in this country for my vacation. I haven’t decided which one, maybe Arhus. So please tell ALL our offices if they receive a call about me, to please confirm my job there."

On or about January 23, 2009, Headley visited the Jyllands Posten office in Arhaus,Denmark, again under the auspices of checking rates for advertising in this newspaper.That same day, Headley sent an email to defendant RANA, the subject of which was described as “Copenhagen and Arhaus.” Headley wrote:"Ok Doc, . . . I checked for our office ad in Arhus as well. You might be receiving price quotes in your other email address. Did the Copenhagen guy, [name omitted] send you any mail yet? I think our company has a really bright future here. We will become rich or should I say richer."On or about January 26, 2009, consistent with Headley's statement to RANA that he had given “our business email,” an email was received at an email address subscribed to the address of First World Immigration and used by RANA, from a sales coordinator at the Jyllands-Posten.. The email stated: "Dear [ Headley],thank you for your visit at Jyllands-Posten Friday last week [January 23, 2009] concerning advertising in our newspaper."On or about January 29, 2009, RANA, posing as Headley, responded to the email, stating: "Thank you for your reply. I will be in touch soon. I am trying to coordinate with a local attorney in Denmark for taking care of our clients locally. I intend to visit you in the coming spring."Records reflecting the internet protocol address from which this email was sent reveal that it was sent from Chicago, Illinois, and, more specifically, the address of RANA’s residence. As of the date of this email, Headley remained overseas.

Headley's representations that his travel to Denmark was for the purposes of opening an office for First World Immigration in Denmark appear implausible for multiple reasons, including, among others, the following:

a.A review of phone records for both Headley's and RANA’s home and personal cell phones, as well as the phone records for five separate lines at First World Immigration, has revealed not one phone call to Denmark during 2009;

b.A search of emails originating from Headley, RANA and First World Immigration Services accounts in Chicago for 2009 has revealed no records reflecting the use of First World’s services by Danish residents;

c.Although Headley and Individual A discussed the trip to Denmark for the Mickey Mouse project extensively in email exchanges and by telephone, their recorded conversations and emails did not touch on the immigration services business, efforts to establish an office for First World in Denmark or expand its business in Europe, or the need for advertising;

d.Likewise, although Headley's email exchanges with RANA during Headley's visit to Denmark discussed Headley's communications with the Jyllands-Posten about purported plans to advertise for First World, those communications did not discuss in any detail other aspects of establishing a new branch of First World in Denmark. Although Headley advised RANA that a representative of the Jyllands-Posten might call First World’s offices, he did not suggest that First World would be receiving similar calls from other potential business partners or vendors in Denmark;

e.Had Individual A and RANA been interested in obtaining information about advertising in the Jyllands-Posten, such information is readily available on the newspaper’s web site, as is the name and phone number of the newspaper’s sales representative;

f.Prior to his visit to Denmark, Headley had expressed his displeasure at the Jyllands-Posten cartoonists “who slandered our prophet,” and said that “I feel disposed towards violence for the offending parties,” making it unlikely that Headley would seek to patronize the Jyllands-Posten as a business advertiser;

g.The list of items that Headley prepared and emailed to himself relating to the Mickey Mouse Project on December 7, 2008, contains multiple references that do not appear consistent with plans to open an immigration office,including “Route Design (train, bus, air)”; “Cross (Cover Authenticator)”;“Counter surveillance (magic eye)”; “Security (armed)?”; “Zoom”; and “Entry and exit method in the house.” Based on my ( FBI agent's) training and experience, I believe that these notations, particularly in the context of the other information related in this Affidavit, are consistent with planning for a terrorist attack. The list also includes a reference to “Residence for clients.” In my experience, it is unnecessary for the typical immigration services business to provide a residence for its clients; by contrast, a team assigned to carry out a terrorist attack in a city where the team’s members did not reside would need one or more locations to live while preparing to carry out the attack;

h.To date, no advertisements have been placed in the Jyllands-Posten for First World Immigration Services.

On January 24, 2009, Headley departed from Frankfort, Germany, to the United Arab Emirates. From there, he subsequently traveled to Pakistan. On or about March 3, 2009, Headley sent an email to RANA stating that: “As I am traveling and things are so bad these days, I would like to leave a few instructions with you in case of my death or in case I am incapacitated for some reason.” He continued in detail, providing instructions to RANA on how to handle his affairs, including his wishes for his family. In an email response the same day,RANA stated “I acknowledge receipt of this will.” Then, in coded language, RANA directed Headley to communicate with him in a separate email account.

On or about June 11, 2009, Headley returned to Chicago. Once again, RANA arranged for this travel. More specifically, on June 8, 2009, RANA booked the last leg of Headley's travel, a flight from New York to Chicago, on JetBlue Airlines. On or about June 9, 2009, RANA received an email containing a response to a request for travel insurance information for Headley. Further, on or about June 10, 2009, RANA received a confirmation email from JetBlue Airways concerning the last leg of Headley's return to Chicago, his flight from New York to Chicago.While Headley was in Copenhagen, on August 2, 2009, RANA arranged through a travel agency located at an office building once owned by RANA for airfare for Headley to travel from Copenhagen to Chicago through Atlanta. On August 3, 2009,RANA received an email confirmation from this travel agency, which, in part, forwarded an email from Expedia, an online travel agency. The email stated : “The itinerary is attached below. Thank you for giving us the opportunity to be of service.” A review of the email reveals that the flight booked by RANA was“Copenhagen to Chicago”, the traveler name was Headley and the date of travel was August 5, 2009.On or about August 5, 2009, Headley arrived in Atlanta, Georgia, on a flight from Copenhagen.

On or about August 7, 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A sent an email asking Headley why he had not been responding. That same day, Headley responded: "Sorry, I just don’t check my mail daily if I don’t expect anyone will write me. I am working at a retaurant owned by Dr. Rana and his friend as a manager.Last week they sent me to Germany to buy some butchery equipment and guess where else I went for 3 days (just for a vacation ) on Dr. Rana’s expense." I (FBI agent) understand that in this message Headley is referring to Copenhagen (inaccurately referenced in the email as Germany) as the place of his “vacation,” the same term that he used in his January 23, 2009 email to RANA during his first trip to Denmark. Further, I (FBI agent) understand that Headley is informing Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A that RANA paid for his travel to Copenhagen.

On or about September 4, 2009, RANA and Individual A spoke by telephone. In coded language, RANA asked Individual A about his earlier arrest: “okay, you remember when you had fever during that time – did you ever faint due to the fever?” Individual A responded, “no, no, no, no, no, no. Th-th-that all was fine, there wasn’t any problem.”RANA then commented, “okay, that is very good.”

On or about September 7, 2009, Headley reported to RANA on the lack of contact between “Doctor [Kashmiri]” and Individual A. Headley expressed concern that his “reports” and “notes” would not be delivered. The pertinent part of the exchange was as follows:

Headley:"And, gathering together, whatever reports I had given to [Individual A], he has not been able to pass on the report to him (Kashmiri). It’s been months. There is action going on, you know." Although this conversation was in the Urdu language, RANA used the English word “target.” Based on my (FBI agent's) review of this and other conversations, I understand “defense college” to refer to another overseas target.

Headley:"Today, in the north, after many weeks, there was an attack in the north. It hadn’t happened in months. And, it is in the north, where he live[s]."

RANA:"I see".

Headley: "In any case, I don’t know much, God will help."

RANA:"Whatever happens, hope it is for the best."

Headley: "Yes."

RANA:"When you know that he received the notes, then."

Headley: "God willing, he’ll find a solution."

In this same recorded conversation on September 7, 2009, Headley and RANA discussed and named multiple targets of their planning. More specifically, Headley listed four targets, one of which was “Denmark,” then commented “[a]fter that if I will pray for any other action.God may help me complete this task.” Later in this same conversation, RANA asked Headley to “pass along a message” to Individual A. RANA then stated words to the effect that “top class” was a “befitting” name for Individual A. RANA and Headley then discussed a fifth target. More specifically, Headley referred to the earlier discussion, and stated words to the effect of “oh my friend, not four, five, five.” While RANA laughed, Headley stated“Defense College” twice, and RANA commented “right, this is it. I knew already.”After other discussion, RANA continued “That one, uh, I thought that was the target.” Headley responded, “I don’t know but once he comes then it will be known, but I am going to ask him to do that one first.” RANA responded, “In this matter – defense .”

On September 14, 2009, Headley telephoned RANA and advised him of his telephone call with Individual A and advised RANA that Individual A had asked them to pray for “the doctor.” Headley explained that “so far it is a rumor, it is not confirmed yet,” but he may have gotten “married.” Headley continued with words to the effect of “pray that this should not have happened,” and RANA responded “we will talk about this.”

Headley informed Individual A that he would be coming to Pakistan soon “but now there is nothing to do there. Now let us collect unemployment from the company . . . when a company lays off in case of bankruptcy, it discharges employees.” When Individual A tried to assure Headley that Kashmiri’s death was a “small loss,” Headley disagreed and responded: “no, it is not a small loss, it is a major loss.” In this same conversation, Headley told Individual A that in light of Kashmiri’s reported death, “Now I think you better go back towards him, towards [Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A].”

Headley complained to Individual A that “[Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A] and others, and this [an identified individual] and all of them – again they are – their eyes are again in that direction.” He added that Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A and the identified individual were unwilling to take risk and “have rotten guts.”

Individual A said: “When in business a person wants to do something, there is risk factor also. They do not want to take risk and they want to be praised also.”

Headley responded, “then there will be no profit because when you have high aim, as much an investment will be risky as much is the chance of profits and at the same time there is chance of loss.”

In the same telephone conversation, Individual A stated that “This is business, sir. These type of things happen.”

Headley responded: “I am just telling you that the companies in your competition they have started handling themselves in a far better way, that is why they all are running in losses profit-wise and market-wise. There are continuous losses and it does not seem that they will recover. In these conditions it looks that there will be bankruptcy in approximately six months, my estimate within . . . six to twelve months is that our companies will be done the way things are going on.”

Individual A responded, “it is as it usually happens that if one company fails then another company will come up.”

On or about September 20, 2009, Headley spoke with a different associate in Pakistan in a recorded telephone conversation. Headley related words to the effect that he had discussed with RANA the fact that “business must go on.” Headley continued: “Main thing that I have an income...make some money. I don’t care that if I am working for Microsoft or I am working for a...any...GE or Philips, I don’t care. As long as I am making money, I don’t give a shit.” Based on my (FBI agent's) review of this and other conversations involving Headley, I believe that Headley is indicating that he does not care whether he works for Kashmiri’s group or Lashkar-e-Taiba, as long as he helps carry out attacks.

On or about September 21, 2009, Headley spoke with Individual A by telephone:Individual A: "Buddy, the reports that are com-coming in, by the grace of God, he (Kashmiri) is doing well."Headley: "God willing – uh, uh – you mean the Doctor?"Individual A: "Yes, yes."Headley: "Uh, I, Buddy if this is true, then I will say 100 prayers, 100 prayers."

Four days later, on or about September 25, 2009, RANA spoke by telephone with the Consul General at the Pakistani Consulate in Chicago in an effort to obtain a 5-year visa for Headley to travel to Pakistan. It is clear from email traffic unrelated to terrorist plotting that the Consul General knows RANA and Headley personally as all three attended the same high school. However, the Consul General knows Headley by a different name. In seeking a visa for Headley, RANA stated that he wished to obtain the visa for a white American named Headley who did not have any Pakistani background at all. When the Consul General suggested that RANA send this friend to the consulate,RANA explained that he had sent his friend elsewhere to take care of some unspecified business so that someone else would visit the consulate. It is clear from the foregoing conversation that RANA was attempting to deceive the Consul General into granting a visa for Headley without the Consul General knowing for whom the visa would be issued.On or about September 30, 2009,

Headley and Individual A again spoke by telephone. Individual A informed Headley that “Pir Sahib” is “absolutely all right.”Headley asked Individual A to “swear” several times, and Individual A responded “I swear, I am telling the truth.” Headley added, “so he does not get married,” and asked “so, then, I will be able to meet him upon returning?” Individual A responded words to the effect of “absolutely, right, and he – just today – just today, was asking about you.”

Based on my (FBI agent's) review of this conversation, as well as preceding conversations, I believe that the reference to “Pir Sahib” is Kashmiri. Shortly after speaking with Individual A, Headley spoke to RANA by telephone.He informed RANA that “Pir Sahab is alive.” RANA responded, “wow, all praise be to God.”

Based on recorded conversations with associates and other third parties, Headley intended to travel to Pakistan in early October 2009. Before doing so, Headley intended to travel to Philadelphia from Chicago. Headley received an email confirmation from Orbitz, an online travel agency,reflecting the purchase of airfare from Chicago to Philadelphia on October 3, 2009.

On October 3, 2009, Headley was arrested at O'Hare Airport in Chicago before boarding his scheduled flight to Philadelphia. Agents searched his checked luggage pursuant to a search warrant issued by United States Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys on October 2, 2009. Among other items recovered from Headley's checked luggage were

(1) A photocopy of the front page of an August 1, 2009 issue of the Jyllands-Posten;

(2) a street guide for Copenhagen, Denmark; and

(3) a list of phone numbers, including a Pakistani telephone number Headley had used to contact Individual A.

Also contained in the luggage was a memory stick. Contained on this memory stick were approximately ten short videos, including videos taken of King’s Square (Copenhagen) both during the day and at night. The day-time video of King’s Square includes close-up shots of the entrance to the Jyllands-Posten office. The videos also include shots of what appears to be the entrance to a military barracks, a close-up of a guard stationed near the entrance to that location, and of the exterior and interior of Copenhagen’s central train station.

On October 18, 2009, RANA was arrested. After being advised of and waiving his rights, RANA provided the following statements:

(1) he was aware that Headley had been affiliated with the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist organization for the past few years,

(2) he was aware that Headley had received training from the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist organization,

(3) he was aware that Headley had met with Ilyas Kashmiri within the past year,

(4) he was aware that Headley communicated with Individual A and LeT Member A,

(5) he was aware that Headley was angry about the cartoon depictions of the Prophet Mohammed,

(6) he was offended by the cartoon depictions of the Prophet Mohammed and would not have done business with the newspaper that published them, and

(7) he had discussed the cartoonist and editor from the Jyllands-Posten with Headley.

This is not intended to be an exhaustive account of statements that RANA has made, but a summary for purposes of this affidavit.

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

EXTRACTS FROM FBI AFFIDAVIT REGARDING HEADLEY'S CONTACTS WITH INDIVIDUAL A & LET MEMBER A

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO 575

B.RAMAN

Given below are extracts from the affidavit filed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the US in the district court of the Northern district of Illinois on October 11,2009, justifying its decision to arrest David Coleman Headley, originally known as Dawood Gilani till 2006. These extracts relate to the three Pakistan-based ring leaders of the conspiracy to carry out terrorist strikes in Denmark and India.

2. As already reported, while the FBI identifies one of the ring leaders by name as Ilyas Kashmiri of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and gives his detailed background, it refrains from identifying the two other ring leaders, who are merely referred to as Individual A and Lashkar-e-Toiba member A.However, a perusal of the extracts given below would show that the FBI must be aware of their identities. Why is it coy about identifying them? Has it at least told the Indian agencies about their identities? Has it asked the Government of Pakistan to arrest them and hand them over to the FBI for further interrogation? If not, why not?

3. A perusal of the extracts indicates the following:

(a). Headley had two channels of communications in Pakistan---- with Individual A and LET member A.

(b). He had no direct contact with Ilyas Kashmiri. All his communications with him were through Individual A.

(c). Individual A was arrested by the Pakistani authorities in connection with the investigation of the November 2008 murder of Maj-Gen.Amir Faisal Alvi, formerly of the Special Services Group (SSG), who was the brother of Lady Naipaul, wife of writer Sir V.S.Naipaul. But he was subsequently released. He was close to Maj.Haroon Ashiq, the principal accused in the murder, who reportedly confessed that he and other accomplices murdered Alvi on the instructions of Ilyas Kashmiri. Why did they murder Alvi? Did he play any role in the SSG's commando action in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007?Are all of them, including Individual A, former officers of the SSG, as Ilyas was? If so, did these ex-SSG officers train the LET team that attacked Mumbai on 26/11? These questions need the attention of the Indian investigators.

EXTRACTS FROM THE AFFIDAVIT

After visiting Denmark in January 2009, HEADLEY traveled to Pakistan to meet with Individual A. During this trip, HEADLEY traveled with Individual A to the Federally-Administered Tribal Area (FATA) region in north-western Pakistan and met with (Ilyas) Kashmiri. HEADLEY returned to Chicago in mid-June 2009. Following HEADLEY's return from Pakistan, HEADLEY communicated by email with Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A regarding the status of the Northern Project. Because Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded that he had "new investment plans," coded language for the planning of a different attack, HEADLEY and Individual A began to focus on working with Kashmiri to complete the attack on the newspaper.

In late July 2009, HEADLEY traveled again to Copenhagen, Denmark, and to other locations in Europe. When HEADLEY returned to the United States, he told a Customs and Border Patrol inspector that he was traveling on business as a representative of an immigration business. HEADLEY's luggage contained no papers or other documents relating to such business.

Following HEADLEY's return to Chicago in August 2009, HEADLEY used coded language to inquire of Individual A on multiple occasions regarding whether Individual A had been in touch with Kashmiri regarding planning for the attack. HEADLEY expressed concern that Individual A's communications with Kashmiri had been cut off.

In early September 2009, Individual A called HEADLEY to report that Kashmiri might be dead. HEADLEY expressed dismay and concern, and said that Kashmiri's death means "our company has gone into bankruptcy then," and that "the projects and so forth will go into suspension." Shortly after initial press reports that Kashmiri had been killed in a drone attack in Pakistan, HEADLEY and Individual A had a series of coded conversations in which they discussed the reports of Kashmiri's death and the significance of Kashmiri's death for the projects they were planning. Individual A sought to reassure and encourage HEADLEY, telling him, among other things, that"this is business sir; these types of things happen."

On or about September 17, 2009, HEADLEY discussed with Individual A the need, in light of Kashmiri's reported death, to turn back to Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A and another individual, to complete the planning for the attack on the newspaper. On or about September 20, 2009, HEADLEY told a family member in a recorded telephone conversation words to the effect "that the main thing is the business must go on." HEADLEY also stated words to the effect that it does not matter for which company he works.

On or about September 30, 2009, HEADLEY was told by Individual A that Kashmiri was still alive. When HEADLEY asked whether he would meet Kashmiri on his trip,Individual A advised that Kashmiri had been asking about HEADLEY. HEADLEY stated in intercepted communications that he intended to travel to Pakistan in early October 2009 to meet with Individual A and Kashmiri. HEADLEY had a reservation to fly from Chicago, Illinois to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on October 3, 2009, and indicated in intercepted communications that he intended to travel on to Pakistan.HEADLEY was arrested by FBI agents on October 3, 2009, as he prepared to board a flight from Chicago to Philadelphia. After being advised of his rights, HEADLEY made statements to FBI agents.

Among other things, HEADLEY stated that beginning prior to 2006 HEADLEY worked at various times with Lashkar-e-Taiba (an organization he knew to be a designated foreign terrorist organization) and that he received training from Lashkar-e-Taiba. HEADLEY also stated that at times he worked with Ilyas Kashmiri,including in connection with planning the Denmark attack.HEADLEY changed his name from "Daood Gilani" in or about 2006. In an August 2009 interview with Customs and Border Patrol, HEADLEY advised that he changed his name so as to raise less suspicion when he traveled. HEADLEY at times has claimed to be a consultant with or representative of an immigration business. Surveillance of HEADLEY's activities, as well as HEADLEY's phone conversations and email exchanges, reflect that HEADLEY performs few services for such business.

HEADLEY has no known or reported employment other than with such business. His residence in Chicago is an apartment leased to an individual who is deceased. Notwithstanding his apparent lack of financial resources and substantial employment, HEADLEY has engaged in extensive international travel since at least 2006, including multiple trips to Pakistan, India, Denmark, and other countries in Europe.Records reflecting the locations of internet protocol addresses used by HEADLEY to send emails indicate that HEADLEY has spent substantial time in Pakistan and elsewhere during the last several years - often for months at a time.

Emails between HEADLEY and third parties reflect that Individual A was arrested by Pakistani authorities in Summer 2009 and later released. As noted above, Individual A is associated with the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist organization, and with Ilyas Kashmiri, a leader of Harakat-ul-Jihad-Islami ("HUJI"), a Pakistani-based terrorist organization,among other entities. Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A, whose identity is known to the government, is an individual with substantial influence and responsibility within Lashkar-e-Taiba.

International news media reports have identified Kashmiri as the operational chief of the Azad Kashmir section of Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami ("HUJI) with links to al Qaeda. In April 2006, the United States Department of State issued the 2006 "Country Reports on Terrorism," which listed a number of designated "foreign terrorist organizations" and also listed "other selected terrorist groups also deemed to be of relevance to the global war on terrorism." HUJI was listed in the latter category. The report noted the group's "links to al Qaeda," and that "HUJI's operations in Kashmir were led by Commander Ilyas Kashmiri, a former commander in the Afghan jihad, .... [who] was arrested in October[2005] on charges of attacks against President Musharraf in 2003."

In September 2009,international news media reported that Kashmiri had been killed in a drone attack in the Waziristan region of Pakistan. On September 18, 2009, HEADLEY reviewed an article concerning Kashmiri's reported death, entitled "Pakistani Kashmiri militants now fighting NATO forces," which contained a number of details relating to Kashmiri, including the following:a. Kashmiri was the ameer [leader] of the Azad Kashmir chapter of HUJI. b.Kashmiri was considered to be one of the most dangerous al Qaeda-linked Pakistani commanders;c. Kashmiri was no. 4 on the Pakistani Ministry of Interior's Most WantedList;d. Kashmiri had established a training camp in the Razmak region of Waziristan;e. Kashmiri was named in a 12-page charge sheet filed by the Islamabad police in an anti-terrorism court for his role in the November 2008 murder of retired Major General Amir Faisal Alvi, the former General Officer Commanding of the Pakistan Army's Special Services Group. The charge sheet identified three people in the Alvi murder, including retired Major Haroon Ashiq, and alleged that the murder was carried out on the instructions of Kashmiri, who also had provided funds and weapons; and f. Kashmiri also was named in a charge sheet relating to the October 2008 kidnaping of a renowned film producer and distributor. Major Haroon Ashiq was one of the kidnapers.This same article reported that, following his arrest, Major Haroon Ashiq had told interrogators that Haroon, along with his younger brother Captain Khurram, had "joined hands" with Kashmiri in early 2008. The article stated that, according to Haroon,Kashmiri had tasked Haroon with kidnaping affluent people living in urban areas in order to raise money for Kashmiri's group.

On or about September 19, 2009, HEADLEY spoke by telephone to a family member and, using coded language, brought up the subject of Kashmiri's reported death.HEADLEY asked the family member if the family member had learned anything about "doctor," and stated words to the effect of: "[h]e was your Pir Sahib [spiritual guide],where I and you went, we went to Samanabad and we did Baiat [an oath of allegiance]."After the family member responded, "[y]es sir, absolutely, absolutely," HEADLEY continued "he just had a heart attack ... it has made me very sad."

Based on my (FBI agent's) review of HEADLEY's communications concerning Kashmiri's death, I believe that the term"heart attack" in this context to be a coded reference to the reported fact that Kashmiri had been killed.In the same conversation of September 19, 2009, HEADLEY continued to discuss Kashmiri, noting the press coverage following his reported death. HEADLEY stated words to the effect of: "now many other great things about him have come to surface, his supernatural powers and miracles, from his followers and others, yeah, they have also printed a small paper about him and many other things."

HEADLEY, Individual A, and Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A have used several methods of communication, including in-person meetings, telephone conversations (including calls placed using long distance calling cards) and emails. HEADLEY, in particular, utilized a cell phone, the account for which is the name of a deceased individual. In nearly all of their communications, HEADLEY, Individual A, and Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A have used coded language. Since the beginning of 2008, HEADLEY has communicated through the use of multiple email accounts. As discussed throughout this affidavit, HEADLEY, Lashkar-e-Taiba' Member A, and Individual A have frequently used coded language and changed their methods of communications in order to conceal the nature and content of their communications. For example, on or about August 28, 2009, in a recorded telephone conversation between HEADLEY and Individual A, HEADLEY spoke in coded language to describe a new account that HEADLEY had created for their continued communications. More specifically, after informing Individual A that he had formed an account on the "same system," HEADLEY instructed him to write his colleague's name and his younger brother's name and write the names without spaces and write 1 with it. On or about August 25, 2009, HEADLEY created such an account with a name blending two first names.

Records of email accounts used by HEADLEY reflect that between in or about August 2008 and December 7, 2008, HEADLEY sent multiple email messages from internet addresses located in the Pakistani cities of Karachi and Lahore. On or about December 7,2008, before traveling from Pakistan to the United States that same day, HEADLEY used one of his email accounts to save a list of items, which was titled "Mickey Mouse."

On or about December 16, 2008, HEADLEY sent an email from Chicago, Illinois to Individual A. Among other statements, HEADLEY told Individual A in this email that "I will be going for the Mickey Mouse project in the north in the middle of next month. Let me know any new info on it." One week later, on or about December 23, 2008, HEADLEY again communicated with Individual A concerning the Mickey Mouse project. More specifically, in an email sent from Chicago, Illinois, to Individual A, HEADLEY stated: " Send me the info on the Mickey Mouse project later when I tell you. For now,should I leave here early or around the 14th like previously planned.Do that special thing you do and tell me. ...Bye,Dave."

On or about December 24, 2008, Individual A responded to HEADLEY's email from the previous day, telling HEADLEY to "try to go as early as possible to MMP." In response,HEADLEY used code to request Individual A to use a different email address to further communicate with HEADLEY. More specifically, HEADLEY stated:"Planning for MMP. Send me info about it on other mail I gave starting with [the first four letters of one of Headley's email accounts]. If you don't have it I will mail you from it. . . . How is your friend Harry?. Did you check the Lady Naipaul link?.Ok take care.Dave59."

The next day, on or about December 25, 2008, Individual A responded: "I know ur other email address, no need to use that address yet..first u visit MMP then we will discuss and c the concerned person if needed, and if your friends decline , we'll do that ,I have discussed with baray log . . ."

As described further below, HEADLEY departed from Chicago on January 13,2009, before arriving in Copenhagen, Denmark days later. Lady Naipaul is a Pakistani journalist and the wife of the late Lord V. S. Naipaul,a Nobel prize winning author. Lady Naipaul also is the sister of Amir Faisal Alvi, the former Pakistani General killed in November 2008, allegedly by a group that included Major Haroon. Although Pakistani press reports reflect that Haroon was arrested by Pakistani police on or about February 24, 2009 in connection with General Alvi's murder, it is noteworthy that this email reference to Individual A's "friend Harry" in the context of "the Lady Naipaul link" occurred in late December 2008, shortly after General Alvi's murder and well before public reports of Haroon's involvement in the murder, and police action against Haroon.

I (FBI agent) understand "Harry" to be a reference to Haroon. I (FBI agent) believe that from a review of emails before and after this exchange, as well as subsequent telephone conversations between HEADLEY and Individual A, discussed more fully below, that Individual A was instructing HEADLEYto travel to Copenhagen, then travel to Pakistan to meet with Individual A ("we will discuss") and a third party ("c the concerned person"). Based on my (FBI agent's) review of subsequently intercepted communications, I believe that the "concerned person" was Kashmiri.

On January 24, 2009, HEADLEY departed from Frankfurt, Germany to the United Arab Emirates. From there, as discussed below, he subsequently traveled to Pakistan. Records of email accounts reflect that between in or around late January and early March 2009,HEADLEY sent multiple email messages from locations in Pakistan. As described earlier, on December 25, 2008, prior to HEADLEY's departure for Denmark, Individual A instructed HEADLEY as follows: "First u visit MMP then we will discuss and c the concerned person if needed." Further, on December 26, 2008,HEADLEY responded that he would get a "feel of the property" and "return by middle of next month to you [Individual A]." In a later email with the "abdalians" Yahoo group, HEADLEY confirmed his trip to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas ("FATA") region in northwestern Pakistan, bordering Afghanistan, a region in Pakistan in which various terrorist organizations operate.

More specifically, on or about May 4, 2009, a member of the group sent an email to the group discussing a recent survey concerning drone attacks in that area. The member's email stated in relevant part:... "a think tank of researchers and political activists from the NWFP and FATA, conducts research, survey and collects statistics on various issues concerning the Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorism and human security there. Their research teams go deep inside Taliban and al-Qaeda-occupied areas of FATA to collect information. Most of the areas are not accessible to journalists. Between last November and January [the think tank] sent five teams, each made up of five researchers, to the parts of the FATA that are often hit by American drones, to conduct a survey of public opinion about the attacks. The team visited Wana (South Waziristan), Ladda (South Waziristan), Miranshah (North Waziristan),Razmak (North Waziristan) and Parachinar (Kurram agency).According to the email, one of the conclusions of the survey was that the notion that a large majority of the local population supports the Taliban is inaccurate. Further, the sender of the email stated his personal view that the majority of the residents of the FATA saw the enemy as the Taliban and al Qaeda and viewed the drone attacks as not violating the sovereignty of Pakistan.

HEADLEY's sharp response confirmed that he had been to the area occupied by the Taliban and al Qaeda. He stated:"This "survey" is the biggest crock of S ... I was there on some business recently and I assure you this dude is not even close .. I even doubt the ability of the surveyors to conduct this "research" in Miranshah or Razmak. I even challenge [the identified individual who posted the survey article] to just walk around the bazaar in Miranshah. This bazaar is bustling with Chechens,Uzbeks, Tajiks,Russians, Bosnians, some from EU countries and of course our Arab brothers.According to MY survey, the foreign population is a little less than a third of the total. Any Waziri or Mehsud I spoke to seemed grateful to God for the privilege of being able to host the "Foreign Mujahideen."

On or about June 11, 2009, HEADLEY returned to Chicago. In or around mid Summer 2009, HEADLEY became aware that Pakistani authorities had detained Individual A. In that time frame, HEADLEY emailed a contact living in Pakistan. HEADLEY indicated in this email that Individual A had been arrested, and that HEADLEY wished to know whether Individual A would be available to continue working with HEADLEY and HEADLEY's associates.

On or about July 26, 2009, HEADLEY traveled to Europe, visiting various countries enroute to Copenhagen, Denmark. As described further below, during HEADLEY's second visit to Copenhagen, HEADLEY took surveillance video of several locations in Copenhagen Denmark, including the office of the Jyllands-Posten in King's Square in Copenhagen. On or about August 5, 2009, HEADLEY arrived in Atlanta, Georgia, on a flight from Copenhagen, Denmark. An officer with Customs and Border Patrol interviewed HEADLEY upon his entry. HEADLEY stated that he traveled to Copenhagen, Denmark,and elsewhere in Europe for business. HEADLEY claimed to be a consultant for an immigration business. An examination of HEADLEY's luggage revealed no papers,flyers or any documents relating to such business.

Following his return from his second visit to Copenhagen, HEADLEY received an email in response to his inquiry about the arrest of Individual A. The sender wrote, "your friend that u asked about has reached home yesterday.How r u and what r the plans?" HEADLEY replied to the email and stated "thank you. I spoke with him after his arrival."

I (FBI agent) understand that when HEADLEY indicated that he "spoke with him after his arrival,"HEADLEY was referring to Individual A. Phone records for Headley's cell phone revealed call the day before he received the above referenced email with a Pakistani phone number.

Following his return from his second visit to Copenhagen, HEADLEY exchanged emails with Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A, regarding, among other topics, his trip to Copenhagen.On or about August 7, 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A sent an email asking HEADLEY why he had not been responding. That same day, HEADLEY responded:"Sony, l just don't check my mail daily if I don't expect anyone will write me. I am working at a restaurant owned by [a named associate of Headley's] and his friend as a manager. Last week they sent me to Germany to buy some Butchery equipment and guess where else I went for 3 days (just for a vacation ) .

I (FBI agent) understand that in this message HEADLEY is referring to his recently completed trip to Copenhagen (inaccurately referenced in the email as Germany)as a "vacation," the same term that he used in his January 23, 2009 email during his first trip to Denmark. On or about August 9, 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded in pertinent part:"God You are something... how was visit? Did you buy some thing for me? I heard that [names an associate of Headley and Lashkar-e-Taiba member A] is with Haroon.So be careful please."

I (FBI agent) understand the statement that the associate is "with Haroon" is a reference to this associates's arrest by Pakistani authorities, and the continued detention of Major Haroon by Pakistani authorities. Months before August 2009, Pakistani news reports stated that Haroon had confessed to his role in the murder of General Alvi and provided information about Kashmiri's operations. In fact, on or about April 14, 2009, HEADLEY had posted an article to the "abdalians" Yahoo group regarding Haroon. The article stated in pertinent part that Haroon "confessed that he had assassinated General Alvi," and confessed that he had kidnaped four separate victims in order to get money for militant organizations.

HEADLEY and Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A continued their exchange about the travel to Copenhagen. The following are the pertinent excerpts from their continued exchange:(HEADLEY, August 10, 2009)"Yes, we bought some abbatoir [animal butchery] equipment from there. I did get you something. The same gift I got for you last time I was there. . . ."(Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A, August 11, 2009). . ."whatever I am saying, I know deep in my heart is futile.coz its YOU. . . ." (HEADLEY, August 11, 2009) "I don't understand, what is futile?"(Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A, August 11, 2009) "Futile are my advices, coz you do what you feel like, matter and situation is not clear. Your skin is dear to me, more than my own."I (FBI agent) understand that, in the above exchange, HEADLEY is reporting on his travel and the fact that he has additional video surveillance for Lahkar-e-Taiba member A, and Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A is recommending that HEADLEY be careful and expressing some frustration because HEADLEY does not always follow advice.

Throughout the remainder of August and early September 2009, a number of intercepted telephone conversations between HEADLEY and Individual A reveal that HEADLEYcontinually sought word of whether Individual A had been in contact with Kashmiri regarding their plans. On or about August 22, 2009, HEADLEY and Individual A spoke by telephone. The pertinent discussion was as follows:HEADLEY: "First tell me have you spoken to Doctor?"Individual A: "No friend - there is nothing."HEADLEY: "Contact."Individual A: "Nowadays, there is no contact.." *HEADLEY: . . . "about discussion with Mister Doctor, that if this doesn't - for example- along these lines you should, you should consider that - . . .these who are coming to meet."-Individual A: "Hmm."HEADLEY: - "if they - example what you people had thought about them - in doubt -if they are not fulfilling on it." Individual A: "Hmm".HEADLEY: "Then B, there should be something as a B option."Individual A: "Okay."HEADLEY: "Yeah."Individual A: "On the contrary, on the contrary, not B, but there should be B and C as well."From my ( FBI agent's) review of intercepted communications between HEADLEY and Individual A, I believe that the use of the term "Doctor" in this particular context is to refer to Kashmiri.HEADLEY: "Yeah, there should be B and C as well. So that's why - about it. Ahm -okay . Secondly I - that - used to make an email - I mean, you, you could write on it every now and then."Individual A: "Okay, yes, yes, yes."HEADLEY: "So that, I, I mean, had made one more, and I will give it to you sometime -we can do on it too." Individual A: "Okay."HEADLEY: "So, about, so think about it. Because I have a return ticket for October29th, for there, to return."Individual A: "okay".HEADLEY: "Where I came from, recently."Individual A: "Yes, yes, yes."HEADLEY: "So for now, do it, delay it, give priority or put at the end, what is its arrangement. And. secondly, I also said that to you, that also find out, that if. that. I mean that what I told you. That".Individual A: "Yes, yes. That." HEADLEY: "Yeah."Individual A: -" that, understand, I understand."

I (FBI agent) understand that, in the above conversation, HEADLEY discussed developing other options ("B" and "C") if communications with the "doctor" failed.As discussed previously, on or about August 28, 2009, in a telephone conversation between HEADLEY and Individual A, HEADLEY spoke in coded language to describe a new email account created by HEADLEY. HEADLEY and Individual A, in fact, had at least three separate conversations regarding this account, based, in part, on Individual A's confusion over how HEADLEY spelled the names of the persons used to create the account.

FBI AFFIDAVIT AGAINST HEADLEY: REFERENCES TO INDIA

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.574

B.RAMAN

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the US had filed an affidavit in the district court of the Northern district of Illinois on October 11,2009, justifying its decision to arrest David Coleman Headley, originally known as Dawood Gilani till 2006. The evidence against him described in the affidavit is based on the interception of his telephone conversations and e-mail communications between October,2008, and October 3,2009, when he was arrested and the information gathered from him after his arrest.

2. The affidavit refers to three of his ring leaders in Pakistan----Ilyas Kashmiri, formerly of the Special Services Group (SSG) of the Pakistan Army who subsequently joined the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), a contact of Ilyas Kashmiri, who is referred to as Individual A and an operative of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), who is referred to as LET member A. While the affidavit identifies Ilyas by name and gives considerable details of his background, it refrains from identifying the other two. The reasons for this are not clear.

3. While the major portion of the affidavit is about the attempted use of Headley by Ilyas to carry out a terrorist strike in Denmark, there are also references to the LET's interest in using him for a terrorist strike in India. Some media reports had initially described Headley as a White convert to Islam, but the affidavit indicates that he was a Chicago resident (US citizen?) of Pakistani origin, who claimed to have studied in the military cadet school of the Punjab Government at Hasan Abdal.

4. He would appear to have come to the notice of the FBI in October, 2008, when he had posted an entry in a chat group of former students of the cadet school expressing his anger over the insult of the Prophet in a cartoon published by a Danish journal. Subsequent investigation brought out that Headley hade been associated with the LET at least since 2006, if not earlier, and had been trained by it. He had made visits to India, but the affidavit makes no reference to any role played by him in the Mumbai suburban train blasts of July 2006 and the terrorist attacks of 26/11. He was in Pakistan during the period between December 2008 and June 2009. During his stay,he visited the Waziristan area, met Ilyas for the first time and swore his loyalty to him.

5. The references to India in the affidavit have been extracted below:

Lashkar-e-Taiba Shifts its Focus From Denmark to Potential New Attack in India

In July and August 2009, HEADLEY exchanged a series of emails with an individual that HEADLEY later identified to FBI agents as Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A. Certain of these emails are summarized below.

On July 3, 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A sent HEADLEY an email in which Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A said, "i need to see you for some new investment plans."

On July 8, 2009, HEADLEY sent Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A an email which stated, in part: "What do you want me to do? Where are you interested in making investments?"

In another email on July 8, 2009, HEADLEY told Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A that "I think when we get a chance we should revisit our last location again and say hi to Rahul."Following his arrest, HEADLEY acknowledged that, in this email, "Rahul" refers to a prominent Indian actor with the first name "Rahul."

Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A replied to the above email on July 8, 2009 and told HEADLEY in an email that "to see Rahul is a good idea coz have some work for you over there too. Matters are good enough to move forward...."

On July 9 , 2009, HEADLEY responded:"When you say "move forward" do you mean in the North direction or towards Rahul? Also in the future if we need to meet to discuss anything, do I have to come all the way over there or can we meet somewhere in the middle like Africa or Middle East?"

The same day, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded that "I mean towards Rahul."

On July 10, 2009, HEADLEY sent an email to Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A in which he stated:"I would like to know a few things if you can tell me:1) What is the status with the Northern project, i's it still postponed indefinitely?2) The visit to Rahul's place, is it for checking out real estate property like before,or something different and if so tell me what you can please. Also is it exactly in Rahul's city or different one?3) How long do you think I will need to stay at Rahul's place to complete this task?4) Will I have to stay there continuously for a while, or back and forth like before?"

Based on my (FBI agent's) review of this and other communications, I believe that HEADLEY had inquired of Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A whether the Denmark project was on hold, and whether the visit to India that Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A had asked him to undertake was for the purpose of surveilling targets for a new terrorist attack.

Later on July 10,2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded to HEADLEY's email, stating, in part, that:"There are some investment plans with me, not exactly at Rahul's city but near that. Rest we can decide when meet according to your ease".

In an email to Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A on July 16, 2009, HEADLEY stated, in part:"One very important thing I need to know please is that how long do you need me for,meaning how long should it take me to finish my work, in your opinion. And is it really urgent? Before it seemed that the Northern Project was really urgent."

After Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded on July 18, 2009, that "it may take somewhere between 2 to 4 weeks," HEADLEY replied on July 19, 2009, that "I think I can manage it," and that he would be available in October. He closed his email by asking"Is the Northern Investment definitely postponed for now?"

Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A and HEADLEY continued to exchange emails through late August 2009, when HEADLEY told Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A that he "will be there end of next month."

I (FBI agent) understand these emails to reflect that beginning in July 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A was placing a higher priority on using HEADLEY to assist in planning a new attack in India than on completing the planned attack in Denmark.

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd) , Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

THE FORT HOOD INCIDENT IN THE US

B.RAMAN

The dilemma and the problems posed by the existence of pockets of qualms of conscience and divided loyalties in the Muslim communities of the non-Muslim world has been tragically illustrated by an incident in a US military base in Fort Hood, Texas, on November 6,2009.Major Nidal Malik Hasan, a psychiatrist of the US Army born to Palestinian migrants to the US from Jordan, suddenly went on a killing spree killing 13 soldiers with a handgun before he was injured and overpowered. He is presently under interrogation.

2.It has been reported that the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been sought in the investigation to rule out any terrorist conspiracy behind the incident. The indications till now are that it was the act of a lone Muslim with a mind troubled by conflicting loyalties to the US and Islam and angered by his own allegedly negative experiences as a Muslim in the US as well as in the Army and by the US involvement in the campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Iraq and Afghanistan, which is constantly and mischievously projected by Al Qaeda and its affiliates as a campaign against Islam. Media reports claim that over a period of time this officer, with a 20 year record of service in the Army, had been expressing ideas of solidarity with his fellow-religionists, who had taken to arms against the US. He had also come to notice for allegedly speaking with some understanding of what he saw as the compulsions which drove some Muslims to take to suicide terrorism.

3.This was not the first incident of its kind in the US Armed Forces since 9/11, but this was the most dramatic. There were two previous incidents, which were equally troubling, but less dramatic.Just before the US troops entered Iraq in March,2003, Sergeant Hasan Akbar of the US Army based in Kuwait threw hand-grenades and opened fire into a tent in which US military personnel were sleeping. Two officers were killed.There was another incident in which two soldiers were killed outside a recruitment centre in Little Rock, Arkansas.

4. The fact that such incidents have till now been few and far between show that the US military authorities are sensitive to the pressures that are likely to be faced by the Muslim soldiers of their Armed Forces arising from the propaganda that the US military is waging a campaign against Islam and not against Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other terrorist groups and that efforts are being made to remove wrong impressions of the campaign against terrorism in the minds of the Muslim soldiers, whose number in the US Armed Forces is estimated at around 3600.

5.The Fort Hood incident shows that despite this, troubled minds continue to exist among the Muslim soldiers. There has been an obvious failure of the human element in that despite past reports of the negative thinking and ideas of Major Hasan timely action was not taken to facilitate his exit from the Army in response to his reported desire to leave the Army.

6. Those opposed to the US role in Iraq and Afghanistan would use the Fort Hood incident as one more reason why the US should quit Iraq and Afghanistan. Isolated incidents such as this should not be allowed to influence policy decisions of strategic significance.

7. As of now, there is no evidence that a terrorist conspiracy might have been behind the incident. But it is likely that Al Qaeda and its affiliates would exploit it to spread disaffection and anger among the Muslim soldiers just as in the 1980s, the Afghan Mujahideen spread disaffection and anger among the Muslim soldiers from Chechnya, Dagestan and Central Asia serving in the Soviet Army. They went on duty to Afghanistan as convinced communists, but returned as born-again and wahabised Muslims. They constituted the initial core of the terrorist movements in Chechnya, Dagestan and the present-day Central Asian Republics. A similar possibility in the US has to be guarded against. ( 7-11-09 )

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

MUMBAI 26/11: A DAY OF INFAMY

May like to see http://news.rediff.com/special/2009/nov/05/local-involvement-in-2611-needs-attention-says-b-raman.htm

26/11: HEIGHTENED ALERT

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.573

B.RAMAN

As the first anniversary of the 26/11 terrorist strike by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in Mumbai approaches, there is a heightened alert by the secuity agencies to prevent any major terrorist strike coinciding with the anniversary by the LET itself or by other Pakistani and/or Indian organisations such as the Indian Mujahideen (IM) or the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) . The terrorists would be calculating that a successful strike around the anniversary would damage the credibility of the Indian State in the eyes of its own people and the international community and strengthen their support base.

2. While it is primarily the responsibility of the State's security agencies to thwart in time any fresh conspiracy by the terrorists, the public will have a useful role to play by sharing with the agencies any information or suspicious activity coming to its notice. The state agencies should create an awareness of the kind of role the public can play and as to how to convey any information or suspicions to the State agencies. Successful counter-terrorism depends on effective State-public co-operation.


3. We have not had any terrorist strike by the IM and SIMI for 14 months now and by the LET and other Pakistani organisations in the Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir for almost 12 months now. The credit for this should go to our intelligence and physical security agencies and the police. It is not that fresh conspiracies were not being hatched in Indian and Pakistani territories. They were, but these were thwarted by the success of the intelligence agencies and the police in identifying and neutralising the cells which might have played a role in the execution of these conspiracies.

4.The recent arrests of two persons resident in Chicago by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on a charge of trying to assist the LET and Ilyas Kashmiri, a former officer of Pakistan's Special Services Group (SSG), who has emerged as another Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), in carrying out a terrorist strike in Denmark and a repeat of 26/11 in India show that the conspiracies are not confined to the sub-continent. They extend to Europe and North America where there is a large diaspora of migrants from Pakistan and the rest of the Islamic world and some local converts to Islam, who are prepared to assist Al Qaeda, the LET and their associates in carrying out their plans.

5.Even in 2003, the LET had wanted to mount a terrorist strike in India by using recruits in the US, but its plans were detected and foiled in time by the FBI. India has reasons to be thankful to the US agencies for their alertness and for their co-operation in preventing fresh strikes. Strengthened, active and discreet Indo-US co-operation in counter-terrorism has been a significant post-26/11 feature. The US may be still reluctant to act against the Government of Pakistan for continuing to use terrorism against India, but it has given indications of its determination to help India in preventing a repeat of 26/11 in whatever way it can. The strong technical capability of the US agencies and the ground capability of the Indian agencies for human intelligence should help in the efforts to prevent a repeat of 26/11.

6.In counter-terrorism, it is important to avoid over-confidence and self-complacency. Any planning should factor into it the possibility that despite all the precautions and enhanced vigilance by the intelligence agencies, some terrorist conspiracies may still escape detection by the intelligence agencies. As the post 9/11 cliches goes, in counter-terrorism the agencies know what they know, but they don't know what they don't know.

7. While the agencies will be making every effort to reduce the zone of "what they don't know", it will not be possible to eliminate it altogethrer. That is where the importance of vulnerability perceptions and reviews comes in. Vulnerability perceptions help in denying success to the terrorists even if one doesn't detect in time terrorist conspiracies. Capacity-building, physical security and alertness play an important role in this. The foiled attacks on the Indian Parliament House in December,2001, and on Ahmedabad's Akshardam temple in September 2002 are good examples of how success can be denied to terrorists through effective physical security based on vulnerability perceptions.

8. Physical security reviews based on vulnerability perceptions have to be an on-going process. Vulnerability identification and follow-up action to plug gaps in physical security become a difficult exercise in India because of its large size and the hundreds of potentially soft targets available in our metro cities. Despite this, a constantly updated vulnerability map is a must to prevent a repeat of 26/11.

9.A continuous modus operandi (MO) review is as important as a vulnerability review. The terrorists oprerating in the Af-Pak region keep changing the MO to make their terrorist strikes more lethal and to take the security agencies by surprise. The MO used by them after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 is a mix of the old and the new----use of hand-held weapons and improvised explosive devices, commando-style attacks, simultaneous or orchestrated attacks of a complex nature on multiple targets, suicidal (fedayeen) and suicide attacks and so on. The training and re-training of our security agencies and police must enable them to meet the changing MO of the terrorists.

10. IEDs did not play as important a role in the 26/11 terrorist strikes as they did in the July,2006, terrorist attacks on Mumbai suburban trains.Of course, the IM and the SIMI relied largely on IEDs, but the Pakistani associates of Al Qaeda were using more and more complex commando-style attacks with hand-held weapons, the most spectacular of which were the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore earlier this year and the recent attack on the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army at Rawalpindi. Some of the terrorist attacks in the Af-Pak region after the GHQ attack show that the terrorists are shifting once again to vehicular bombs involving large quantities of explosives. These attacks show the continuing availability of large quantities of explosives to the terrorists operating in the sub-continent.

11.While the Indian and US security agencies have a welcome record of increasing successes in detecting and neutralising terrorist cells before they can go into action, they have had little success in detecting and neutralising potential sources of supply of explosive material. This is a weak point in our counter-terrorism capability which needs the individual and joint attention of the Indian and US agencies.

12. Pre-conceived ideas and facile assumptions have no place in counter-terrorism such as the following---- the next attack may also come from the sea, the potential targets mentioned by terrorists under interrogation such as the National Defence College reportedly mentioned by the two Chicago suspects may be the real targets etc. Al Qaeda, the LET and their associates train their recruits and volunteers in ways of misleading the security agencies and the police when caught.

13.These are some of the points needing attention as we strengthen our alertness on the eve of the 26/11 anniversary. It is important for the Government to set in place a scenario-anticipation group to evaluate continuously the likely scenarios to improve our preparedness. ( 5-11-09)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

MUMBAI 26/11: A DAY OF INFAMY

May like to see http://news.rediff.com/report/2009/nov/02/b-raman-takes-a-look-at-2611.htm